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This dissertation develops a new approach that enables policy-makers to analyze 
welfare gains from improvements in the quality of infrastructure services in developing 
countries where data are limited and supply is subject to interruptions. With the tight 
budgetary constraints that usually exist, it is important to be able to prioritize public 
sector investments on the basis of expected benefits. However, policy analysts are rarely 
able to measure the benefits of improving the quality of infrastructure services, even 
though they may yield large welfare benefits. The most frequently cited reason for 
failures to carry out such welfare analysis is the scarcity of data on service quality.  
The main contribution of this dissertation is a new model of welfare evaluation of 
changes in the quality of infrastructure services. This model is estimated using the 
existing data from household energy surveys or data from the energy sections of multi-
purpose household surveys. Potential applications of this model range from ex-ante 
reform evaluation to ex-post monitoring of policy outcomes, which makes this approach 
a useful contribution to policy analysis and to the literature on welfare evaluation of 
quality changes in infrastructure. 
An application of the proposed model in the former Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan 
demonstrates how this approach can be used in welfare assessment of energy sector 
reforms. The planned reforms in Azerbaijan include a set of measures that will result in a 
significant improvement in supply reliability, accompanied by a significant increase in 
the prices of energy services so that they reach the cost recovery level. Currently, 
households in rural areas receive electricity and gas for only a few hours a day because of 
a severe deterioration of the energy infrastructure following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The reforms that have recently been initiated will have far-reaching poverty and 
distributional consequences for the country as they result in an improvement in supply 
reliability and an increase in energy prices.  
The new model of intermittent supply developed in this dissertation is based on 
the household production function approach and draws on previous research in the energy 
reliability literature. Since modern energy sources (network gas and electricity) in 
Azerbaijan are cleaner and cheaper than the traditional fuels (fuel wood, etc.), households 
choose modern fuels whenever they are available. During outages, they rely on traditional 
fuels. Theoretical welfare measures are derived from a system of fuel demands that takes 
into account the intermittent availability of energy sources.  
The model is estimated with the data from the Azerbaijan Household Energy 
Survey, implemented by the World Bank in December 2003/January 2004. This survey 
includes an innovative contingent behavior module in which the respondents were asked 
about their energy consumption patterns in specified reform scenarios. Estimation results 
strongly indicate that households in the areas with poor supply quality have a high 
willingness to pay for reliability improvements. However, a relatively small group of 
households may incur substantial welfare losses from an electricity price increase even 
when it is combined with a partial reliability improvement. Unlike an earlier assessment 
of the same reforms in Azerbaijan, analysis in this dissertation clearly shows that targeted 
investments in improving service reliability may be the best way to mitigate adverse 
welfare consequences of electricity price increases. Hence, policymakers should focus 
their attention on ensuring that quality improvements are a central component of power 
sector reforms.    
Survey evidence also shows that, although households may incur sizable welfare 
losses from indoor air pollution when they rely on traditional fuels, they do not recognize 
indoor air pollution as a factor contributing to the high incidence of respiratory illness 
among fuel wood users. Therefore, benefits may be greater if policy interventions that 
improve the reliability of modern energy sources are combined with an information 
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1  Introduction 
 
Transition economies have witnessed radical changes in the energy sector in the last 
decade. In many countries electricity service quality has deteriorated most notably due to 
unanticipated interruptions in supply, while many households have lost their supply of 
network gas completely. The service quality deterioration has been especially severe in 
the poor countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). 
Deterioration has been caused by the lack of investment in the energy infrastructure in the 
former Soviet countries since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the disruptions in 
energy exchange and trade between the newly independent countries.  
The reforms that have begun in the electricity sector in the former Soviet 
countries have resulted in an increase in electricity tariffs and, in some cases, also in an 
improvement in service quality, particularly in the capital cities. The pace of reforms 
differs by country. For example, Armenia and Moldova have already implemented 
substantial electricity price increases, while Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have yet to raise 
the electricity tariff to the cost recovery level, estimated to be around 4.5-5.5 US 
cents/kWh (Table 1).  
Table 1. Average residential electricity tariffs (current US cents/kWh). 1/ 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Armenia 0.48 2.46 2.90 3.36 3.80 4.67 4.63 4.50 4.36 
Azerbaijan 0.02 0.06 0.42 1.26 2.48 2.33 2.15 2.06 1.99 
Georgia Na na 1.55 2.35 2.41 2.31 2.40 2.60 2.98 
Hungary 3.00 4.34 4.65 5.40 5.69 5.94 6.59 6.59 6.79 
Kazakhstan 2.12 3.25 3.19 4.63 4.78 3.15 2.68 2.57 2.53 
Moldova 2.00 2.00 2.83 4.76 4.66 4.37 4.67 4.82 4.94 
Poland 5.53 5.73 7.18 7.23 6.59 6.79 6.52 6.63 7.78 
Note: 1/ These are nominal tariffs converted into US currency using the current exchange rate.  
Nominal electricity tariff remained at AZM 96 in Azerbaijan, and the observed reduction after  
1998 is due to exchange rate fluctuations.  
Source: Data are provided by local consultants for the World Bank study Power’s Promise, 2004. 
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At a time when some people are cash constrained because of wage and pension 
arrears, a drastic electricity tariff increase may mean a significant welfare burden for 
some households. At the same time, others may benefit from an improvement in service 
quality if they can afford the higher-priced electricity service. The focus of my 
dissertation is on the reforms in Azerbaijan, a former Soviet Republic located east of 
Turkey on the coast of the Caspian Sea (see Map 1.1).  
Map 1.1 Azerbaijan on a political map of the region. 
   
     Source:  Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection 2003 (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/asia.html).  
     Note: The area in the Southwest is Naxichevan, and is separated from the rest of the country by the 
      
     territory of Armenia. 
Reforms in the energy sector may affect the welfare of consumers through a 
change in the price of service, coverage, and service quality. Methodologies for 
evaluating the welfare impact of a change in price or access to service via a new 
connection are well established. Evaluation of the welfare impact of a service quality 
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change, however, is more complicated and ideally requires accurate data on pre- and 
post-reform service quality, which are rarely available. If the anticipated outcome of 




ted by including only the gains from a price decline and omitting the welfare gains 
from a service quality improvement unambiguously provide a lower bound of the 
benefits. This is a likely reform scenario in the countries where increased competition 
following de-monopolization and unbundling of the utilities into separate distribution, 
transmission and generation entities is expected to lower the price of service. However, if 
the welfare effects of the price and quality changes are in opposite directions, omitting 
the quality component may lead to policy conclusions that are wrong even qualitatively. 
Yet in project and policy analysis, methodology is lacking for estimation of the welfare 
change from service quality improvement or deterioration. The main reason is scarcity of 
data on service quality and ambiguity about the appropriate methods to analyze th
ted welfare effects. 
The main contribution of this dissertation is an analytical framework to analyze 
the effects of service quality changes due to infrastructure reforms. A structured 
methodology is developed for theoretical and empirical measurement of the welfare 
effects of reforms in the energy sector that affect the reliability of supply. The model of 
intermittent supply developed here can be estimated using the existing data from 
household energy surveys or data from the energy sections of multi-purpose household 
surveys when various data are missing. Potential applications of this model range from ex 
ante reform evaluation to ex post monitoring of policy outcomes. Broad applicability and 
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fairly modest data requirements make this approach a useful contribution to policy 
analysis and to the literature on welfare evaluation of quality changes in infrastructure. 
In this dissertation, I use the model of intermittent supply to assess the welfare 
impact of reforms in the electricity sector in Azerbaijan. As a legacy of central planning, 
residential energy supply is still heavily subsidized in Azerbaijan and electricity prices 
are below the cost-recovery level. Lack of adequate financing for new investments and 
maintenance of energy infrastructure has led to a severe deterioration in the quality of 
energy supply, and service interruptions have become wide-spread in many parts of the 
country. The reforms of the electricity sector envisage a substantial price increase of 
approximately 50 percent in 2006 and equally large increases in subsequent years until 
electricity prices reach the cost-recovery level. Electric utility companies would 
presumably use the additional proceeds to make investments in improvement of supply 
reliability. Thus, the reforms hold the promise of a higher quality level at a higher price. 
A dramatic price increase at this scale, however, could have serious consequences for the 
poverty level in the country. The fear of social consequences and broad-based opposition 
to reforms stall the efforts of the government to proceed with the unpopular price 
increase. The main policy objective of this dissertation is to assess the relative magnitude 
of the losses from a price increase and the gains from quality improvement. Another 
objective is to identify the losers and make policy recommendations about whether it will 
be necessary to devise a social protection scheme to mitigate the losses of these 
households. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the 
reform program in the energy sector in Azerbaijan and basic facts about the energy 
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sector, and discusses the political factors influencing the pace of reforms. Chapter 3 is a 
detailed discussion of the data sources used in this dissertation. Chapter 4 describes the 
nationally representative pattern of energy consumption by Azeri households and sets the 
stage for an evaluation of the welfare impact of reforms in subsequent chapters. It also 
draws preliminary policy conclusions. The literature review in chapter 5 puts the problem 
of poor reliability of electricity supply in the broader theoretical prospective of the 
literature in environmental and energy economics. Chapter 6 is the main contribution of 
this dissertation. It presents the new model for empirical examination of intermittent 
supply. Contrary to the conventional approach, the discussion of the data precedes the 
literature review and a chapter describing the theoretical model, because data availability 
plays a key role in the choice of a modeling approach proposed in this dissertation.  
Chapter 7 describes the results of model estimation using household survey data from 
Azerbaijan. Chapter 8 presents analysis of policy simulations based on the model 
estimated in chapter 7. Chapter 9 presents conclusions of the analysis.  
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2 Household energy consumption in Azerbaijan: Background  
The transmission and distribution networks in Azerbaijan were originally designed to 
provide almost universal access to electricity. However, the power sector has suffered 
from inadequate funding to perform essential maintenance functions, resulting in a severe 
deterioration of the quality of supply and frequent rolling blackouts of electricity.1 The 
power sector in Azerbaijan is in dire need of investment. By some estimates, investment 
needs exceed $475 million in order to meet the future energy demand in Azerbaijan. Over 
half of this amount would be required before 2007.2  
Furthermore, the state-owned electricity company Azerenerji, which manages 
electricity generation and distribution, is not financially viable.3 At the current tariff 
levels it is unable to meet its cash flow requirements and it receives budgetary financing 
for the purchase of fuel for domestic electricity generation and for imported electricity. 
These transfers to Azerenerji represent a heavy budgetary burden. By some estimates, the 
cost of the quasi-fiscal transfers to the energy sector in Azerbaijan exceeded 10 percent of 
GDP per annum during the second half of the 1990s. This amount is greater than the total 
annual spending on pensions and social assistance programs, which average 5-6 percent 
of GDP (World Bank 2004, 2005). 
 
                                                 
1 The power sector as used here refers only to electricity. 
 
2 These estimates are from a least-cost planning study, concluded in 2003 by Burns and Roe Inc. and 
funded by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank 2005). 
 
3 This company manages generation and transmission. Distribution activities are grouped in four regional 
distribution companies, two of which are privately operated under concession agreements. A private 
company, Barmek Holding AS, has managed the Baku and Sumgayit power distribution networks since 
2002 and 2003, respectively, and the state-owned Baku High Voltage Electrical Equipment Company 
manages the Ali-Bayramli and Ganja networks (World Bank 2005). 
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Historical background, institutional setting and reforms in the power sector 
During the Soviet period, the provision of network gas was nearly universal whenever it 
was technically feasible. Thus, the gas network extended everywhere except for the 
remote rural and mountainous areas. Gas was provided by Russia at highly subsidized 
prices. The rising cost of imported gas from Russia in recent years and the poor condition 
of gas pipelines in Azerbaijan have led to gas shortages, leaving some rural areas entirely 
without access to gas during the last decade, as shown in Table 2.1 and Map 2.1.  
For example, although 79 percent of households have gas connections and had 
gas supply in the past, only 56 percent receive gas at least part of the time. According to 
the 2003 Household Energy Survey data, gas is available 20 hours a day during the 
winter for those with gas supply, and almost a quarter of all households with gas supply 
experience service interruptions. Even when gas is supplied, the pressure is sufficient for 
only one fifth of the households. 
Table 2.1 Gas supply quality by region. 
 
 Share of households that report 
having gas 
Average hours per day gas is 
available 
  
Connection Supply Interruptions 
(last two weeks) 
Good pressure 
(last two weeks)
during winter during summer
Alibayramly 100% 91% 33% 42% 22 23 
Baku 99% 94% 27% 38% 23 24 
Ganja 95% 71% 70% 45% 14 16 
Goycay 95% 23% 17% 4% 17 22 
Guba 63% 25% 3% 0% 23 24 
Imishly 0% 0% 0% 0% - - 
Ismailly 98% 40% 3% 10% 24 24 
Mingecev 100% 100% 100% 18% 10 11 
Sabirabad 37% 10% 3% 2% 23 24 
Sumgayit 100% 99% 24% 25% 21 23 
       
Total 79% 56% 23% 19% 20 22 





Map 2.1 The quality of gas supply in Azerbaijan. 
 
Note: Dark blue denotes areas where gas is supplied to an entire administrative district (called rayon), 
turquoise – only to district center, red – gas is not supplied, shaded or gray – no data.  
Source: Created by GeoData, U.K. (2004) using information published in a local newspaper about gas 
supply in 2003 (Azerbaycan. No. 57. March 10, 2004).  
 
Having lost their supply of natural gas, around 40 percent of households in urban 
areas now use electricity as either the primary or secondary source of heating (see chapter 
4). Electricity is produced in Azerbaijan by thermal stations using natural gas and oil or 
by hydropower stations. Because of energy losses in the process of conversion, it is 
inefficient to use electricity for heating from the economy-wide point of view.  
The government has recently embarked on a path of market reforms in the 
provision of utility services to address the supply problems and financial insolvency of 
the energy company. The reform objective is to eliminate the sizable fiscal burden of 
subsidizing utility companies and to improve consumption efficiency while releasing 
funds for much needed investments in upgrading energy supply systems. The key 
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components of the government strategy are the promotion of private participation in the 
provision of utility services and the establishment of a tariff policy to raise the price of 
utility services to the full cost recovery level.4 In addition, the government is planning to 
introduce metering to all households whose consumption of utility services is currently 
not metered.5 The anticipated reforms will affect electricity and gas. They will also affect 
municipal water supply, but water sector reforms are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
The prices of utility services are regulated by the tariff-setting commission in the 
Ministry of Economic Development, which acts as the regulatory body for the entities 
that provide utility services. In the course of reforms, the residential price of natural gas 
will rise four-fold and for electricity it will rise more than two-fold over the next five 
years. The price of natural gas to residential consumers has already more than doubled 
from AZM 35,560 per 1,000 m3 in 2003 to AZM 81,000 in 2004. This is still below the 
full cost recovery price, calculated as approximately AZM 140,000-150,000 per 1,000 
m3. A further price increase will be necessary over the medium term to meet this 
benchmark. The residential electricity price has remained unchanged at AZM 96 (or 
approximately 2.0 US cents depending on the exchange rate) per kWh in spite of the 
earlier intentions of the government to implement a price increase. 
In the recent “Letter of Development Policy,” the government has committed to 
eliminate all financial support for the provision of electricity, gas, and water services and 
                                                 
4 See the “Letter of Development Policy for the Poverty Reduction Support Credit” (PRSC-I, 2005) (World 
Bank 2005). 
 
5 As shown in Appendix Table 4.8, less than half of residential electricity and gas consumption is metered, 
and most metered households are in the Barmek utility company’s service area covering Baku, Sumgayit 
and the rest of the Absheron Peninsula. 
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to achieving full cost recovery tariffs by 2010. The reform option that appears the most 
plausible envisages a 50 percent increase in wholesale electricity tariffs (from 71 
AZM/kWh to 106.5 AZM/kWh) effective in 2006, with equal annual percentage 
increases thereafter in order to reach full cost recovery, estimated at 174 AZM/kWh, by 
the end of 20106 (World Bank 2005). 
Social cost-benefit analysis of power sector reforms 
The reform process has been slow. The nominal electricity price has remained constant, 
even though in 2003 the government planned to implement pricing reforms no later than 
2005.7 Raising residential electricity prices is a politically sensitive issue, met with great 
social opposition. If the reforms are to be successful, the government needs to build a 
strong constituency of support of reforms, a daunting challenge for an unstable 
government. The most effective approach to building such a constituency is to ensure that 
the distributional objectives of reforms are well addressed and that an increase in prices 
indeed leads to better service quality. To achieve this, the government may need to 
develop an effective social protection scheme to mitigate the adverse effect of an increase 
in electricity prices on the most vulnerable households and set clear targets of improving 
service quality. Even then, the reform process will meet strong opposition as many low 
income households will probably be ineligible for compensation, given that the poverty 
rate has been estimated at 50 percent in 2001 and 45 percent in 2002. Fiscal resources to 
finance transfers on such a scale, if necessary, are not likely to become available (World 
                                                 
6 The residential prices are expected to increase in similar proportion to the wholesale electricity prices and 
reach the full cost recovery level of about 4.5-5.5 US cents/kWh by 2010. 
 
7 “Letter of Intent of the Government of Azerbaijan,” April 21, 2003. 
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Bank 2005).8 Furthermore, identifying the poor is highly problematic, especially in 
countries such as Azerbaijan where income is not accurately reported and much of it is 
from non-formal employment. 
The existing cost-benefit analysis of the proposed reforms assumes that the gains 
from higher service quality will outweigh the losses from higher prices, simply because 
the government has committed to use the budgetary resources currently used to support 
the energy company to better protect vulnerable households (World Bank 2005). 
However, many households who do not receive support will not experience welfare gains 
as a result of the on-going reforms, because to them the losses from a price increase may 
exceed the potential gains from an improvement in quality. Whether the welfare gains 
from a reliability improvement exceed the losses from a price increase remains to be 
determined empirically and is one of the goals of this dissertation. 
In the capital, Baku, and other big cities, the welfare gains from electricity 
reforms will likely be small because service quality is already high in the sense that 
electricity is available 24 hours a day with very few interruptions. In most other areas, 
electricity supply is often interrupted, especially in a large part of the rural communities. 
Rural households in Azerbaijan experience frequent outages in electricity supply, with 
the rural areas receiving electricity an average of only 9 hours per day during the winter 
(Table 2.2).9 The evidence about low daily hours of supply of electricity (and gas) is 
                                                 
8 An on-going World Bank-financed technical assistance project aims to help the government improve the 
social protection system with better targeting of social assistance payments than with the current system. 
However, only a small share of the poor households will most likely be covered by such a program given 
the high poverty rate in the country. 
 
9 Unlike the somewhat higher estimates in the 2004 Energy Survey, the 2002 World Bank Rural 
Infrastructure Survey reports that households received electricity an average of 4 hours per day. 
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confirmed by the nationally representative 2004 Household Budget Survey (Appendix 
Table 2.1). 
Table 2.2 Electricity supply quality by region. 
 Hours per day of electricity availability   Share of households that experienced 










damage due to 
fluctuations 
Alibayramly 17 22  21% 46% 17% 
Baku 24 24  18% 71% 74% 
Ganja 10 22  43% 68% 3% 
Goycay 15 18  19% 42% 22% 
Guba 9 15  38% 90% 28% 
Imishly 8 20  25% 90% 0% 
Ismailly 18 21  13% 77% 17% 
Mingecev 9 21  27% 86% 0% 
Sabirabad 8 20  31% 78% 1% 
Sumgayit 24 24  30% 67% 55% 
       
Total 16 21  25% 72% 31% 
Source: 2003 Azerbaijan Household Energy Survey. 
 
Even if electricity is supplied in the rural areas, the voltage is sometimes 
insufficient to operate certain electric appliances, and appliance damage due to outages 
and voltage fluctuations is commonplace.10 Appliance damage causes a further welfare 
loss for households, but its measurement requires detailed data on the types and costs of 
appliances that were damaged by the fluctuations. Since such data are not available for 
Azerbaijan, this dissertation cannot consider this aspect of the welfare losses. Most likely 
that will not significantly affect the results since the appliance costs are low relative to 




                                                 
10 Low voltage in rural areas means that even light is barely bright enough to read. Much greater voltage is 
required for heating or cooking. (Personal communication with 2004 Energy Survey interviewer 
supervisors, March, 2004.) For statistics on fluctuations, see Table 2.2.  
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Factors determining household choice of fuels 
Household choice of fuels is determined mainly by the availability of network fuels and 
reliability of supply because network energy sources are cleaner and less expensive than 
fossil fuels. Heating oil, dung, and fuel wood, if they are purchased, are the most 
expensive fuels when their market prices are converted into the price per kilogram of oil 
equivalent and adjusted for the efficiency of using a particular fuel for cooking or 
heating.  
As shown in Table 2.3, at current prices, natural gas is by far the cheapest cooking 
and heating alternative based on the energy content and conversion efficiency. Electricity 
is the second cheapest alternative for heating, followed by wood, LPG, and kerosene. For 
cooking, the order is similar except that LPG is cheaper than wood, and charcoal is the 
most expensive fuel after adjusting for energy content and appliance efficiency. Gas and 
electricity, in that order, are clearly the preferred energy sources when they are available, 
but energy sector reforms are expected to change these relationships. 
Table 2.3 Energy prices in Azerbaijan, 2004 1/ 
























35.56  0 $    0.01 0.833 $      0.01 0.60 $    0.01 
Electricity 
(kWh) 
96  0 $    0.02 0.085 $      0.23 0.75 $    0.31 
LPG (kg) 1,000  69 $    0.20 0.635 $      0.32 0.37 $    0.86 
Wood (kg) 100  52 $    0.02 0.056 $      0.36 0.25 $    1.46 
Kerosene 
(liter) 
900  566 $    0.18 0.288 $      0.64 0.35 $    1.82 
Dung (kg) 750  313 $    0.15 0.341 $      0.45 0.12 $    3.74 
Note: 1/ It is assumed here that 1 cubic meter of fuel wood (which costs on average AZM 20,000) 
contains 300 kg of dry wood; 2/ Effective price per kgoe of LPG can be lower than for wood when these 
fuels are used for heating rather than for cooking, depending what heating conversion coefficients are 
applied (e.g., relative fuel costs reported in Environmental Resources Management 2002). 
Source: Calculated from 2004 HBS data and converted into kilogram of oil equivalents (kgoe) using 
energy conversion coefficients of the International Energy Agency. Cooking conversion coefficients were 
provided by Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (O’Sullivan and Barnes 2006).  
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The costs of technology adoption usually represent a significant barrier for 
switching to a different cooking or heating fuel. For example, in Bolivia the costs of 
switching from fuel wood to LPG were found to be a significant barrier. Cultural factors, 
lifestyle, cooking habits and education also explain the persistence of fuel wood use when 
LPG is available (Israel 2002). However, the situation is different in Azerbaijan. A recent 
survey of appliances utilized by households in the North of Azerbaijan shows that most 
appliances are home made. Surprisingly, this is true not only of the appliances that use 
fuel wood, but also electricity and, to some extent, even LPG (Environmental Resources 
Management 2002).11 Clearly, more sophisticated appliances are also used in Baku and 
some other areas of the country. However the low-cost alternatives are always available 
for use as long as the fuels to operate them are supplied. In fact, due to intermittent 
supply, most households have the appliances, primitive as they may be, that are necessary 
to switch readily from one fuel source to another when gas or electricity supply is 
interrupted. Consequently, the cost of appliances and cultural factors are a less significant 
determinant of fuel choice in Azerbaijan than in typical developing countries. 
Summary and conclusions 
To sum up this chapter’s findings, the Government of Azerbaijan has initiated a series of 
market reforms in the public utilities sector with the aim of improving the financial 
viability of utility companies and the quality of services provision. Although electricity 
pricing is not the only reform on the agenda, and the natural gas and public water 
                                                 
11 Out of 120 households sampled in the 2002 Environmental Resources Management (ERM) Appliance 
Survey, 100 percent of cookers, ovens and heaters were found to use fuel wood or electricity and 17 
percent of LPG cookers were home made. For example, an electric heater is simply a spiral and an electric 
oven is a simple appliance consisting of a spiral attached to a metal box. Appliances that use network gas 
are factory-made but households with a working supply of network gas either already own a gas stove, or 
they can purchase it as cheaply as US$8. Several other models of gas cookers and heaters are available for 
purchase, with the prices ranging from US$8 for a Turkish cooker to US$120 for a Spanish-Iranian butane 
water heating unit (ERM, 2002). 
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supplies will also undergo reforms, electricity pricing reforms are a highly sensitive area 
from the social point of view. The slow process of reforms in this area attests to the 
significant obstacles faced by government and regulator alike. Even if reforms reduce the 
gaps between the prices of network and non-network energy sources, given how wide 
these gaps are at present, relative fuel prices are not likely to change in the near term. 
Network gas and electricity are very inexpensive in Azerbaijan and even after a 
significant price increase they will remain the preferred energy sources for a majority of 
Azeri households, as other factors such as appliance costs and cultural factors do not 
appear to impede consumption of network energy.  
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Appendix to chapter 2: Reliability of electricity supply 
 
Appendix Table 2.1 Average number of hours electricity and network gas are available. 
 Electricity  Network gas 
  Cities Towns Rural areas  Cities Towns Rural areas 
Poorest 20% 18.9 13.3 9.9  18.1 15.9 20.8 
2 17.3 13.2 9.3  16.9 16.4 19.5 
3 18.7 12.6 9.4  17.6 15.9 18.1 
4 18.8 12.2 9.4  17.3 16.4 19.2 
Richest 20% 19.6 16.3 9.9  19.1 18.2 20.2 
Total 18.8 13.2 9.6  17.9 16.4 19.6 
Note: Averages are for households that use electricity and network gas, respectively. 











3 Recent household energy surveys and other sources of data 
 
Data sources 
The main sources of data for this dissertation are the 2004 Azerbaijan Household Budget 
Survey (HBS) and the 2003 Azerbaijan Household Energy Survey (HES). The HBS is a 
nationally representative survey that is implemented quarterly by the State Statistics 
Committee (SCC) of Azerbaijan. In the second quarter of 2004, the SCC included a 
detailed module on energy consumption in addition to the other modules in the regular 
questionnaire. This chapter uses the HBS data collected through the energy module to 
present a nationally representative picture of the patterns of energy use by households in 
Azerbaijan. Chapter 4 uses these data to examine the relationship between energy use and 
household income. The second source of data is the 2003 HES. It is the main source of 
data used for the estimation described in chapters 7 and 8. These two data sources and 
their overlap as well as some related data are described in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Description of data sources. 
Data source Observations Available information and comments 
2004 Household 
Budget Survey (2nd 
quarter data) 
2,111 This module contains energy consumption and supply quality 
information, as well as data on self-collected fuels (fuel wood 
and dung). After merging the module with the remaining 
modules of the 2004 2nd quarter HBS, housing structure, 
demographic and expenditure information are also available 
for all households. 
2003 Household 
Energy Survey 
2,000 This survey contains housing structure, demographic data, 
income, actual and hypothetical electricity consumption and 
actual gas and fossil fuel consumption and price data. Few 
households report time costs and other information related to 
fuel collection. The survey does not contain accurate 
information on total expenditures.  
Monthly electric 
utility household-
level billing and 
payment records  




These data include monthly billing and payment records from 
January 2002 to December 2003 for most households that 
were included in the HES. 
Subsample of the 
2003 HES that is also 
in the 2002 HBS 
504 This subsample allows constructing an empirical relationship 
between total expenditures and variables that are in both the 
HBS and the HES, which permits imputing total expenditures 
for households with missing total expenditures in the HES.  
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The HES was implemented by the World Bank in December 2003 and January 
2004 as part of the Poverty and Social Impact Assessment of the planned energy reforms 
in Azerbaijan (World Bank 2004). The HES sample includes a total of 2,000 households, 
of which 1,210 are in the urban and 790 in the rural areas of Azerbaijan. It contains 
detailed household-level data on the consumption of all types of energy in the current and 
the hypothetical reform scenarios. In addition, it includes information on housing 
conditions, demographics, and a detailed income section. There is also an overlap of 504 
households between the 2003 HES sample and the 2002 HBS sample. Since the HBS 
contains a detailed expenditure module, and the HES contains only income, this overlap 
provides a source of more accurate information on the level of welfare in terms of 
permanent income.12
By design, the 2003 HES is not representative at the national level because this 
survey did not collect a statistically representative sample of all households in the 
country, unlike the case of the HBS. Instead, the HES sampled households from several 
regions of the country with access to different combinations of energy sources. The 
sample was drawn according to the following dimensions: access to gas, availability of 
fuel wood (proximity to forest areas), and the type of area (rural or urban). Thus, the 
survey data include sub-samples of approximately equal size from four types of areas: 
regions with a good supply of network gas, areas without a reliable network gas supply 
                                                 
12 Reliability of the consumption aggregates in the HBS and therefore of the poverty measures in 
Azerbaijan have been questioned because of a very low income inequality (Gini coefficient ranging from 
0.09 to 0.32) obtained when these aggregates are used as a proxy of household income. A recent evaluation 
of the data quality in the HBS concluded that the sample design, data collection and supervision practices 
were satisfactory. The interviewers were very consistent in the three years 2002, 2003 and 2004 when the 
survey was conducted, and the survey data satisfy such basic empirical regularities as Engel’s Law. The 
food share is inversely related to the logarithm of total consumption expenditures. (“Assessment of 
Household Budget Survey Data in Azerbaijan.” World Bank (2006), mimeographed). 
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but with reliable electricity service, areas where neither electricity nor gas supply is 
available but which are forest-rich and have easy access to wood, and areas without a 
reliable supply of any of the above energy sources where the use of dung is common.  
The areas included in the 2003 HES can be categorized into geographic zones. 
The first zone is the Absheron Peninsula (Baku, Sumgayit and Ali-Bayramly), the second 
zone consists of Guba, Ismailly and Goycay in the North, the third zone includes 
Sabirabad and Imishly in the South and the forth zone is Mingechevir and Ganja City. 
The Absheron Peninsula has the most reliable supply of gas and electricity. The second 
and third zones have poor supply of gas and electricity. While the second zone has 
abundant forest resources, forests in the fourth zone have been degraded. The fourth zone 
is fairly similar to the Absheron Peninsula in terms of fuel availability. These zones and 
the breakdown of the sample are shown in Map 3.1 and Table 3.2. 
 






















The 2003 HES data include detailed 
information about the consumption levels of market 
fuels, network gas and electricity by season, 
demographic characteristics, and energy prices. These 
prices are used in conjunction with the information 
available from other sources on the energy content and 
conversion efficiency of different fuel types for 
heating, cooking and lighting uses to calculate effective 
prices of fuels from different sources. Other information included in the 2003 HES 
questionnaire is summarized in Table 3.3. 















Table 3.3 Summary of the information contained in the 2003 HES. 
Survey section Available information and comments 
Housing 
characteristics 
Type of housing, number of rooms, type of insulation and other information 
about housing conditions. 
Electricity usage Quality of electricity supply, average daily hours of uninterrupted supply in 
winter and summer, information about damage to electric appliances due to 
voltage fluctuations, last month’s (i.e., December) electricity bill and detailed 
information about the hours of use of each electric appliance in the current 
scenario and in the reform scenario. 
Gas usage Quality of gas supply and whether it is available, average daily hours of supply 
in winter and summer, last month’s bill, and information about gas pressure. 
Fuel wood usage Information about fuel wood use and collection, quantity of wood collected and 
collection costs (monetary and time expenditures), distance to the site of 
collection, mode of transportation, type of wood collected, information about 
the last wood purchase (quantity and expenditures), as well as information about 
usage of each wood stove. Note that information on the expenditures associated 
with fuel wood collection is very poor as it is illegal to collect wood on public 
grounds, and households were reluctant to respond to these questions. 
General patterns of 
fuel use 
Average quantities and the corresponding cost of each non-network fuel (LPG, 
kerosene/heating oil, and dung) consumed in an average winter month and in an 




Contingent behavior questions about fuel choice and hours of use of each 
electric appliance that is currently owned or that will be purchased in the reform 
scenario. Each household was asked about its consumption of electricity and 
substitute fuels only in one scenario, with the price bids specified in the scenario 
varying by respondent. Information on consumption of substitute fuels in the 
reform scenario is poor because few households replied to those questions. 
Household 
characteristics 
Total expenditures of the household in the past month including food and non-
food expenditures but excluding durable items, education level of the 
respondent, household size; age, employment status, occupation and salary or 
pension of each household member; household income by source. 
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The average quantities of market fuels, such as fuel wood, kerosene, heating oil 
and LPG, are reported in the survey for a typical winter and summer month. Using these 
data for estimations in this dissertation allows controlling for seasonal differences in 
energy demand. The survey also contains information on the average number of hours of 
electricity and gas supply in the previous month, which will be the basis for measuring 
supply reliability. In order to enable the imputation of the shadow price of fuel wood for 
households that collect wood themselves, the survey includes questions on collection 
expenses and time costs. However, very few households answered these questions.13 
Thus, I valued self-collected fuel wood at the average market price of fuel wood in a 
village or settlement where a household is located. This approach is not ideal, as market 
prices of wood are likely to be an overestimate of the shadow price of wood collection. 
However, no data were available in the survey that would allow the imputation of shadow 
wages.  
Contingent behavior questions in the 2003 HES 
Electricity and gas tariffs are set at the national level and do not vary by region in 
Azerbaijan. The 2003 HES includes a contingent behavior module in order to create the 
necessary price variation from hypothetical data for estimation of the electricity demand 
function and calculation of the welfare effects of a price and reliability change. In this 
section first I describe the structure of contingent behavior questions and then I evaluate 
the plausibility of the responses. 
                                                 
13 In the 2003 HES, the households were reluctant to report the amount of wood they collect or the 
associated time and monetary costs because of legal restrictions on unauthorized harvesting of wood in 
government-owned forest and park areas. The majority of households that report use of collected wood do 
not state how much they collect nor where and at what cost it is collected. According to the information 
provided by the 2003 HES interviewer supervisors, households are more reluctant to provide such 
information in the winter than they are in the summer because of fear of the authorities. In the summer, a 
sufficient amount of time has passed so that they are less concerned about providing such information to 
the interviewers (Personal communication, 2004). 
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In the contingent behavior section, respondents are presented with a scenario in 
which electricity became available 24 hours per day, 7 days a week, and asked how much 
electricity they would consume at different price and reliability levels of electricity 
supply. As shown in Figure 3.1 for the example of electricity consumption for cooking, 
first the respondents are asked whether they already use electricity for cooking. Then they 
are presented with the reform scenario of a price increase and a reliability improvement. 
Households that already use electricity are asked whether they would decrease or increase 
their level of electricity consumption, or there would be no change. If respondents 
indicate they would change their consumption level, they are asked about the hours of use 
of each appliance they currently own, assuming the price and reliability levels specified 
in the reform scenario. Questions about new appliance purchase decisions and the 
intended usage level of those appliances are posed only to households that report they 
would increase their electricity consumption or those who don’t currently use electricity 
and would start using it in the reform scenario. Questions about heating and cooling use 
of electricity are similarly structured. The structure of questions about the use of 
electricity for lighting is simpler as respondents were not asked about their purchase of 
new light bulbs in the reform scenario.  
In order to facilitate understanding of the stated price increase, the question about 
the new consumption level after reforms asked for hours of use of each electrical 
appliance currently owned as well as the appliances that would be purchased in the 
reform scenario. In order to ensure that respondents were aware of the cost implications 
of their choices, they were shown tables with a range of possible daily hour usage of 
typical appliances, the associated costs, and the total monthly bill.  
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Figure 3.1 Structure of the contingent behavior questions (cooking). 
Currently use electricity Currently do not use electricity 









Will not start 
to use 
electricity 
Will start to 
use electricity 
New appliance 
-Ask respondent to look at the chart  
  showing operating and purchase costs 
-Then ask if they would purchase ovens, 
  stoves etc. and how many hours per day 
  they would intend to use them 
-Ask about the expected purchase price 
Ask in turn about each stove, oven, and 
refrigerator already owned: 
  -Would you continue to use it? 
  -How many hours per day will you use it 
    after the change?  
Ask the “increase” group 
Reform happens Reform happens 
 
A large share of respondents indicate that they would not change the level of their 
electricity use for lighting, heating or cooking in the reform scenario, as shown in Table 
3.4. In cases where the respondent report “no change” in the reform scenario, the current 
usage level and the resulting electricity consumption can be assigned for both the actual 
and the reform scenarios. The data on usage of appliances that are not currently owned 
and would be purchased in the reform scenario are missing for the majority of the 
respondents. Therefore, these data are insufficient to consider the long-run response of 
appliance ownership to prices and quality of supply. 
Consumption of substitute energy sources may change when electricity 
consumption falls or rises following the proposed reform. While a significant share of 
respondents report a change in the consumption of alternative energy sources, especially 
for cooking, few actually stated the amount by which consumption would be increased or 
reduced.  
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Table 3.4 Distribution of price bids by region in the 2003 HES (percent of respondents). 
 96 1/ 120 144 192 240 Total Number of 
observations 
Alibayramly  23% 29% 27% 21% 100% 100 
Baku  27% 28% 25% 21% 100% 

























% 25% 25% 22% 5% 100% 201 
Imishly % 22% 22% 24% 7% 100% 200 
Ismaill % 28% 25% 21% 5% 100% 200 
Mingechevi  19% 36% 23% 22% 100% 100 
Sabiraba 21% 26% 24% 24% 7% 100% 200 
Sumgait  27% 32% 21% 20% 100% 150 
Total 12% 
2  
24% 27% 24% 14% 100% ,000 
Number of 
s observation
32 482 538 470 278 2,000  
N nks indicate by des body corre  reg as g  curren e bid 
o t per kWh, since these a ve relatively few  inter ns an reform  
s rrent price, there wo  almo hang  the p reliab d pric
S  Azerbaija hold gy Sur
 
ids: zero, 25, 50, and 150 percent increase 
over th

















uld be st no c e from resent ility an e.  
n House  Ener vey. 
Electricity prices that households would have to pay in the reform scenario vary
random y and include the following price bl
e current price per kWh (96 Manats). Areas where there is presently no rationing 
did not receive the bid of zero price increase, as this would imply no changes at all in the 
reform scenario (Table 3.4). Importantly, survey respondents were told in the reform 
scenario that they would have to pay their monthly electricity bill in full.  
Payment discipline is not strictly enforced in Azerbaijan, although this situation is 
changing through the process of reforms that are transferring manageme
tion to private companies. Baku probably has the highest payment discipline, and 
the billing records of the private distribution company, Barmek, which is responsible for 
electricity distribution in the capital city, indicate that payment is still far from 100 
percent (Table 3.5). This situation is likely to change in the future as payment 
enforcement is one of the key issues on the reform agenda. Taking into account the low 
collection rates at the current price of 96 Manat per kWh, a price increase that is stated in 
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the 2003 HES assuming a 100 percent collection rate, as specified in the survey 
questionnaire, represents a higher effective than nominal price increase. However, it is 
likely that respondents do not believe that payment would be strictly enforced. This issue 
is further investigated in chapter 4 and requires testing in the estimation in chapter 7.  
Table 3.5 Baku previous month electricity bill payment rate. 










            Source: Barmek  utility records for a subsampl useholds in the 2003 HES. 
Plausibility of responses ngent behavior questio
Next, I el 
ctricity price and reliability 
uels to electricity or 
 electric e of ho
to conti ns 
 assess the validity of the responses to contingent behavior questions about fu
use choices in the reform scenario which posits a higher ele
level. In the urban areas where the quality of the electricity supply tends to be much 
higher than in the rural areas, most households report that they would reduce electricity 
consumption and few of them would switch to electricity in the reform scenarios (Table 
3.6). On the contrary, as shown in Table 3.6, around 10 percent of the rural households in 
Imishly and Sabirabad, the rural regions with the fewest hours of daily electricity supply, 
report that they would start using electricity in the reform scenario. Electricity supply 
tends to be unreliable in the urban areas in these regions as well, so it is not surprising 
that we observe the highest increase in electricity consumption and some incidence of 
switching to electricity in these regions even in the urban areas.  
Overall, many more respondents report that they would reduce their electricity 
consumption than those who say that they would switch from fossil f
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increas
 No change Switch Increase Reduce N 
e their electricity consumption level. This suggests that households may be more 
sensitive to the price increase than they are to an improvement in service quality. This, in 
turn, implies that, for many households, the rationing constraint due to poor supply 
reliability may not be binding, and raising the electricity price would lead to a reduction 
in consumption. I will further examine the implications of these responses in a formal 
model of household energy consumption in chapter 7. 
Table 3.6 Reported change in electricity use in the reform scenario. 1/ 
Urban:     
Alibayramly 71% 0% 0% 29% 100 
Bak
Ganja 1
t 47  0% 0% 53 1
ay 
u 66% 0% 0% 33% 499 
38% 0% 0% 62% 50 
Sumgai % % 50 
Minchegevir 67% 1% 4% 28% 100 
Goych 74% 0% 0% 26% 50 
Guba 73% 0% 0% 28% 40 
Imishly 88% 3% 10% 0% 40 
Ismailly 85% 0% 0% 15% 40 
Sabirabad 40% 3% 5% 53% 40 
Rural:      
Goychay 
y 94  0% 0% 6% 1
/ All colum er than th t indicate th e ponde  
. “Switch ns that th ondent reports he/she do  curre
icity for ooking o ting, and w start usin n the reform 
90% 1% 0% 9% 150 
Guba 92% 1% 0% 7% 160 
Imishly 61% 11% 16% 12% 160 
Ismaill % 60 
Sabirabad 41% 9% 6% 44% 160 
Note: 1 ns oth e las e percentag of res nts in
each area ” mea e resp es not ntly 
use electr
scenario. 
either c r hea ould g it i
Source: 2003 Azer  Househo ergy Survebaijan ld En y. 
 
Th electricity 
onsumpt n the reform scenarios, while the 
share o
e share of households that report they would reduce their 
c ion rises as the electricity price increases i
f those who would increase their electricity consumption or would start using it if 
they are not presently using it falls (Figure 3.3). Switching to electricity is limited largely 
to the rural areas, where the supply is currently unreliable, but would become perfectly 
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reliable in the reform scenario. These findings further reinforce the credibility of the 
contingent behavior data. 
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     Note: 1/ The bids are the stated prices per kWh in the reform scenario. 
           Source: 2003 Household Energy Survey. 
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Imputation of electricity consumption from information on the use of appliances  
Electricity consumption in kWh in the current price and reliability scenario and in the 
reform scenario is imputed using the information on hourly usage of electric appliances 
in these two scenarios. Electric appliances are used for heating, cooking, lighting, 
refrigeration and entertainment. Since households report hourly usage for each appliance 
separately, it is possible to impute electricity consumption for heating, cooking, lighting 
and refrigeration in the baseline and in the reform scenarios, using the wattage of typical 
household appliances in Azerbaijan and the information on hourly usage. Electricity use 
for other less energy-intensive purposes such as entertainment (radio, television etc.) was 
not available in the survey, with the result that total consumption is slightly 
underestimated. The resulting electricity consumption is reported in Table 3.7 both in 
terms of monthly winter kWh and in terms of the budget shares that those levels of 
consumption correspond to.  




Electricity as a percent of total monthly 
expenditures 
  All 
uses 
Heating Cooking Lighting 
2/ 
  All 
uses 
Heating Cooking Lighting 
2/ 
All households  3/ 
Unmetered 267 62 111 99  1.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 
  Metered 230 49 96 77  3.0% 0.7% 1.3% 1.0% 
Households using electricity for heating  3/ 
Unmetered 438 193 149 112  1.8% 0.9% 0.7% 0.4% 
  Metered 368 149 125 80  4.8% 2.0% 1.8% 0.9% 
Households not using electricity for heating  3/ 
Unmetered 184 0 92 93  0.9% 0% 0.4% 0.5% 
  Metered 162 0 81 76   2.1% 0% 1.1% 1.0% 
Note: 1/ Winter consumption estimates in this table are generally comparable and somewhat higher than 
summer electricity consumption estimates from the 2004 Household Budget Survey data reported in 
chapter 4; 2/ Electricity use for lighting and refrigeration is combined; 3/ The reported budget shares were 
calculated assuming that households pay their bill in full, so that actual electricity expenditures are 
proportionally lower by the amount of non-payment.  
Source: 2003 Household Energy Survey.  
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In order to assess the accuracy of the imputation of total electricity consumption 
is reliable. On average, electricity consumption calculated 
f u is 250 
kWh per month in the current scenario and h per month in the reform
This is a good approximation of actual elec
a ge tricity consum n calc ted ro com  bil eco r 
m se s in  is 2 h p ont . T ave are ate  
s ic utility company records were available, while 
the distribution of actual and impu  electr  co u n is ted i ure 
based on the hours of use of each appliance, I compare the average level and distribution 
of electricity consumption obtained from this imputation procedure with consumption 
calculated based on utility company records. In this comparison I use a sub-sample of 
metered households from the 2003 HES for whom utility records are available. As 
described in Table 3.1, the data from the 2003 HES were matched household-by-
household with the monthly billing and consumption records provided by the electric 
utility companies for a subsample of households in the survey.14 These records are more 
accurate than the self-reported payment and consumption records collected in the 2004 
Household Budget Survey.  
Thus, I used electricity consumption figures calculated from the utility company 
records to verify that imputed electricity consumption based on the reported hours of 
usage of electric appliances 




ption. As shown in Table 3.8, 
ctual avera  elec ptio ula f m the pany ling r rds fo
etered hou hold Baku 52 kW er m h hese rages calcul d for a
ubsample of households for which electr
ted icity ns mptio depic n Fig 3.2.  
                                                 
14 The 2003 HES data are supplemented by the electric utility records provided for most households for a 
two-year period from January 2002 to December 2003. The utility records contain monthly billing and 
payment by each household in the subsample. However, only the records provided by the utility company 
umgayit, gthat services two main cities, Baku and S
nce most households are metered there. 
ive an indication of actual electricity consumption, 
In other urban and in rural areas usage is not metered. Rather, the 
ill is based on normative consumption, which is calculated based on the number of electric or gas 






Table 3.8 Electricity consumption in Baku (metered households). 
  kWh/month 1/ % of total budget 
Current use 
Actual kWh (from utility records) 252  1.1% 
Imputed kWh (from hours of appliance 
use) 
250  1.3% 
Imputed kWh in reform scenario
All uses 223 3.2% 
Of which heating  49 0.6% 
                Cooking 88 1.2% 
                lighting 1/ 82 1.3% 
    Note: 1/ Electricity consumption for lighting and refrigeration were aggregated to  
Source: 2003 Household Energy Survey data and Barmek billing records for metered 
households.  
 
As shown in Figure 3.2, the distributions of actual and imputed electricity 
consumption in the current s
 represent the base load of electricity consumption.  
cenario are similar except for households with the low range 
of electricity consumption below 100 kWh.  
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Note: These histograms compare actual and imputed current electricity consumption for metered 
by dividing the total monthly bill by electricity price. Imputed electricity consumption is calculated base
on the current stated hours of usage of electric appliances.  
 
households for whom the utility company billing records were available. Actual consumption is calculated 
d 
Source: 2003 HES data and Barmek records. 
 
The discrepancy in imputed and actual electricity consumption at low 
consumption levels is not surprising. This result might be explained by the fact that 
information on hourly usage of multiple low-wattage appliances, such as radio and 
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television, was not collected in the 2003 HES, and it is excluded from usage-based 
imputed el
Imputation of total consumption expenditures 
The mode forma n total cons on expenditure, 
as this var ator of the b et share equa  However, total 
expenditures, which are used as a proxy for total income, were not available for three 
quarter ed on the 
subsamp m total 
consum
 about the relative merits of using total 
expend n 
developed countries income rather than expenditures tends to be used as a measure of 
well-being, while the reverse is true in most developing countries. The aggregate of total 
expenditures includes four components: consumption of food and non-food items, 
consumer durables and housing. In order to correctly account for expenditures on 
durables and housing, consumption of these items is usually valued at the “user cost” or 
“rental equivalent” that is usually imputed from the stock of durables rather than the 
veloping countries total consumption expenditures 
are a 
ectricity consumption. 
l estimated in chapter 7 requires in tion o umpti
iable appears in the denomin udg tions.
s of the total sample in the 2003 HES and had to be imputed bas
le of 504 households. This subsample includes households for who
ption was available in the 2003 HES and in the 2002 HBS. In this section I 
develop an imputation procedure and verify its validity. 
There is a debate in the literature
itures and total income as measures of the level of well-being. Overall, i
purchase costs (Deaton 1997). 
As shown in the literature that establishes an empirical relationship between total 
income nd total expenditures, in de a
more satisfactory measure than total income for two reasons. First, total 
expenditures are not closely tied to short-term fluctuations in income, for example when a 
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large share of income is of seasonal nature. As a result, total expenditures provide a 
smoother and less variable measure of welfare than total income. Second, it has been 
ously difficult to obtain whenever self-
ere asked about their income by 
source.
rrelated with the total expenditures variable in the 2002 
HBS. 
shown that an accurate income measure is notori
employment in small-scale business or agricultural production is common and, more 
generally, whenever households have diverse income sources (Deaton 1997, Deaton and 
Grosh 1999, Grosh and Glewwe 1998). Last, in the former Soviet countries under-
reporting of income is a common problem, rendering income aggregates a poor measure 
of the level of well-being.  
The 2003 HES was not designed to include a comprehensive module on itemized 
monthly expenditures, and instead survey respondents w
 As discussed earlier, total income is not a reliable measure of the level of well-
being, particularly in Azerbaijan with pervasive tax evasion and under-reporting of 
income. In addition, the survey included a question about total monthly expenditures in a 
single question rather than asking for itemized expenditures and the stock of durables. 
Clearly, it is not possible to disentangle the expenditures on durables and impute the 
corresponding “user cost” from this information. It has been shown that this approach 
tends to provide a measure of total expenditures that may not be well correlated with the 
actual income level (Scott 2003). Indeed, I found that the total income variable reported 
in the 2003 HES is poorly co
The State Statistics Office of Azerbaijan relies on the expenditure aggregate 
generated from the 2002 HBS to undertake poverty analysis and calculate poverty rates in 
the country. Even though some concerns have been raised about the reliability of the 
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consumption aggregate in the HBS, as discussed earlier, this is a far more reliable 
measure of total income than the income information that was collected in the 2003 HES.  
In order to impute total expenditures for households in the 2003 HES sample for 
whom this information was not available from the 2002 HBS I developed the following 
imputation procedure. I combined information on total expenditures and demographic 
and location characteristics for 504 households from the 2002 HBS, and information on 
the same demographic and location characteristics from the 2003 HES, and predicted 
total expenditures (income) for 1,496 households with missing total expenditures. The 
models
with missing data. 1/ 
, shown in Table 3.9, are OLS regressions of the logarithm of total expenditures 
on a range of variables representing demographic and location characteristics, with the 
second model incorporating a set of household assets as dependent variables. These 
estimation results need to be interpreted with caution. The purpose of the imputation 
procedure presented here is to obtain the best possible prediction of total expenditures 
rather than explain the factors that determine total expenditures and focus on the 
interpretation of the meaning of individual coefficients on particular variables.  
Table 3.9 Alternative models for imputation of total consumption expenditures for households 
OLS  OLS  
  Model 1a Model 1b 
Demographic variables:
Household size (log) 0.37** 0.34** 
 (5.28) (4.78) 




d size*region 2 (Sabirabad and Imishly), logarithm -0.06 -0.05 
 (0
Househ
 (2.38) (2.12) 
incomplete) 2/ 
Dummy = 1 if household head has a low level of education 
(incomplete secondary, vocational, primary or none) 2/ 
0.02 0.02 
.41) (0.3) 
old size*region 3 (Guba, Ismailly and Goycay), logarithm -0.17* -0.16* 
Dummy = 1 if household head has higher education (complete or 0.02 0.02 
 (0.37) (0.34) 
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 (0.3) (0.3) 
 (1.77) (1.69) 
Number of employed persons as a share of all household members -0.31 -0.32 
Number of children as a share of all household members -0.2 -0.19 
 
Numbe
 (3.69) (3.13) 
 (0.26) (0.21) 
(1.72) (1.75) 
r of unemployed persons as a share of all household members 0.12 0.12 
 (0.84) (0.77) 
Number of retired persons as a share of all household members 0.08 0.06 
 (0.52) (0.41) 
Dummy = 1 if living in a house 0.09 0.07 
 (1.3) (1.01) 
Total area (sq. m, log) 0.16** 0.14** 
Number of heated rooms (log) 0.02 0.01 
Income structure expressed as income from each source as a share of total income (omitted - pensions): 
Salaries of all household members 0.13 0.13 
 (0.62) (0.55) 
 (1.78) (1.6) 
 (0.28) (0.15) 
 (1.61) (1.52) 
Other labor income 0.02 0.02 
 (0.19) (0.16) 
Social assistance payments (allowances) 0.11 0.09 
 (1.16) (0.91) 
Seasonal income -0.13 -0.15 
 (1.04) (1.15) 
Remittances (transfers from other household members and friends) 0.04 0.04 
Income from product sales 0.18 0.17 
Other income -0.05 -0.03 
Energy use and location characteristics:
Dummy = 1 for space heater use -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.68) (0.94) 
Dummy = 1 for water heater use 0.1 0.11 
 
ummy = 1 for wood collection 
(1.07) (1.14) 
d use 
ours of electricity supply in village/town (sq. root, 
(1.26) (1.38) 
D -0.07 -0.07 
 
ooDummy = 1 for fuel w 0.25* 0.23* 
 (2.33) (2.13) 
Fuel wood use dummy*Zone 2    3/ -0.26 -0.2 
 (1.45) (1.13) 
Fuel wood use dummy*Zone 3   3/ -0.17 -0.15 
  (1.26) (1.09)
Dummy = 1 for dung use -0.12 -0.11 
 (1.5) (1.3) 













Average village/town payment ratio for electricity (sq. root) -  -  
(
ummy = 1 if rural household 
dministrative region dummy variables (Baku, Sumgayit and Sabirabad om
2.68** 2.41**
 3.85) (3.35) 
D 0.65** 0.56* 
 (2.67) (2.27) 
A itted):
Ganja 1   1   
1  1   
0   0   
ousehold asset dummy variables:
.55** .42**
 (3.78) (3.38) 
Goycay -0.11 -0.06 
 (0.47) (0.26) 
Guba .50** .41**
 (4.56) (4.18) 
Imishly 0.29 0.32 
 (0.91) (0.98) 
Ismailly .99** .94**
 (3.59) (3.35) 
Mingecev 1.01**  0.92**  
 (3.24) (2.85) 
H
Air conditioner  0.06 
  (0.86) 
Color TV  0.01 
  (0.28) 
Satellite TV  0.04 
  (0.73) 
VCR  -0.06 
  (1.25) 
Video camera  -0.02 










ote: 1/ The absolute values of t statistics are given in parentheses. Signific t the 5% lev
at the 1% level is indicated by ‘**’; 2/ Omitted categories ar
ecialized secondary and secondary education levels; 3/ Zone 1 is the omi gory and 
t and Sa were drop  to 
d use an  dummy v
ce: 2003 HES and 2002 HBS. 
 0.03 
  (0.72) 
Sewing machine 
  (0.5) 
C  0.05 
  (0.9) 
M 0.17 
  (0.92) 
C 0.07 
  (1.26) 
C 0.85** 1.05** 
 15.59) 15.47) 
O 504 504 
R-squared 0.35 0.36 
A 0.30 0.31 
Pseudo R-squared     
N ance a el is 
indicated by ‘*’ and significance e 
sp tted cate zone 4 was 
dropped due to multicollinearity; 4/ Dummy variables for Sumgayi









Estimation results indicate that total expenditures th hou size 
(especially for households living on the Absheron Peninsula and the capital city), 
e f electr ply 
m  by average daily hours of supply. The estimated coefficients on these variables 
are statistically significant at the one-percent or five-percent  Interes otal 
expenditures fall as payment discipline rises, as captured by the average village or town 
p  ratio for electricity, and the coefficient on this variab nificant ne-
percent level. I have included this variable to capture the un ble ch tics 
specific to location that have not been captured by other dependent variables. For 
e variation in payment enforcement may be correlated wi  variation i level 
of development of infrastructure and public services in a pa icular locat  The 
negative coefficient on this variable suggests that, after controlling for other factors and 
l teristics, stricter payment enforcement is correlated with lower incomes. 
Another interesting and somewhat counter-intuitive result is that, after controlling for 
other factors, total expenditures are higher for rural than urban households. Since the 
regional dummy variables are also included in the model, this resu  is less surp .  
Model 1b with the asset variables appears to be preferable because it has a good 
fit compared to typical cross section analyses, and the signs of the coefficients are 
generally as expected. Thus, model 1b is used to impute total consumption expenditures 
for 1,496 households for whom this information is not available
 
rise wi sehold 
ducation level of household head, total housing area and the quality o icity sup
easured
 levels. tingly, t
ayment le is sig  at the o
observa aracteris










mgayit service areas), the utility company is implementing a set of 
easures to raise collections and raise the credibility of disconnection for nonpayment.  
 Judging by communication with local energy experts, the stringency of payment enforcement 
articularly low in areas that are poorly accessible to meter readers from the utility company and where it 
asy for customers to either tamper with the meters or bribe meter readers. In the areas where th
anagement of electricity distribution companies has been transferred to the private sector (i.e., Barm
tility company covering Baku and Suu
m
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To examine the accuracy of this approach of imputation further, the errors of 
imputation in predicting the overall distribution of expenditures were examined using 
data on the 504 households for which expenditures were reported in the HBS data. 
Results suggest that the imputation procedure yields a very accurate characterization of 
the overall distribution of expenditures. As shown in Figure 3.4, the cumulative 
distribution of predicted expenditures is very similar to the actual expenditures from the 
2002 HBS data for the 504 households.  


























expenditures, but only mildly so. The somewhat narrower distribution is also evidenced 
accurate, the errors in the regression of Table 3.10 are apparently intra-distributional, 
meaning that the imputation procedure predicts a very accurate overall distribution, but 
there are errors in predicting the correct quintile of individuals.  
 
Predicted expenditures have a somewhat narrower distribution than actual 
by the smaller standard errors of predicted expenditures compared to actual expenditures 




.10 Actual and predicted total consumption expenditures for 504 households with 
 Actual  Predicted 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Alibayramly 740,886 242,004  721,105 174,667 
Ganja 709,748 317,615  662,954 181,189 
Goycay 807,324 243,339  780,310 106,298 
Imishly 1,064,978 355,932  1,028,395 164,109 
Mingecev 620,560 262,970  586,567 149,709 
Note: Consumption expenditures were predicted
Source: 2002 HBS and 2003 HES. 
Guba 789,354 362,714  717,358 130,731 
Ismailly 819,638 308,480  772,738 95,546 
Total 784,803 323,230  744,041 192,285 
 for 1496 households with missing data.  
 
Ideally, the poverty ranking would remain unchanged when using the actual and 
predicted expenditure aggregate. Table 3.11 shows that only 37 percent of the households 
who are in the bottom quintile of per capita total expenditures in the 2002 HBS are also 
in the bottom quintile using the imputed measure of per capita expenditures. However, 
and the corresponding figure for the top quintile is 73 percent. While the former 
percentage is troubling, the latter is encouraging. Furthermore, 66 percent of households 
who are in the bottom quintile of actual expenditures are classified in the bottom two 
quintiles by imputed expenditures.  
Table 11 Tabulation of quintiles of actual and imputed expenditures (N=504). 
Quintile of actual 
expend




  Poorest 20% 2 3 4 Richest 20 % 
Poorest 20% 37% 29% 22% 10% 1% 
2 20% 22% 22% 20% 15% 
3 14% 18% 19% 28% 20% 
4 6% 15% 23% 26% 30% 
Richest 20% 0% 3% 9% 15% 73% 
Note: Quintiles were weighted by household size. The null hypothesis that the classification of households 
into quintiles based on actual total expenditures is independent from the classification based on imputed 
total expenditures is rejected at 1 percent level by a chi square test. 
Similarly, the percentages classified in the correct or adjacent quintile are 64% for 
quintile 2, 65% for quintile 3, 79% for quintile 4, and 88% for the richest quintile. Only 
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o n the top 
quintile (richest) when they are actually in the bottom (poorest) and no households in the 
t  are c  as being ottom quint  the pred  
expenditures. Thus, the evidence presented here suggests that, while the imputed 
expenditure measure is not perfect, eful put edure, an ularly so 
for the better off households.  
edicting total 
penditures for the poor as for the nonpoo The 504-household subsample in the 2002 
HBS that was used as the basis for the prediction is not a random selection of households 
in the survey. There is bias in terms of location. For example, no one from the capital city 
of Baku is included in the 504-household subsample that was available for merging with 
the 2003 HES data (Table 3.12).  
Table 3.12 Number of households with reported and imputed total expenditure variables. 
  2002 HBS Imputed Total 
ne percent of the 504-household sample is erroneously classified as being i
op quintile lassified  in the b ile using icted measure of
 it is a us  im ation proc d partic
It is not surprising that the model does not perform as well in pr
ex r. 
 Source of the total expenditures variable 
    
Alibayramly 51 49 100 
0 499 499 




ailly 40 0 200 
4  100 
0 0 200 
gayit 0 0 150 
al 50 96 2,000 
Baku 
Ganja 15












S S and 2003 H
 
HBS is 690,709 Manat per year, but is somewhat higher at 784,803 Manat per year for 
ource: 2002 HB ES. 
 
In addition, average household expenditures for the whole sample of the 2002
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the subsample of 504 households.16 This means that poor households are under-
represented in the 504-household subsample. Thus, it is not surprising that the model 
used to predict total expenditures appears to perform worse for the poor than for the 
nonpoor households. 
Conclusions 
To sum up the findings in this chapter, the results of the contingent behavior module in 
the 20
holds, poverty analysis in this dissertation should be 
i nditures 
variable on the right-hand side of an energy demand could pro iased results, 
while using this variable as the dependent variable (or its component) leads to the less 
serious problem of measurement error. Keeping in mind these data lim ns, the model 
proposed in chapter 6 and estimated in chapter 7 does not utilize the predicted total 
expenditures as an independent variable. 
                                                
03 HES are plausible and the imputation procedures of total electricity 
consumption and aggregate consumption expenditures are relatively reliable. The overlap 
in the samples of the 2002 HBS, 2003 HES and utility company billing records was used 
throughout the different steps of the imputation procedure to assess the reliability of the 
predictions. Since the imputation of total expenditures is somewhat more reliable for the 
nonpoor than for the poor house
nterpreted keeping that in mind. Furthermore, using the predicted total expe
 model duce b
itatio
 
16 Statistics are for the entire sample of the 2002 HBS as reported in “Assessment of Household Budget 
Survey Data in Azerbaijan” (World Bank, 2006, mimeographed). 
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4 Overview of energy consumption patterns in Azerbaijan 
Households in Azerbaijan use a variety of fuels for heating, cooking and lighting. The 
choice of fuel is largely determined by the availability and supply quality of modern 
energy sources. This chapter argues that supply factors are far more important 
determinants of the fuel mix than household income or appliance ownership. I show this 
by examining how energy consumption patterns vary by income and other socio-
economic dimensions and by location and the quality level of gas and electricity supply. 
The data used in this chapter are from the 2004 Household Budget Survey. So the pattern 
of energy consumption presented here is nationally representative. 
The importance of supply reliability in explaining fuel consumption patterns 
Usually, reliance on traditional fuels (e.g., wood, coal, dung) declines with income, while 
the share of households using modern fuels (e.g., central heating, network gas, electricity) 
rises with income (Barnes et. al. 2005, Lampietti and Meyer 2002). This tendency is also 
apparent in the household survey data from a sample of the former Soviet republics. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that this trend generally holds for fuel wood and network gas, 
however it is also true of the other modern and traditional fuels. There are some 
exceptions to this tendency, such as the higher incidence of fuel wood use among the 
nonpoor than among the poor in Armenia, Latvia and Lithuania, but typically the use of 
modern fuels is lower among the poor than among the nonpoor. 17  
   
                                                 
17 It may seem surprising that the incidence of fuel wood use is higher among the nonpoor than the poor in 
Armenia, Latvia and Lithuania. At the time this survey was implemented in Armenia, it was experiencing 
the consequences of an energy blockade during a period of particularly tense relations with Azerbaijan, and 
electricity supply interruptions were very severe, leaving little except fuel wood for households at some 
income levels. In Latvia and Lithuania the situation is very different. Fuel wood could be considered a 
luxury good and its consumption is more comparable to Western Europe than the other former Soviet 
countries.  
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lculated from household survey data and reported in Lampietti and Meyer (2002); 
author’s calculations for Azerbaijan using 2004 HBS data. Poor are defined as households in the 






Reliance on ompared to 
other countries in the region, because gasification in Azerbaijan occurred on a much 
larger scale than in neighboring Armenia or in the Central Asian countries (Tajikistan and 
the Kyrgyz Republic). These charts do not take into account supply quality. It is not 
surprising that, given such a high level of reliance on network gas, problems with its 
supply are viewed as a serious social problem in Azerbaijan.  
Supply constraints may explain much of the large variation in observed patterns 
of consumption by location. For example, in large cities households use a combination of 
electricity and network gas, as they tend to have relatively reliable supply of these fuels 
(Table 4.1). In small towns the supply of network gas is not reliable, leading to some 
reliance on fuel wood and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) as back-up energy sources. In 
rural areas network gas is either not available at all or gas supply is so unreliable that 
very few households are able to use it. This is believed to be the reason why almost 40 
percent of rural households report using fuel wood and LPG in rural areas.  
Table 4.1 Reported energy use by households in cities, towns and rural areas.  
  
Network gas Electricity LPG Heating oil, 
kerosene 
Wood Dung Other 
network gas and fuel wood is rather high in Azerbaijan c
Large cities 96% 98% 8% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Towns 78% 94% 39% 6% 23% 1% 0% 
Rural areas 6% 82% 64% 18% 78% 22% 1% 
Total 53% 90% 38% 9% 38% 10% 0% 
Source: 2004 Household Budget Survey. 
 
In Azerbaijan, a country with low relative prices of network gas and electricity, 
the patt evel. 
As sho olds 
 large cities use network gas, while the corresponding shares of households in towns 
erns of energy consumption appear to vary more by location than by income l




Network Electricity LPG Heating oil, Wood Dung Other 
al areas around 80 and less than 10 percent, respectively, again with little variation 
by income level.  
Table 4.2 Reported energy use by households in different income groups. 
  gas kerosene 
Cities        
Poorest 20% 94% 96% 8% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
2 97% 98% 10% 0% 2% 0% 0% 
3 96% 99% 5% 0% 
4 96% 97% 8% 1% 
0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 
Richest 
Total 
Towns        
2 76% 96% 41% 7% 20% 2% 0% 
4 71% 90% 46% 3% 35% 0% 0% 
Total 78% 94% 39% 6% 23% 1% 0% 
% 1% 
20% 95% 98% 8% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
96% 98% 8% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Poorest 20% 75% 95% 45% 6% 25% 1% 0% 
3 83% 95% 33% 4% 17% 1% 0% 
Richest 20% 92% 95% 23% 8% 18% 0% 0% 
Rural areas        
Poorest 20% 3% 86% 57% 26% 77% 33% 1% 
2 4% 80% 69% 17% 79% 25% 1% 
3 5% 86% 67% 16% 76% 18% 0% 
4 6% 76% 64% 16% 80% 12% 2% 
Richest 20% 12% 79% 64% 13% 75% 12% 0% 
Total 6% 82% 64% 18% 78% 22
Source: 2004 Household Budget Survey. 
 
Electricity is used by m 0 t o ds n  c nd 
o hat less al areas, although supply reliability varies. La
reliable gas and electricity supply in some t  and in the majority of the rural areas is 
c f LPG and fuel wood use, especially in rural areas. 
Dung i
supply constraints rather than demand factors in fuel choice at current relative prices of 
ore than 9 percen f househol  in tow s and ities a
nly somew in rur ck of access to 
owns
ompensated by a high incidence o
s also used in some rural areas, especially in the South of the country where the 
forest is degraded, and high transportation costs result in high market prices of fuel wood. 
The relative lack of correlation between the usage patterns and income for the modern 
and fossil fuels, and the distinct regional differences, clearly indicate the importance of 
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fuels.18 Any model explaining fuel choice and electricity demand must clearly reflect 
that. 
A similar story to the pattern of energy use is true of the levels of consumption of 
different types of energy, to the extent that energy expenditures reflect consumption 
quantities. Energy expenditures vary from an average of 2.8 percent of total household 
expenditures in big cities to 4.7 percent in the rural areas, and their share is particularly 
high for the rural poor (Table 4.3). If the collectio sts of fu ood dung e 
r ere in d, the s would be even higher in rural areas.  
Table 4.3 Structure o thly en xpend s. 1/ 
Percent  ene penditur  
n co el w and in th
ural areas w clude share
f mon ergy e iture













rk W ting 
il, 
sene 






f tal  to
ome) 
Cities    
Poorest 20% 59 40.1 - - 20,57
61 37.5 - - 22,57
61 37.3 0.4 - 22,16
63 35.2 - 0 - 20,89
- 0.7 - - 22,626 2.5 
Total 61.4 37.8 0.1 0.6 - - 21,878 2.8 
Towns 
Poorest
4 59.4 32.3 4.3 4.0 0.1 - 26,286 3.5 
Total 55.7 29.4 11.0 3.5 0.3 - 31,239 3.8 
Poorest 20% 61.4 1.9 29.5 4.8 2.2 0.2 36,084 5.3 
3 50.8 5.4 33.2 8.2 2.0 0.4 42,918 4.7 
.7  0.2 - 4 3.5 
2 .7  0.7 - 4 2.9 
3 .8  0.5 - 3 2.7 
4 .9  0.7 .2 2 2.6 
Richest 20% 60.4 38.9 
   
 20% 53.1 32.7 9.9 3.9 0.3 - 31,200 4.7 
2 51.2 26.4 20.4 1.8 0.2 - 39,304 4.5 
3 58.9 25.7 9.9 5.2 0.3 - 31,006 3.6 
Richest 20% 56.2 34.1 6.6 2.3 0.8 - 23,799 2.5 
Rural    
2 55.6 1.6 34.3 5.8 2.5 0.2 39,567 4.9 
4 54.3 3.4 34.4 6.3 1.6 - 42,766 4.3 
Richest 20% 56.9 3.7 29.9 7.3 2.1 0.1 36,815 3.9 
Total 56.1 3.0 32.3 6.3 2.1 0.2 39,604 4.7 
Note: 1/ Expenditure quintiles were created using total expenditures net of food and alcohol expenditures. 
Collection expenditures on fuel wood and dung are excluded.  
Source: 2004 Household Budget Survey.  
                                                 
18 In the case of network gas, the supply quality is better in less remote areas, which also tend to have 
higher income. 
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The differences in supply quality can be made apparent by defining three regimes 
of fuel availability pertaining to any given point in time. Let the first regime denote a 
situatio
 clearly shows 
cation (also see Appendix Table 4.1). 
Hence, it is n i l to d l on
energy sources, some of which are used as back-up sources of energy during supply 
interruptions of network g  ele it
                Figure 4.3 Percent of tim  each ailabil  regim
n when all fuels (network gas, electricity, wood, LPG and kerosene) are available. 
Let the second regime denote the situation when all fuels except for network gas are 
available. The third regime denotes the situation when households have access only to 
wood, LPG, and kerosene. For simplicity, the first regime is referred to as the “network 
gas regime,” the second as the “electricity regime,” and the third as the “traditional fuels 
regime,” although the latter includes wood, LPG and kerosene. Figure 4.3
the striking differences in fuel availability by lo
ot surpris ng that househo ds in wns an in rura  areas rely  multiple 
as and ctric y. 
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                      Source: World Bank staff estimates, as reported in Alam et al (2005). 
 
Although budget shares do not have welfare significance from an economic point of 
 evaluation of possible welfare 
onsequences of reforms. There is no accepted rule of thumb of what level of electricity 
expenditures relative to household income is affordable, although a 10 percent budget 
lationship between electricity consumption and income 
Electricity expenditures constitute less than 2 percent of total household expenditures and 
are comparable to the budget shares in Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, none of 
which have yet implemented electricity pricing reforms. As indicated in Figure 4.4, the 
discrepancy between the electricity budget shares of households in the lowest and highest 
income categories grows in tandem with electricity prices.  


























































































view, they are often used as a benchmark in the course of
c
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share, recently proposed by the UK government, is sometime used as the benchmark 
 of low energy consumption. 
Hence, it is crucially important to understand which of these reasons are important in 
each particular case.  
In Azerbaijan income level does not appear to be an important determinant of 
electricity and network gas consumption. The absolute level of monthly electricity 
consumption exhibits surprisingly little variation by income level, even though there is 
significant variation by location (Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4 Monthly average summer electricity consumption by region and type of area. 1/ 
 Per capital expenditure quintile  
  1 2 3 4 5 Total 
level of affordability.19
In spite of their frequent use as an indicator of the magnitude of the affordability 
burden, budget shares could be low for various reasons, each having different policy 
implications (Foster and Tré 2003). For example, they could be low because of non-
payment of utility bills, because of high income, or because
By region:       
Nakhchyvan 287 266 279 354 310 295 
Absheron 132 225 106 124 114 141 
Ganja-Gazakh 177 171 185 154 143 172 
Shaki-Zagatala 89 107 110 161 89 104 
Lankaran-Astara 175 187 100 104  159 
Guba-Hachmaz 101 159 111 78 114 109 
Aran wi 174 
Baku ci y 122 131 142 131 140 135 
Dagliq irvan 99 127 118 99 116 109 
By ty
th Yuh. Karabah 163 177 140 200 217 
t
 sh
pe of area:       
 city 130 149 137 137 142 139 
Town 139 155 125 160 101 138 
Rural area 127 159 199 178 172 157 
Total 130 151 142 141 141 141 
Note: 1/ These figures are calculated as the monthly bill divided by electricity price (including only 
excluding food and alcohol. 
Large
metered households, N=848). Note also that quintiles were created based on total per capita expenditures 
Source: 2004 Household Budget Survey. 
                                                 
19 DTI (Department of Trade and Industry). 2001. United Kingdom Fuel Poverty Strategy. London: DTI. 
Cited in Komives et. al. (2005). 
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On average, households living in towns and cities report that they consume 139 
kWh/month of electricity and 211 m3/month of network gas during the summer.20 In the 
rural a
d Budget Survey.21 The levels of monthly electricity consumption 
show l
 finding 
that energy consumption levels are not correlated with income It is common g 
A olds not to pay elec  bills ot to pay them in full. In the capital city 
Baku, the collection rates calculated as th ual pa nt div  by ill a nt 
tend to be lower for the poor than for the nonpoor (Table 4.5).  
                                                
reas, network gas is rarely available, and average electricity consumption is 
slightly higher, but households meet most of their energy demand by using fuel wood. 
There is also surprisingly little correlation of the consumed quantities with 
income across all regions. This finding is not consistent with evidence from other 
countries in the former Soviet Union and in the world, but in Azerbaijan it is not unique 
to the 2004 Househol
ittle variation by income level even when consumption is calculated from the 
records of the electric utility company for the capital city Baku.22 Most of the variation is 
between regions, reinforcing again the conclusion supply factors have overriding 
importance in household fuel choices.  
Variability in collection rates is a plausible explanation of the surprising
. amon
zeri househ tricity  or n
e act yme ided the b mou
 
20 as calculated by divid the reported amount of the last bill by the  of el ity 
a  respectively. The table includes a rage elect ty consu ion for ouseholds with 
m ctricity consumption and age g nsump for ho olds mete  
c During the heating season tricity as con tion is bu mation about 





e lated with income (Komives et. al. 2005). 
 
22 Average consumption was 198 kWh/month, and there was very little variation by income quintile. This 
was based on the 2002 Household Budget Survey and 2002 Barmek records (electric utility company) for 
1,094 metered households in Baku (Source: World Bank 2004). 
 Consumption w ing price ectric
nd network gas,  ve rici mpt h  
etered ele
ion. 
aver as co tion useh with red gas
onsumpt , elec  and g sump  higher, t infor
inter consu  this sur
 Wu et. al. (2004) show in several form oviet c ies that oor co e less energy for 
han the nonpoor when monthly energy consumption from different sources is converted into kilogram oi
quivalents and aggregated into total energy consumption. However, there is also evidence that quantity of
er S ountr  the p nsum heati
lectricity consumption is not very well corre
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Table 4.5 Evidence that differences between the poor and nonpoor are small (Baku only). 1/ 








  US$/month kWh per month   Payment/bill 
Poorest 20% 123 190 2.1% 65% 
2 137 202 1.9% 61% 
3 154 192 1.9% 74% 
4 16
Richest
2/ The difference between the collection rate of the poorest 20% and the richest 20% is statistically 
1 201 1.9% 68% 
 20% 189 200 2.2% 81% 
Total 158 198 2.0% 71% 
Note: 1/ Figures for Baku are based on records for 1,094 metered households in the HBS.  
significant at 5 percent level. 
Source: calculated from 2002 Household Budget Survey and 2002 Barmek records and reported in 
World Bank (2004). 
 
The average collection rate for the households in the bottom quintile of per capita 
expenditures was 65 percent compared to 81 percent for the households in the top quintile 
(World Bank 2004). If the payment discipline is weaker among the poor households than 
the richer households in other locations as well, then the effective price of electricity is 
lower f
 that half of all electricity 
and gas consumers pay according to meters (Table 4.6). The remaining households pay 
according to normative consumption depending on a variety of factors including their 
ownership of appliances, housing area and household size.  
or the poor because they tend to pay a smaller share of the bill. Hence, it is not so 
surprising that the electricity consumption levels vary little with income. The situation 
could be similar with network gas, although there is no empirical evidence.  
Reform measures to enforce payment collection are accompanied by the planned 
introduction of universal metering. At present, slightly less than
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ith meteredRegion useholds w  consum o ption 1/ 
 
Na
Electricity work gas 
khchyv na 24% 
Net
an 
Absheron 10% 48% 
Ganja-Gaz 17% 18% 
i-Zag 6% 86% 
Lankaran-  0% 8% 
73% 92% 
43% 46% 




Guba-Hachmaz 2% 31% 
Aran with Yuh. Karabah 32% 24% 
Baku city 
Dagliq Shirvan 0% 49% 
Total 
Note: 1/ These are percentages of households with an electricity (gas) connection. 
Source: 2004 Household Budget Survey. 
 
Other factors affecting fuel choice  
Although world-wide evidence points to a significant effect of fuel wood or coal use for 
heating and cooking on the incidence of respiratory illness, concerns about indoor air 
pollution resulting from the high reliance on fuel wood do not appear to be an important 
determinant of fuel choice by the Azeri households.23 Respiratory illnesses are more 
prevalent among users of wood than among non-users in the urban areas, especially in 
large cities. However, these figures are only suggestive because they are not based on an 
epidemiological study and do not control for the income level and other confining 
factors.24 Nevertheless, survey respondents do not appear to be very concerned with 
indoor air pollution from burning fuel wood at home.  
                                                 
23 See, for example, evidence from international experience presented in Ahmed et. al. (2005). 
 
24 In 28 percent of the households that use wood, at least one household member experienced chronic cough 
during the previous winter, compared to 10 percent in those that did not use wood. The corresponding 
figures in towns are 14 versus 12 percent, and in the rural areas 15 versus 19 percent (2004 HBS).  
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When asked about the relative importance of the factors affecting their choice of a 
heating fuel, over 50 percent of survey respondents indicated that fuel price, convenience, 
availabilit  and reliability of supply, or t e adverse s leaks had the 
strongest (Table 4.7).  
Table 4.7 F the choice of heating fuel (percent of responden
 Weak                        ong   
(in percent s)  1 2 3 4 5 Sum of  
4 and 5 
y he possibl effects of ga
influence 
actors affecting ts). 
     Str
 of all respondent
Price 7 10 21 26 36 62 
Convenien 5 12 27 26 30 56 
Uninterrup bility for purchase 9 14 26 22 51 
Possible ad effects of gas leaks on health 16 20 51 
Availability 47 
Health of h 47 
Possibl ad 18 23 21 18 20 38 
Taste o ood cooked on a wood stove 17 23 24 18 19 37 
ce 
ted supply/availa 30 
verse 13 16 34 
25 2of appliances/equipment at home  15 25 2 




verse effects of smoke on health 
Note: respondents were asked to rank on a scal
factors on their heating fuel choice. The num
e from 1 (weakest) to 5 (strongest) the influence of eight 
bers denote percentages of households. 
Ownership of appliances, health effects of smoke from burning fuel wood and the 
taste characteristics of food prepared using a wood stove appear to influence the choice 
the effects of smoke from fuel wood on the incidence of respiratory illness (Table 4.8).  
Table 4.8 Factors that in the view of respondents are responsible for respiratory illnesses. 
Source: 2004 Household Budget Survey. 
 
less strongly. At the same time, only 30 percent of the households seem to be aware of 
     Weak                                                Strong 
(in percent of all respondents) 1 2 3 4 5 Sum of  
4 and 5 
Poor diet/insufficient vitamins 6 10 17 28 39 67 
Smoking 11 10 21 21 37 58 
Poor drinking water quality 17 14 
Low indoor temperature at home 9 14 21 28 28 56 
15 20 34 54 
Smoke associated with coal use  17 18 21 20 23 44 
Smoke at home from fuel wood use 21 25 25 19 11 30 
Genetic predisposition 16 24 33 15 11 26 
Source: 2004 Household Budget Survey.  
These findings may indicate that the population is not well informed about the 
health effects of fossil fuel use for heating or cooking. They also suggest that other 
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problem
 chapter have several implications for the modeling 
lay a large role in 
a sumption levels. The location and fuel availabilit  key 
d of fuel choice decisions by Azeri households. This suggest that the main 
c ent is rationing (supply), not income mand). 
B uture as supply reliability proved, the prices of electricity 
and network gas increase, and payment disc e im ov T  is a rtunate 




ear to be o or f by 
reflect the h h dependence of fuel use patterns on fuel 
cation. 
o not appea  be  co rned ith i or air p ution 
ds d ot ap r to well inform bout th ealth 
conseq
s, such as the affordability of heating sources and nutritious food, are simply 
more important to the people, as they indicate in the survey. 
Implications for modeling household choice of fuels 
The empirical findings in this
approach adopted in chapter 6. First, income does not seem to p
ffecting fuel choice or con y are the
eterminants 
onstraint to modern energy use at pres  (de
ut that can change in the f is im
iplin  is pr ed. his  fo
situation given that income is poorly measured in the available survey 
 concerns about the reliability of the total expenditures aggregate even in the HBS 
data where it is available.25 That is, in this situation, omitting the income variable is not 
likely to cause serious bias in estimation.  
 Second, because of the wide variation in supply availability constraints an
intermittent reliability, explicit modeling of these supply constraints and e
intermittent reliability app f ov rriding importance. The dema d fe n uel use 
type must appropriately ig
availability, defined by the lo
 Third, households d r to very nce  w ndo oll
from fuel wood use. Since househol o n pea  be ed a e h
uences from indoor air pollution, externalities from fossil fuel use seem to be 
                                                 
25 Pers. communication with the World Bank team for the Poverty Assessment for Azerbaijan. Based on the 
reported consumption aggregate, Azerbaijan has a very low level of inequality, which cannot be true. 
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unimportant as affecting energy choices. Therefore, the preference parameters for indoor 
air quality in an intermittent supply model are not likely to be significant. This means that 
s alone after accounting for fuel 
 80 percent, the effective tariff increase could 
the choice of fuels is likely to be driven by the price
availability. 
Fourth, the cost of heating and cooking appliances does not appear to have a 
strong influence on the decision by households to use network gas or electricity for 
cooking and heating. This is not surprising, given that homemade cooking and heating 
appliances, made by the local craftsmen, are commonly used in Azerbaijan. As long as 
there is access to a reliable supply of gas or electricity at a sufficiently low price, 
households seem to prefer those sources. 
Last, it is important to differentiate between the nominal tariff and the effective 
tariff paid by the households with low bill collection rates. If the reforms result in more 
than a doubling of tariffs to reach the full cost recovery level and an increase in collection 
rates, which currently vary between 35 and
be substantially higher than the nominal increase. 
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Appendix to chapter 4: Fuel availability regimes 
ndix Table 4.1 Percent of the time households are in each fuel availability regime. 
  Regime Regime Regime   Regime Regime Regime   Regime Regime 
 
Appe
 Cities  Towns  Rural areas 
1  2 3 1 2 3 1 2 
Regime 
3 
Poor 1% 3% 26%  50% 10% 40%  3% 38% 59% est 20% 7
2 68% 2% 30%  51% 12% 36%  3% 36% 61% 
3 60% 
4 69% 3% 29%  48% 9% 43%  4% 35% 60% 
Rich 56% 
Total 71% 3% 26%   53% 9% 38%   4% 36% 59% 
70% 3% 27%  55% 8% 37%  4% 36% 





Source: 2004 Household Budget Survey. 
: Regimes are defined as follows: 
me 1: All fuels are available 
e 2: All fuels except for network gas are available 





5 Alternative approaches for infrastructure service quality modeling26  
Before focusing on m ng the intermittent supply problem in Azerbaijan, thi
reviews traditional m ods f welfare luation of infrastructure service qu ity 
changes and puts these me  i a der theoretical perspective of welfare 
en desc e theoret al ptio ata rem nts and illustrates 
es lig tin mmon features and differences among 
that the problems of intrinsic service quality 
g willingness-to-pay estimates derived from market-based 
consum r surplus estimates, averting behavior analysis, and discrete choice welfare 
methods. However, the choice of modeling approach depends on data availability and on 
the way the quality affects household behavior.  
Theoretical framework 
From a theoretical standpoint, the benefits of improvements in service quality can be 
interpreted as a resulting change in an individual’s or household’s utility and can be 
measured by compensating variation (CV). By definition, CV is the money payment 
(possibly negative) necessary to compensate a consumer for a price and quality change 
after it occurs in order to bring her back to her initial level of well-being. Formally, CV 
can be defined in terms of the indirect utility function as 
where p0 and q0 is the initial price and quality combination, p1 and q1 is the price and 
quality combination after the change, and y is income. The change in welfare could also 
be measured by the equivalent variation (EV), which is defined as the money payment to 
                                                
 
odeli s chapter 
eth or eva al
thods n  broa
measurem t. It ribes th ic assum ns, d requi e
each method with exampl  high h g co
methodologies. This review demonstrates 
changes can be analyzed usin
e
1 1 0 0( , , ) ( , , )V p q y CV V p q y− =  
 
26 This chapter is adapted from a paper co-authored with Michael Lokshin (Klytchnikova, I. and M. 
Lokshin (2006). “Measuring Welfare Impact of Infrastructure Service Quality Changes.” Development 
Economics Research Group Working Paper. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Forthcoming). 
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a consumer (possibly negative) that would make her well-being the same in lieu of the 
rice/quality change as if it had occurred. In terms of the indirect utility function, EV is 
defined as . These two measures are equal when the 
ity are small enough so as not to alter the 
marginal utility of
Infr  attributes that fall into two categories: 
service relia . Examples of intrinsic service quality are 
voltage flu pressure for network gas, or the level of 
contam bility for utilities is reflected in the 
of their timing. As shown in Figure 5.1, 
several mo  assess the welfare effects of a change in 
the reliabi ture services.28  
e implications of outage occurrence for 
e cases outages can be analyzed in the 
fram ctions apply uniformly across observed time 
 implications for household behavior as a 
change in in  the same framework as intrinsic quality 
existing approaches are adequate, such as in 
the case of interm  supply when households substitute back and forth within 
                                                
p
),,(),,( 1100 yqpVEVyqpV =+
changes in utility from the change in qual
 income.27  
astructure services have a variety of
bility and intrinsic service quality
ctuations for electricity services, 
inants in a water supply. Service relia
frequency of outages and the predictability 
deling approaches could be used to
lity and intrinsic qualities of infrastruc
The choice of an approach depends on th
household behavior. For example, in som
ework of rationing if the rationing restri
periods. In others, they may have the same
trinsic quality, permitting analysis in
changes. In yet other situations, none of the 
ittent
 
maximum WTP to avoid new conditions (Haab and McConnell 2002).  
 
28 Another possibility is that households may do nothing during outages and simply wait for the supply of a 
service to resume. This is probably less likely than the case when households engage in some type of 
storing behavior. I do not consider either of these cases in this chapter. 
27 Willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) are alternative definitions of the same 
theoretical measures of welfare. For an improvement in circumstances, CV is equal to the maximum WTP 
to obtain better quality, and EV is the minimum WTA to forgo the improved service quality. For 
degradation in service quality, CV is the minimum WTA to agree to new circumstances, and EV is the 
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observed time periods between the network source of an infrastructure service and its 
market substitutes depending on whether the network source is available. One of the main 
objectives o conditions under which one of the existing 
approaches is appropriate, and provide motivation for a new model of intermittent supply 
developed in chapter 6. 
f this chapter is to clarify the 
Figure 
these cases, several methods have been proposed to account for the discrepancy between 
the observed consumption level and the true quantity demanded.29  
                                                
5.1 Characteristics of supply interruptions and household modeling approaches. 
 
Poor reliability of a service causes rationing for the households for which the 
quantity of services consumed falls below the quantity that would otherwise be demanded 
at prevailing prices. Since prices do not reflect the marginal utility of consumption in 
rationed markets, observed consumption levels cannot be used in welfare analysis of 
service reliability changes (Deaton 1981; Pudney 1989; Hentschel and Lanjouw 2000). In 
 
29 Deaton (1981) and Pudney (1989) propose an econometric approach that accounts for the discrepancy 
between observed consumption quantities and unobserved quantities demanded. Sometimes an unbiased 
measure of consumer surplus or CV can be obtained when it is possible to impute the unobserved quantity 
Infrequent interruptions Frequent interruptions 
Timing 






can be  
predicted 
Timing 



















  Intermittent 
supply 
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The case of pure rationing describes a situation of outage when outages are not 
frequent and their timing cannot be predicted. Hence, households do not adjust their 
energy consumption pattern in response to their expectations about supply quality, but 
simply do without an energy service on the rare occasions that outages occur. Cases of 
pure quantity rationing are rare in developing countries and are mostly found in countries 
nt 
the additional cost of storage facilities. However, both of these cases are unlikely to be 
common for energy demand in the developing world because storage of energy is not 
                                                                                                                                                
with high service reliability. For example, household welfare losses from a rece
blackout in New York could be analyzed in the framework of pure quantity rationing.30  
Conversely, in developing countries with persistent supply problems, outages tend 
to be frequent. In some cases, outages are frequent but predictable (i.e., they always occur 
the same time of day). In this case, households may simply incur the inconvenience of 
having to time their use of services to match predictable periods of availability so that the 
welfare implications of inconvenience are inherent in observed demands as in the case of 
intrinsic quality models. In other cases, storage may be possible as in the case where 
water can be stored for consumption at other times when water pressure is adequate. In 
this case, the effects of quality can be measured by the averting behavior, which incurs 
 
impute a virtual price, which is a price that corresponds to the observed consumption if this was the actual 
 
re to estimate the cost of 
outages. This framework is only applicable to analyzing welfare gains from improved service reliability in 
countries where outages are infrequent and unexpected. In a review of outage cost literature, Caves et al. 
(1990) describe the consumer surplus approach to outage cost estimation. It relies on the assumption about 
advance warning of an outage. The shorter the warning time, the less the consumers are able to adjust their 
consumption patterns, and thus the steeper is the demand curve and the greater are the welfare losses from 
an outage (Sanghvi 1983). With no advance warning, this method is equivalent to the rationing model.  
that would be consumed if the rationing constraint were not binding. Alternatively, it may be possible to 
quantity demanded. Virtual prices can be obtained from markets with very similar conditions, but no 
rationing (Hentschel and Lanjouw 2000). 





service is supplied, and it is zero when it is not available. Thus, part of the time the 
demand curve is unconstrained and part of the time it is inapplicable because supply is 
zero. On average, the observed demand is below the level it would be in the absence of 
outages, but the extent to which it is below depends on what portion of the time the 
outage applies in each observed time period. The review in this chapter makes clear that 
al and outages normally occur due to unplanned system failures rather than 
managed power cuts.  
The conventional methods described in this chapter apply to (i) change in intrinsic 
quality, (ii) cases where outages are infrequent, (iii) cases where the timing of outages 
can be predicted, or (iv) rationing and outages that apply uniformly across observed time 
periods. When outages are frequent but their timing cannot be predicted, households may 
adjust to the changes in infrastructure service quality by investing in appliances that use
te sources of energy when outages occur. These adjustments allow households to 
reduce losses from an outage but, at the same time, may cause additional costs associated 
with mitigating actions. Households may permanently shift away from an unreliable 
source and start using a more reliable substitute, for example fuel wood instead of 
electricity for heating and cooking. If all such adjustments are permanent changes in the 
choice of energy source, then this situation can be described in the same framework as a 
change in an intrinsic quality of a service. In this case, it could be represented by an 
inward shift of the demand curve for electricity. However, households may continue to 
use the unreliable service part of the time when it is available, and use substitutes during 
outages. In this situation, household consumption of a service is unconstrained when the 
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this case cannot be represented in the conventional frameworks of rationing associated 
with cases (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv). Chapter 6 presents a new approach to modeling this case.   
Empir
combined with household appliances produces lighting, heat, energy for cooking, and 
ical methods of measuring the welfare impact of quality changes 
The welfare impact of changes in infrastructure service quality in cases (i), (ii), (iii), and 
(iv) can be measured with revealed or stated preference data using one of three methods 
reviewed in this chapter: exact measurement of the welfare impact of a change in service 
quality with the direct demand estimation method, welfare approximation based on the 
averting behavior model, and measurement of the expected welfare impact through 
conjoint analysis.   
The revealed preference approach is comprised of various methods that use data 
on actual spending on market goods associated with the service in question. These data 
permit estimation of an implicit value of welfare improvements due to the change in 
quality of a particular service. Revealed preference methods include direct demand 
estimation, averting behavior, travel cost models based on random utility modeling, 
hedonic pricing, and, in the case of effects on human health, cost of illness models. Since 
the latter two methods are not particularly useful in welfare evaluation of infrastructure 
service quality changes, I omit their discussion from this chapter. 
With the exception of the random utility modeling approach, most revealed 
preference methods of measuring the welfare impact of infrastructure service quality 
changes are based on the household production function approach (Becker 1965; Gorman 
1956; Lancaster 1966). In this theoretical framework, households use infrastructure 
services as inputs in the production of household services. For example, electricity 
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entertainment provided by the radio and television. Network gas can be used to produce 
heating or cooking services. Water can be consumed for drinking or for bathing and 
cleaning (which could be considered as health services). At the same time, if water is 
ouseholds’ willingness to pay for a service quality improvement, or 
about t
 approach, respondents 
are ask
contaminated with harmful bacteria, it provides a disservice through an increase in the 
risk of illness. This framework applies to the direct demand estimation method and the 
averting behavior approach as well as the intermittent supply model discussed in the next 
chapter.  
The term “stated preferences” refers to survey-based methods that rely on 
information about h
heir choices and behavioral changes in hypothetical scenarios involving service 
quality changes (Freeman 2003). Stated preference methods include contingent behavior, 
conjoint analysis, and contingent valuation. Contingent behavior methods are based on 
survey questions about respondents’ behavior in a hypothetical situation. For example, 
such a survey might ask whether a respondent would switch to a different fuel or water 
source if its price or quality were to change by a certain amount. In conjoint choice 
surveys, a respondent is given a choice of alternative projects or commodities with 
specific quality and price attributes. In the contingent valuation
ed to directly report their willingness to pay for a change in quality of a service.  
Most of the approaches discussed in this chapter may use revealed preference data 
and/or stated preference data from contingent behavior or conjoint choice surveys. In 
subsequent sections of this chapter, I discuss the theoretical basis, applicability and data 
requirements for each of these methods and provide illustrative examples of welfare 
evaluation of changes in the quality of different infrastructure services.  
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Direct demand estimation method 
The most straightforward way to estimate the welfare effect of a change in service quality 
is to measure it by the area between demand curves at the original and improved quality 
levels and above the price line. This is the essence of the direct demand estimation 
method. This approach is applicable when two assumptions are satisfied. The first 
assumption is weak complementarity, which requires that the consumer’s welfare is 
unaffected by changes in the quality of a service he or she does not consume (Mäler 
1974). For example, we can assume that the welfare level of a household that consumes 
no electricity is unaffected by a change in the quality of electricity supply. The second 
assumption is non-essentiality. It implies that there exists a sum of money that would 
compensate the individual for complete loss of the service. This assumption would not be 
satisfied for a vitally important service or good, such as air, food, water or heat. However, 
in the case of infrastructure services like water and heat, the non-essentiality assumption 
can be relaxed. Although water and heat are essential goods, inputs in their production 
such as bottled water, public water, gas and electricity are individually non-essential. 
This condition is satisfied in household production models that allow complete 
substitution for any particular input used in the production of an essential household 
service. 
When the weak complementarity and non-essentiality assumptions are satisfied, 
the area between two compensated (Hicksian) demand curves is finite and can be 
interpreted as an exact welfare measure of a change in service quality (Just et al. 2004; 
Train 2003). Graphically, the CV of a change in quality is represented by area abcd in 
Figure 5.2, where hZ  denotes the Hicksian demand for the service, 0q  and  are quality  1q
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levels before and after the change, respectively,  is the initial level of utility,  is the 
lity levels ve t line can be expressed in terms of the earlier 
notatio
 0u 0p
price of service, and )( 1* qp  and )( 0* qp  are the so-called choke prices at the initial and 
final quality levels. The choke price is the lowest price at which the demand for the 
service is zero. It is only defined for non-essential goods because otherwise the demand 
curve does not intersect the vertical axis.  
Figure 5.2 Compensating variation of a quality change. 
 
 














and abo he price 
n as 
* 1 * 0
0 0
( ) ( )
1 0 0 0( , , ) ( , , )
p q p q
h h
p p
Z p q u dp Z p q u dp−∫ ∫ . 
Using Shepherd’s Lemma, from which the Hicksian demand is derived by 
differentiation of the expenditure function with respect to price, / ,hZ e p= ∂ ∂  evaluation 
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of these integrals at the limits of integration obtains area 
* 1 1 0 1 * 0 0 0 0 0 0( ( ), , , ( ( ), , ) ( , , )abcd e p q q u p q e p q q u e p q u= − + ,  
where the sum of the first and the third terms is equal to zero if the weak 
complementarity assumption is satisfied (Freeman 2003). In terms of the expenditure 
function, CV is then the difference betwee
 
0) ( , )e u −
n the expenditure necessary to attain the same 
level of utility  the change, 
. Thus, the sum of the second and fourth terms is equal 
 the quality change from  to . The EV can be found 
similarly by replacing u0 by u1. 
In practice, the compensated (Hicksian) demand is not directly observable 
because it depends on unobservable utility. Alternatively, many studies measure the 
welfare implications of quality changes by using the uncompensated or ordinary 
(Marshallian) demand, which is directly observable. Calculations similar to those above 
with ordinary demand functions measure the change in consumer surplus, which 
approximates the welfare change (CV or EV) when certain conditions are satisfied.31 The 
welfare effect of a price and quality change, represented by a change in consumer 
surplus, is depicted in Figure 5.3, where ordinary demand curves for service x at the 
initial and improved quality levels are represented by D(q ) and D(q ), respectively. The 
nsumer surplus associated with a simultaneous change in price from p0 to p1 
                                                
0
 after a change in service quality as before
),,(),,( 010000 uqpeuqpeCV −=






ides a close app
ge. If these co
i.e., if the expenditures on the good in question form a small share of the overall household budget, and the 
income elasticities are low, then the change in CS associated with a price change falls within tight bounds 
between the CV and EV measures. If Marshallian demands are used to approximate the welfare impact of a 
change in quality rather than price, then an additional restriction is necessary to establish these bounds 
(Bockstael and McConnell 1993; Palmquist 2005).  
ian demand curves are utility-constant and are not directly observable, unlike the observable 
 demand curves, which are income-constant. Willig (1976) shows under which conditions the 
consumer surplus (CS) measure (the area under the Marshallian demand) prov roximation to 
the area under the Hicksian demands, which is the true measure of welfare chan nditions hold, 
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and a change in quality from q0 to q1 is the difference between the initial and final 
consumer surplus, denoted by area p1de – area p0bc.  
While Hicksian demands cannot be observed directly, work by Hause (1975) and 
Hausman (1981) has shown how Hicksian demands can be inferred from estimates of 
translog, generalized Leontief, and generalized Cobb-Douglas forms, which can be used 
to represent indirect utility, these methods are quite flexible. Just et al. (2004) describe 
the application of this approach to welfare measurement for a variety of flexible 
functional forms. Thus, exact welfare measures of price changes (CV or EV) can be 
derived from those indirect utility forms. While quality variables can be integrated into 
this approach by making some of the parameters functions of quality levels, the popular 
second-order flexible forms impose essentiality on all goods so that choke prices do not 
Figure 5.3 Consumer surplus change associated with a quality and price change. 
 
ordinary demands. With the development of modern second-order flexible forms, e.g., the 













exist. Thus, goods for which weak complementarity applies cannot be modeled directly 
with such forms.  
For the case of weak complementarity exact welfare measures have been derived 
only for semilog demand functions, which somewhat limits the applicability of this 
approach in the evaluation of welfare impacts of quality changes. Further, for large price 
changes, such as are contemplated in this study, Kling has shown that functional form can 
have critical implications for the measurement of welfare change. Thus, more flexibility 
in the demand specification is desirable.32 However, flexibility can be attained by 
modeling demand for essential household services such as cooking and heating using a 
flexible functional form, and then modeling substitution of the household technologies 
that produce the household services. This is the approach pursued further in the following 
chapter.  
Alternatively, the traditional approach has been to use the direct demand 
estimation method to assess the welfare impact of changes in reliability of residential 
electricity provision. With this approach, the demand for fuel is modeled as an ad hoc 
function of some reliability measure. For example, the costs of electricity outages are 
estimated using data on consumption of electricity at different reliability and price levels. 
Having estimated demand functions for alternate reliability levels, a researcher can 
calculate the change in welfare resulting from a reliability improvement (e.g.,Westley 
1984; Dias-Bandarnaike and Munasinghe 1983). This approach is based on the 
observation that households reduce their reliance on electricity, switching to substitute 
                                                 
32
In a simulation experiments, Kling (1989) shows that the errors resulting from the use of an incorrect 
functional form for large price changes can range from 4 to 107 percent of the estimated consumer surplus. 
 The choice of functional form for the demand function has a large impact on consumer surplus measures. 
The error is equal to only a few percentage points for small price changes. This leads her to conclude that 
for small price changes, the choice of functional form is not nearly as critical as it is for a large change. 
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sources of energy and/or increasing their consumption of non-energy goods when 
electricity supply becomes unreliable. A reliability improvement has the opposite effect, 
causing
e estimated increase in consumer surplus was about fifty percent of the initial 
consum
An additional assumption of perfect substitutability between the publicly supplied 
infrastructure service and its market substitutes extends this method’s applicability and is 
 an increase in consumption of electricity. The electricity demand curve shifts 
outward from D(q0) to D(q1) in Figure 5.2 and this shift is assumed to represent an 
increase in a consumer’s willingness to pay for all units of electricity delivered with 
higher reliability.  
An evaluation of the welfare impact of changes in electricity supply reliability in 
Costa Rica illustrates this method. Dias-Bandarnaike and Munasinghe (1983) use county-
level time-series data on residential electricity consumption to estimate demand at the 
very low, low, and medium reliability levels. Three demand equations at alternate 
reliability levels are used to derive demand projections depending on supply reliability 
levels. Th
er surplus when supply reliability in Costa Rica improved from the very low to 
medium level.  
 In practice, applications of the direct demand estimation approach are limited by 
the availability of data. The prices of infrastructure services tend to be regulated and set 
nationally or at least regionally, resulting in insufficient price variation for the estimation 
of a demand function. Moreover, when supply interruptions constrain consumption, the 
observed consumption may be below true demand, and therefore these observations 
cannot be used in demand estimation without accounting for discrepancies between 
demand and observed consumption.  
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commonly made in practice (e.g., World Bank 2002; Choynowski 2002; Barreix et al. 
2003). Two examples of an evaluation of the welfare effect of service quality 
improvement of municipal water supply and electricity provision illustrate this point. 
In the recently launched Public Enterprise Reform Program, the Panamanian 
government sought to encourage private sector service delivery in the water supply and 
sewerage sector. The cost-benefit analysis of the sector’s reforms focuses on the behavior 
of unm
g that water from overhead tanks is a perfect substitute for water from 
nd other expenses associated with the operation of 
overhea
etered consumers who cope with intermittent water supply (Barreix et al. 2003). 
Before the project, these consumers paid a fixed monthly fee, receiving water at a zero 
marginal price, and dealt with supply interruptions by using overhead water tanks. The 
implicit price of water when overhead tanks are used is the marginal cost of operating a 
tank. After the project, households received service twenty-four hours a day, but they 
were forced to pay a new tariff depending on their water consumption rather than a zero 
marginal price.  
 Assumin
the public supply, the price-quantity combinations of these two sources are sufficient to 
estimate a linear demand function and to calculate a change in consumer surplus. The 
welfare impact of the project can then be approximated as a sum of two components. The 
first component is a reduction of consumer surplus resulting from a decline in 
consumption at a higher marginal tariff because of the introduction of consumption-based 
volumetric charges. The second component is an increase in consumer surplus due to the 
savings in electricity, maintenance, a
d tanks.  
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The drawback of this analysis is that it fails to account for changes in behavior of 
households with intermittent supply. It assumes that households always rely on the use of 
the overhead tanks, even when water is available from the public supply system. These 
assump
r. 
for electricity.  
tions could lead to overestimating the benefits from improving supply quality. 
Before the reform, some of the time the formerly unmetered households relied on water 
from the public supply, which they received at a zero marginal price, for which they were 
charged after the change. Another problem with this approach is the assumption of 
perfect substitution between water from overhead tanks and from the public water supply. 
The analysis assumes that households experience no additional benefits from consuming 
water from the public supply system versus the overhead tanks, which are more 
cumbersome to operate. This assumption could lead to underestimating the benefits of a 
service quality improvement. Overall, the direction of the bias in the calculated welfare 
measure is unclea
The assumption of perfect substitutability requires more careful consideration 
when employed for household energy use. The direct demand estimation approach has 
been used to approximate welfare gains of electrification in the Philippines (World Bank 
2002; Choynowski 2002). In the Philippines, electricity is primarily used for lighting. If 
kerosene and electricity are assumed to be perfect substitutes in producing light, the data 
on kerosene consumption by non-electrified households and electricity consumption by 
electrified households give two points on the demand curve for lumens. This information 
is sufficient to calculate consumer surplus of electrification under an assumption of linear 
demand function 
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However, the assumption of perfect substitutability is not always plausible. While 
it could be reasonable to assume that public water and water from overhead tanks are 
perfect substitutes, its applicability is more questionable for electricity versus kerosene 
used for lighting or for electricity versus fuel wood used for heating. For example, in the 
Philippines the majority of non-electrified households that use kerosene for lighting 
recognize that indoor air pollution can cause health problems, so they place a higher 
value on a lumen from electricity than on a lumen from a kerosene lamp (World Bank, 
2002). In some cases, consumer surplus calculated with the assumption of perfect 
substitutability can be interpreted as the lower bound on the true welfare gains even when 
this assumption is not satisfied in practice. Thus, in the Philippines the consumer surplus 
of switching from kerosene to electricity is the lower bound on the welfare gains, as long 
as lumens from electricity are cheaper than lumens from kerosene. 
The direct demand estimation method is a highly useful approach when adequate 
data ar
 this case as they can supplement observed data and 
provide useful observations outside the variation of observed sample data. As 
e available. If necessary data are available, direct demand estimation permits 
accurate welfare measurement of an impact of a service quality change with CV (EV). 
However, modeling weak complementarity and non-essentiality, where appropriate, with 
flexible functional structure is a challenge. Further, price and quality variation in the data 
on consumption of the service in question are rarely sufficient for demand estimation. 
Even when such data exist, if the anticipated service quality and price changes fall 
outside the range of observable data, the estimated welfare measures based on observed 
data may not be statistically accurate. Experimental data from contingent behavior 
surveys are particularly useful in
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demon
an 2003). This 
approa
strated by Azevedo et. al. (2003), combining data in this way is an advantageous 
approach as it imbeds stated preference data in observed behavior. To the best of my 
knowledge, except for this dissertation, an evaluation of the welfare impact of 
infrastructure service quality changes has never been attempted using the direct demand 
estimation method combining revealed preference data with data from contingent 
behavior surveys.  
Averting behavior model  
The direct demand estimation approach may be too demanding in terms of data 
requirements for some applications. In situations where direct demand estimation is not 
feasible, the welfare impact of infrastructure service quality changes can be estimated 
using a model of averting behavior, which is referenced in the literature alternatively as 
defensive expenditures, mitigating behavior, or coping cost models (Freem
ch is less demanding in terms of the data requirements.  
 The averting behavior model estimates bounds on CV using information on 
expenditures associated with deterioration in service quality. This model assumes that a 
consumer can mitigate deterioration in service quality by using some purchased 
commodities. In other words, the quality of the service and the purchased commodity are 
assumed to be substitutes. Under this assumption, a change in averting expenditures 
triggered by a change in service quality represents bounds on the welfare effect.  
Consider, for example, a household that purchases bottled water to avoid 
exposure to contamination in the public water supply. Suppose a household maximizes a 
utility function )),(,( bxzqU  subject to a budget constraint, where q is a composite 
bundle of purchased commodities, x is purchased bottled water, b is the quality of public 
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drinking water supply, and z is the level of health services a household obtains from 
drinking water.33 The utility function is increasing in q and z, and z is increasing in x and 
b. Also suppose that public water is supplied at no charge. This household utility 
maximization problem can be represented as a dual problem of expenditure minimization. 
The expenditure function, ),,,( Ubrpe , represents the minimal expenditure that is 
necessary to reach the level of utility U, where p is the price of the consumption bundle q, 
d water. The expenditure function is decreasing in b and 
xq
and r is the price of bottle
increasing in the other arguments. The expenditure minimization problem can be written 
as follows: 
)),(,((),,(),,,(min bxzqUUbrzCpqUbrpe −++= µ , 
,
where is the cost function for the production of health services from drinking 
ariation resulting from a change in the quality of public water 
, where  denotes the utility 
 
 can be rew
),,( brzC
water. Compensating v
supply can be expressed as ),(),( 0100 UbeUbeCV −= 0U
level before the change, and b  and  b  denote the quality of the public water supply 
before and after the change, respectively. The change in the cost of producing the original 
level of health services is given by the averting 
expenditure ),,(),,( 010000 rbzCrbzCAE −= , and 0z  is the original level of health 
services from drinking water.  
0 1
It can also be shown that ),,(),,();,(),( 01000000100 rbzCrbzCzUbeUbe −=−  
(Bockstael and McConnell 1999). By adding and subtracting the same term, the 
expression for CV ritten as  
                                                 
33 This presentation of the model borrows from Bockstael and McConnell (1999). See also Freeman (2003, 
105) and Ribaudo and Hellerstein (1992). 
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),();,();,(),( 0100100100 UbezUbezUbeUbeCV −+−= . The third term is a restricted 
expenditure function and the fourth term is unrestricted, whereby the former is 
necessarily greater than the latter (Bockstael and McConnell 1998). In other words, 
compensating variation is equal to averting expenditures plus a term that is positive. This 
is a w t due to B
 in service quality are completely mitigated by a purchased substitute good. 
If this is not true, then the averting expenditures associated w  quality deterioration may 
adjusting their consumption of z. For example, they may demand a lower level of health 
services, z, after deterioration in the quality of water from the public supply, b, than 
before the change. Bartik’s lower bound is given by the averting expenditures necessary 
to hold z constant after a change in b. This is sometimes overlooked in practice, when the 
observed change in expenditures on health or energy services is used as the lower bound 
rovide an exact measure of the welfare impact of a change 
d (e.g., bottled water) and quality (e.g., the quality
ationship is likely to hold, but usually this is not a 
ell-known bounding resul artik (1988), who showed that averting 
expenditures provide an underestimate of the benefits associated with a quality 
improvement, and an overestimate of the losses in a case of quality deterioration. 
 A crucial assumption underlying this result is that the losses from the 
deterioration
ith
be an underestimate of the actual welfare losses.  
 It is also important to note that households respond to the quality change by 
on CV (EV) (Ribaudo and Hellerstein, 1992). 
 Averting expenditures p
in service quality if the purchased goo  
of public water supply) are perfect substitutes in the production of good z. In this 
example, the perfect substitutability rel
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plausible assumption, in which case averting expenditu
sent to 
lla et al. (1992) were careful to satisfy 
e, the purchase of home water treatment 
stem
exposure to contamination. 
res give a lower bound on CV(EV) 
rather than an exact measure of welfare change. 
A classical example of the averting behavior method is the much cited study of 
the welfare effect of drinking water contamination in Pennsylvania (Abdalla et al. 1992). 
Following the detection of contamination with Trichloroethylene (TCE) in a 
Pennsylvania community, the Environmental Protection Agency issued a warning to 
notify customers of the contamination incident. Mail questionnaires were 
households in this community to elicit information about increases in averting 
expenditures to avoid exposure to the contaminant. These expenditures included the time 
costs of undertaking averting actions and cash outlays. In attributing averting 
expenditures to the contamination incident, Abda
the assumptions necessary for Bartik’s (1988) bounding result to hold. First, the averting 
expenditures had to exhibit no jointness in production. This means that, for example, the 
purchase of bottled water has no additional benefits apart from mitigating the health risk 
from exposure to TCE. On the contrary, if households purchased water for taste reasons, 
unrelated to the contamination incident, bottled water expenditures cannot be considered 
as averting expenditures. Second, the averting expenditures should not involve sunk costs 
in the purchase of durable goods. For exampl
sy s results in benefits that extend beyond the contamination incident, and so their 
cost can be only partially included in the estimate of averting expenditures. When the two 
assumptions about jointness in production and the purchase of durable goods are 
satisfied, the averting expenditure estimates provide a lower bound on WTP to avoid 
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Applications of the averting behavior model are limited to cases where 
households respond to deterioration in infrastructure service quality by undertaking 
specific
Problem description and reference Averting expenditures used in the study 
 expenditures, either in terms of time or monetary expenditures. The averting 
behavior model has been used for the analysis of welfare implications of changes in the 
quality of air and drinking water, although the range of its potential applications is much 
broader (McConnell and Bockstael, forthcoming). In the area of infrastructure services, 
the most natural area of application of this method is welfare evaluation of changes in the 
quality of drinking water.  
Most studies of drinking water quality, which are described in Table 5.1, use 
averting expenditures as a lower bound on welfare gains from improvements in service 
quality.  
Table 5.1. Applications of the averting behavior model. 
Organic chemical contamination by a microorganism 
Giardia lamblia of water supply in Pennsylvania, 
USA  
(Harrington 1989) 
Cost of public supply drinking water 
substitutes and value of time 
Bacterial, mineral, or organic chemical contamination Expenditures of households that rely on 
in West Virginia, USA 
(Collins and Steinbeck 1993) 
individual wells in West Virginia for cleaning 
and repairing water systems, hauling water, 
and treatment 
Organic chemical contamination of ground water with 
USA 
Increased expenditures and new purchases of 
treatment systems, hauling, and boiling water  
trichloroethylene in two Pennsylvania communities, 
(Abdalla, Roach, and Epp 1992) 
bottled water, expenditures in home water 
Low perceived quality of drinking water, France 
(Carpentier and Vermersch 1997) 
Household purchases of soft drinks and bottled 
water to avoid drinking tap water 
Low perceived quality of drinking water in Moscow, 
Russia 
Prevalence of household activities to reduce 
potential health risks by boiling, settling, 
(Larson and Gnedenko 1999) filtering, and buying bottled water  
Drinking water contamination in Brazil  Increases in expenditures on drinking water 
(McConnell and Rosado 2000) filtration, boiling, and bottled water purchases  
Perceived contamination of the drinking water supply 
in Korea  
(Um, Kwak, and Kim 2002)  
Costs of boiling tap water, purchasing bottled 
water, installation of filtration systems, and 




Some studies estimate averting expenditures associated with a specific 
contamination incident (e.g., Harrington 1989; Collins and Steinbeck 1993; Abdalla et al. 
1992), while others analyze household behavior on the basis of perceived rather than 
measured contamination levels (e.g., Larson and Gnedenko 1999; McConnell and Rosado 
2000; Um et al. 2002). The latter group of studies postulates that individuals act on the 
basis of their perceptions of risk from contamination rather than the objective levels of 
contamination. Perceived rather than objective measures of contamination have been 
incorporated in the framework of the averting behavior model and used as the basis for 
empiric
ases, households may have a choice from a range of providers, or a choice from 
s can be described in the framework of 
c s
household behavior or experimental data provided by conjoint choice or contingent 
behavior surveys. The household decision prob e 
f ) es 
that households, which have several choices of the types of service or providers, choose 
t lity. T  
e a
 ice quality c ork 
o p ty 
tion of the error term. The indire ually 
assumed to be linear in household characteristics, the infrastructure service quality, and 
al analysis (Um et al. 2002). 
Conjoint analysis approach 
In some c
alternative energy or water sources. Such situation
onjoint analysis. In this approach, it is po sible to use actual data from revealed 
lem can be conveniently modeled in th
ramework of the random utility model (RUM (McFadden 1974). The RUM postulat
he alternative that yields the highest uti his problem lends itself to econometric
stimation with discrete choice models (Hanem nn 1984; Train 2003).  
The welfare impact of a serv hange can be measured in the framew
f the random utility model with modest assum tions about the form of the indirect utili
ct utility function is usfunction and the distribu
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other 
⎥⎢ ⎟⎜ +−−⎟⎜ +−⋅= ∑∑ scscWTP γβγββ  
service attributes. Writing the indirect utility function in terms of these 
characteristics and attributes results in an expression for the expected WTP for service 
quality change. As Haab and McConnell (2002) show, if the error term is distributed as a 
type I extreme value, then this expression is given by 

























β  and γ are parameters to be estimated, nc  is the price of service n, ns  is a 
vector of attributes of service n, and n denotes a specific scenario from a range of J 
scenarios. The expression obtained in this calculation is normalized by the m rginal a
utility of income, ,yβ  which is the estimated para ter on the price of service or any 
The W P is computed as the willingness to pay to achieve conditions 
when the cu c s n J
me
other monetary attribute of service that represents its cost (Haab and McConnell 2002). 
* *
n n
T ( , , 1,..., )n nc s n J=  
rrent conditions are ( , , 1,..., ).=  Willingness to pay can be computed 
oett et al. 2000; 
for changes in service price or service quality and removal of a choice option. 
In conjoint choice surveys, a series of experiments are presented to each surveyed 
customer. The alternatives in the experiments are characterized by a range of service 
attributes, such as frequency and duration of service interruptions, voltage or pressure 
levels, etc., as well as price of service (e.g., Henscher et al. 2004; G
Louviere et. al. 2000; Cai et al. 1998). Each attribute, such as the service price or quality 
or the type of service provider (e.g. public or private), is varied across respondents in 
order to provide variation in the data. The advantage of this method is that it allows 
estimation of marginal WTP for each service attribute. 
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The obstacles to wider use of the conjoint choice approach in infrastructure 
service quality valuation are related to the complexity of survey design and the potential 
biases associated with the hypothetical nature of stated preference data. In general, 
welfare estimates generated from contingent valuation surveys, or any other stated 
preference methods, have been criticized because of the hypothetical nature of the data. 
This is considered to be the main drawback of stated preference methods and is 
Briscoe et al. 1990; Griffin et al. 1995). This is particularly likely to be true when 
respondents are very familiar with the infrastructure services described in a survey. 
Griffin et al. (1995) compare the results from a contingent valuation survey of 
th whether 
these h
                                                
frequently revisited in the literature on contingent valuation (Diamond and Hausman 
1994, Carson et. al. 2000, Carson et. al. 2001).34 However, estimates of WTP for 
infrastructure services obtained from stated preference data may be more reliable and 
suffer less from hypothetical bias than similar estimates for environmental quality 
changes, for which these methods were originally developed (Whittington et al. 1990; 
households’ WTP for a piped water connection in the Kerala State in India wi
ouseholds actually chose to connect after the service was offered. In the survey, 
households stated whether they would connect based on scenarios specifying the 
connection charge, monthly fees, and future service reliability. The results of this survey 
were remarkably precise in predicting the share of households that chose to be connected 
to the newly provided piped water supply, thus validating the use of the contingent 
valuation approach in the valuation of infrastructure services.35  
 
enti et al. 2005. 
 
35 Another study compared WTP for infrastructure services from contingent valuation surveys with 
revealed preference data in three Latin American countries and came to a different conclusion (Walker et 
34 A summary of the references on this issue is contained in Devici
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An example of an application of the conjoint choice approach in the infrastructure 
context is given by the research on water and wastewater services in Canberra, Australia 
(Henscher et al. 2004). This study is based on a survey where respondents were presented 
with two choice experiments, one regarding drinking water services and the other 
regarding wastewater services. The experiments specified the price of service and a range 
of service attributes, including the frequency, duration, time of the day, and prior 
notification for service interruptions. Analysis of the responses using a discrete choice 
model estimated WTP for each service attribute. A similar survey was recently conducted 
in Sri Lanka to evaluate demand for quality of water services (Yang et al. 2005).  
Discrete choice models also provide a framework for analyzing contingent 
behavior data if the survey experiment simulates the discrete choice of a source or 
provider of a service. In a study of Chinese households in the Wolong nature reserve 
area, An et al. (2002) modeled the household choice between wood and electricity for 
cookin
onses to changes in the 
quality of water supply in Istanbul, Turkey, and Faisalabad, Pakistan. The paper 
                                                                                                                                                
g and heating. The respondents report whether they would switch from fuel wood 
to electricity with a specific price and electricity reliability scenario. Scenarios were 
varied among respondents. Using the share of respondents that would switch to electricity 
in each specified scenario, the paper estimates a decrease in the volume of fuel wood 
consumption and the impact on the panda habitat in the nature reserve. 
The discrete choice framework can also be applied to modeling actual choices of 
an infrastructure service provider or types of substitutes for publicly provided services. 
Humplick et al. (1993) analyzes households’ behavioral resp
 
al., 2000). Survey estimates of WTP fall below the actual expenditures on substitute sources of water, 
which suggests, contrary to the earlier finding in Kerala, that WTP estimates are not reliable. Of course, the 
results depend on specific conditions in survey areas and on the survey framework. 
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postula
ly of a 
particu
ces among these 
method
tes that households demand attributes of the service, which can be classified as 
reliability, availability, and accessibility attributes. Water supply reliability is defined in 
terms of adequacy of the service, and is measured by the pressure level, interruptions of 
supply, and the quality of water in terms of odor, color, taste, and turbidity. Availability 
is measured for each source of water, i.e., piped water, streams, lakes, rivers, or 
rainwater. Accessibility is defined by the ability of a household to use each particular 
source. The study argues that the prevalence of supply interruptions were one of the 
service attributes that determined a household’s choice of water source. Implicit in this 
approach is the assumption that if there are severe interruptions in the supp
lar source, then a household would not use it even part of the time. This 
assumption precludes, for example, situations when households would use piped water if 
it is available and backup sources otherwise. When this is not a realistic assumption, an 
intermittent supply model such as suggested in the following chapter is a more 
appropriate modeling approach. 
Criteria for choosing a welfare evaluation method 
In this chapter, I have reviewed methods for welfare evaluation of changes in 
infrastructure service quality, described the theoretical assumptions and illustrated each 
method with examples that highlight common features and differen
ologies. I have also evaluated the methods that are used in project evaluation in 
the broader theoretical perspective of welfare measurement. In doing so, I follow an 
important observation by Bockstael and McConnell (1999), who conclude that extending 
current thinking about welfare economics to new problems is more likely to be fruitful 
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when one confronts a problem with general notions of how behavioral methods work, 
rather than with the specific toolkit of travel cost models, defensive expenditures, etc.  
Direct demand estimation techniques are well-developed, highly adaptable, and 
lend themselves to convenient estimation of accurate measures of CV and EV when data 
are available. In contrast, averting behavior models either require stringent assumptions 
or else produce only bounds on WTP. The averting behavior approach allows calculating 
lower (upper) bounds on welfare gains (losses) from improvement (deterioration) in 
service quality. This method also relies on the assumptions of weak complementarity and 
non-essentiality. In rare cases, when the mitigating inputs and service quality can be 
assumed to be perfect substitutes, a change in averting expenditures gives an exact 
measure of CV rather than a lower bound. This approach is particularly useful when for 
various reasons the direct demand estimation method is not a viable analytical tool. 
In some situations, random utility models represent household behavior better 
than continuous utility maximization models. This happens when consumers have a 
ders, types of substitutes, or other 
alternatives. 
choice from among a finite number of service provi
options. This choice could be observed in the data on service consumption or could be 
modeled through conjoint choice or contingent behavior surveys. These surveys are 
beginning to be used for the purpose of conducting welfare analysis of infrastructure 
service quality changes. The downside of this method is the complexity of survey design 
and, if survey data are used, the potential for bias common to all stated preference 
methods. Conjoint analysis of discrete choice problems with RUM models has extensive 
data requirements and requires continuous observations on all attributes of all 
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Assumptions of weak complementarity and non-essentiality are required by most 
methods (direct estimation, averting behavior, and conjoint analysis) which may or may 
not be 
 be a 
useful 
ated preference data with revealed preference data is perfectly feasible in 
appropriate in specific applications. However, they can be overcome in the direct 
demand estimation method by relaxing non-essentiality for essential household services 
such as cooking and heating, while allowing weak complementarity for specific energy 
sources such as electricity or gas. This can be achieved in a household production 
framework that explicitly models the substitution of energy sources in the household 
technology used to produce essential household services. This is demonstrated in the 
approach proposed in the next chapter, which also has the advantage of eliminating the 
need to observe characteristics such as the prices of energy sources that are, in effect, 
temporarily unavailable with intermittent supply. 
When revealed preference data are inadequate, stated preference data can
supplement because revealed preferences can lead to better model calibration in 
the range of observed data while contingent behavior surveys can be used to better 
estimate behavior for conditions far outside the bounds of observed data. Thus, a 
combination of data sources is desirable. The combined use of revealed and stated 
preference data can significantly extend data availability and enable thorough welfare 
analysis of reform at a relatively low cost. All three methods discussed earlier, as well as 
the model proposed in the next chapter, can use revealed preference data or stated 
preference data. Traditionally, direct demand estimation has relied solely upon revealed 
preference data, which leaves such models vulnerable to poor projections for 




 fixed expenditures on appliances that 
use alte
  
emand estimation and eliminates that weakness. Furthermore, revealed preference 
data is more likely available for direct demand estimation and averting behavior models 
while the extensive data requirements of RUM models (i.e., continuous observations on 
all attributes of all alternatives) often renders limited revealed preference data unusable. 
Problems of intermittent supply with frequent and unpredictable service 
interruptions suggest a new modeling approach. The discrete choice model is 
cumbersome at best and inapplicable at worst for problems with intermittent supply 
because the choice set is continually modified. The traditional direct demand estimation 
approach can rarely be used because the data on unconstrained consumption at different 
reliability levels are almost never available. The averting behavior model is not an 
appropriate modeling approach when the data on
rnative sources of energy during service interruptions is weak. Fully accounting 
for the costs of averting actions and the additional benefits beyond the actions required to 
mitigate supply deterioration are both crucially important and particularly difficult with 
intermittent supply problems. The averting behavior model is much better suited to 
situations when households permanently switch to a substitute source of energy or water 
as a result of poor intrinsic quality of the supply rather than temporary switching due to 
intermittent outages. Rather than using one of the traditional approaches, intermittent 
supply problems can be modeled within the framework of a switching regression model 
of direct demand estimation. In the next chapter, I propose such a model aggregated over 
time to correspond with observed time periods in revealed preference data.  
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6 A model of household energy demand with intermittent supply 
e 
conside
Households can obtain energy services from a variety of fuels to produce each home 
ijan, the most common heating fuels are natural gas, electricity and wood 
(see chapter 4). Heating oil (kerosene) and LPG are also used for heating, but to a very 
 
This chapter develops an intermittent supply model that is better suited to the household 
energy economy of Azerbaijan than the various models reviewed in chapter 5. It can b
red a special case of the direct demand estimation method adapted for the case 
where supply interruptions are frequent, their timing cannot be predicted, and their 
duration does not correspond to observed time units of measurement. Unlike most direct 
estimation methods, the intermittent supply model takes into account the supply 
constraints, so data on rationed consumption can be used directly in the model without 
further adjustments. This intermittent supply approach is useful in situations where price 
variation is insufficient for the estimation of a conventional demand function for a 
service, but variation in supply scenarios created by supply interruptions generates 
variation in effective energy prices to the household as the mix of available fuels 
changes. Thus, the data on variation in hours of supply and on consumption and prices of 
substitute fuels can be used for periods when they are available, but are not needed for 
periods when they are unavailable. Estimated parameters from demand equations for 
household services can be used to calculate the CV or EV of a price and service quality 
change based on the household technology. In its current version, the intermittent supply 
model estimates a short-run welfare impact of changes in service quality, treating the 




sm ain cooking fuels in Azerbaijan are natural gas, electricity, and wall extent. The m ood 
lthough LPG is also an important cooking source in some regions. For lighting, 
ming uncertainty, i.e., that supply interruptions cannot 
, consider the short-run problem of how much of each type of energy to 
a
households in Azerbaijan use electricity and to a much lesser extent kerosene. After 
adjusting for the energy content and the conversion efficiency of different fuels into 
useful energy, natural gas is by far the cheapest energy source for either cooking or 
heating. It is followed by electricity, wood, LPG and kerosene, with the latter the most 
expensive source. The planned reforms in the electricity sector, if the government 
proceeds with the electricity and gas price increase as planned, would change the relative 
cost of electricity, making it the most expensive fuel by 2010.  
However, electricity and network gas supplies are frequently interrupted. 
Households use gas when it is available, and during interruptions they rely on more 
expensive substitutes. The second best choice is electricity. If it is also not available, then 
households use the fuels they can buy on the market or collect themselves, like fuel wood 
or dung. While LPG is a relatively cheaper cooking source than wood, is not widely used 
at the national level because of its limited availability in some regions. 
An important aspect of this energy choice modeling problem is that supply 
interruptions for gas and electricity are frequent and unpredictable. To model this 
problem, a useful approach is to consider the instantaneous utility maximization problem 
of the household. For example, consider the fuel choice decision of a single household 
over the course of a month. Assu
be predicted
consume at each point in time given the current stock of appliances owned by the 
household.  
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At each instant, a household maximizes utility as a function of consumption of 
heating, cooking and lighting services, and the numeraire good,  
0max ( , , , )U h c l X  
where h, c and l denote the quantities of heating, cooking and lighting consumed as home 
goods, and X0 is quantity of the numeraire good consumed. These home goods can be 
produced from either network or market fuels using the household technology. The 
choice variables in the problem thus also include how much of each energy source to use 
in producing the home goods. 
To simplify the representation of the household technology, the conversion of 
input e
ds obtained from 
differen
)
nergy from different sources into the home goods can be represented conveniently 
as follows. First, the amount of gas, electricity, and wood can be converted into common 
energy units. For the purposes of this study, each energy source is converted into oil 
equivalents to make price comparisons. Since some fuels such as electricity are more 
efficient in heating and cooking than fossil fuels, a further adjustment for appliance 
efficiency is necessary in order to calculate the amount of home goo
t fuels. The same fuel can be more efficient in heating and less efficient in 
cooking. However, for given appliances the assumption of fixed input-output coefficients 
makes modeling the household technology relatively simple, particularly when data are 
available on energy conversion coefficients. 
The relationship between energy inputs and home goods consumed can be 
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e i = H, C, and L, where 
H, C, and L denote use for heating, cooking, or lighting, respectively; and zij represents 
Gi, Ei, Wi, and Ki denote the quantities of network gas, electricity, wood and 
kerosene, respectively, used for home production of energy servic
both the conversion into oil equivalents and the efficiency of converting energy source j 
into energy service i given household appliances, i = H, C, L; j = G, E, W, K.36 For 
purposes of clarifying terminology, the quantities of the associated home goods 
consumed, denoted by h, c, and l, are differentiated from the quantities of energy services 
used to produce them, HG H HE H HW HH z= G z E z W+ + , CG C CE C CW CC z G z E z W= + + , and 
L z=
sumed in the form of a numeraire good; Y 
denote
                                                
LE L LKE z K+  (gas is not used for lighting in Azerbaijan and kerosene is used only 
for lighting). Consumption of energy services is not observable whereas input quantities 
are observable given available data on energy conversion coefficients. Note also that in 
Azerbaijan some regions rely on LPG rather than wood for cooking when neither 
network gas nor electricity are available. For purposes of illustrating the theoretical 
model, this fuel choice is not modeled, but it is included as a choice in the empirical 
estimation for households that live in such areas. 
Households maximize utility subject to the following budget constraint  
0( ) ( ) ( ) ,G H C E L H C W C H K LP G G P E E E P W W P K X Y+ + + + + + + + =  
assuming nonsatiation where Pj denotes the price of energy source j, j = G, E, W, K; X 
denotes the quantity of all other goods con
s total household income (or expenditures); and the price of the numeraire good is 
 
36 The energy conversion coefficients vary across households depending on the age and type of appliances, 
however information about the type of appliance was not sufficient in the 2003 HES or 2004 HBS to 
discern differences in conversion coefficients across households. Thus, in the dissertation I use standard 
conversion coefficients from international sources reported for developing countries (International Energy 
Agency, reported by O’Sullivan and Barnes 2006). 
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normalized to 1. The prices of gas, electricity and wood are the market prices, unadjusted 
for energy content or appliance efficiency.  












G  and E  are available amounts of gas and electricity, respectively. In the 
Azerbaijan problem of in either 
tively unlimited quantities to the household, or are not available at all. 
As a result, given the technological framework above, availability of gas or electricity 
can be represented simply by a price change from the network or market price to an 
infinite price or, equivalently, by eliminating it from consideration in the household 
problem during outages.
stantaneous consumption, however, gas or electricity are 
available in effec
y technologies embodied in current 
applian le fuel is 
used at each point in time. The fuel choice is thus determined by a combination of 
relative prices and availability. This approach greatly reduces data requirements for 
estimation when certain data are missing (during periods of outages for the relevant 
energy source). In this framework, energy source j is chosen to produce energy service i 
at a given point in time if it is available and k
Assuming that fuels substitute in fixed proportions in producing energy services 
based on efficiency considerations imposed b
ces, utility maximization implies that only the least expensive availab
 / /j ij k iP z P z<  for j, k = G, E, W, K, k ≠ j 
where i denotes the energy service, i = H, C, L. The respective ratios of market prices of 
fuels to the energy coefficients represent the effective prices of a unit of heating, cooking, 
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and lighting services. For example, /G HGP z  is the effective price of one oil equivalent of 
heating services from network gas. 
Based on preliminary empirical verification, the relative prices per effective unit 
of energy services from different fuels, after adjusting for energy content and appliance 
efficiency, are described by the following relationships throughout the sample data: 
Heating:   PG /zHG < PE /zHE < PW /zHW
Cooking:  PG /zCG < PE /zCE < PW /zCW 
Lighting:  PE /zLE < PK /zLK
This allows considerable simplification in the modeling effort (although switching of 
efficiency relationships among fuels could certainly be accommodated in the model). 
Thus, let fuel choices for each energy service be represented by 
{ }| / min( / | ) ,i j ij k ik ij j P z P z k A= = ∈  ,,, LCHi =  
where Ai represents the availability set of energy choices for energy service i at a given 
point in time. Where the utility function U~  and each of the energy service production 
functions, h, c, and l, have typical properties, the utility maximization problem can thus 
be represented as 
0U h z X c z X h z X X U z X z X z X X≡
 
subject to  
=
where U includes both preference parameters of the household and parameters of the 
household energy service production functions, and 
0
0, , , H H C C L L H H C C L LH C L
Hj Hj Cj Cj Lj Lj Hj Hj Cj Cj Lj LjXij Xij Xij X
i
max ( ( ), ( ), ( ), ) ( , , , )
0H H C C L Lj Hj j Cj j Lj
P X P X P X X Y+ + +  
ijX is the quantity chosen of service i 
from fuel j. First-order conditions for the associated Lagrangian,           
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i UP z P
i X i
λ λ∂− = − =
∂ ∂ ∂
 ,,, LCHij ij j
U∂ ∂







the former of which can be expressed as 
/ 0,j
U P zλ∂ − =  .,, LCHi =  
i iiji∂
Thus, using typical duality results, the associated indirect utility function can be 
written as V p p p Y V P z P z P z Y=  where V is a function with  ( , , , ) ( / , / , / , )
H H C C L LH C L j Hj j Cj j Lj
the standard properties of an indirect utility function and the prices of the respective 
home goods, heat, cooking, and lighting, are defined by / , / ,
H H C CH j Hj C j Cj
p P z p P z= =  
and  ./L LL j Ljp P z= This function can take typical f s used for modeling indirect utility orm
functions and can generate the associated demand specifications via Roy’s identity. 
 For example, suppose prices satisfy / / / / ,G iG E iE W iW K iKP z P z P z P z< < <  
LCHi ,,= , and gas and electricity are available, in which case AH = {G,E,W}, AC = 
{G,E,W}, and AL = {E,K}. Then this problem becomes 
 s.t. 0, , ,max ( , , , )H C L HG H CG C LE LG G E X
U z G z G z E X 0 ,G H G C E LP G P G P E X Y+ + + =  
for which the indirect utility function is  In this case with 
both gas and electricity available, the household chooses gas for heating and cooking, and 
electricity for lighting. Other fuels are not used. 
H C
( / , / , / , ).G HG G CG E LEV P z P z P z Y
 If gas is unavailable but electricity is available, then A  = {E,W}, A  = {E,W}, 




max ( , , , )
H C L
HE H CE C LE LE E E X
U z E z E z E X  s.t. 0 ,E H E C E LP E P E P E X Y+ + + =  
for which the indirect utility function is  In this case with 
gas unavailable but electricity available, the household chooses electricity for heating, 
cooking, and lighting. Other fuels are not used. 
 If neither gas nor electricity are available, then AH = {W}, AC = {W}, and AL = 
{K} so the problem ecomes 
max
H C LW W K




( , , , )HW H CW C LK LX U z W z W z K X  s.t. 0 ,E H E C E LP E P E P E X Y, , + + + =   
for which t / , ).z Y  In this case, the 
household chooses wood for heating and cooking and kerosene for lighting. Thus, where 
input fuels substitute in fixed proportions given technical ces, 
he indirect utility function is W HW W CW K LKV P z P z P
 efficiency of current applian
ergy 
types of fu
( / , / ,
fuel choices depend on current fuel availability.  
In this model, the rates at which a household trades off any two types of en
services are sufficient to determine the rates at which the household trades off any two 
els. For example, where electricity is used for lighting and gas is used for 
heating, the tradeoff is 
( )
/ ,( ) /
HG H
HG GH H
LE L LE E E
G
z GU U
z P PG H G U H





⋅∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= = ⋅ = =
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ⋅
 i.e., // ,
/ /
G HG










ther combinations of the energy services 
ces should be equal to the price ratio, with the 
prices adjusted by the respective energy conversion coefficients.  
which is the familiar condition equating the marginal rate of substitution to the price 
ratio. Similar conditions can be derived for all o
and types of input fuels. This optimality condition states simply that the ratio of marginal 
utilities of the heating and lighting servi
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Similarly, comparing tradeoffs of energy consumption for consumption of the 












 i.e., // ,
/ 1






w equates the marginal rate of substitution of energy consumption for the least-cost 
fuel and consumption of the n
hich 
umeraire to the associated price ratio.  
In this model, fuel demands will be a function of the effective prices of energy 
 Effective prices of energy services can be services, income and fuel availability.
represented as 
{ }/ | / min( / | ) ,i j ij j ij k ik ip P z P z P z k A= = ∈  .,, LCHi =  
Thus, the demands for energy services are of the form 
LE L LK H C L
H z
L z E z K L p p p Y
=
With this formulation, relatively few parameters require estimation so the 
structure of the technology permits estimation with some missing data. For example, if 
prices satisfy  
( , , , )
( , , , )
G H HE H HW H H C L
CG C CE C CW C H C L
G z E z W H p p p Y
C z G z E z W C p p p Y
+ + =
= + + =
= + =
 
( , , , ).
H
/ / / / ,G iG E iE W iW K iKP z P z P z P z< < <  ,,, LCHi =  and gas and electricity 
are available, then these equations imply that energy demands are 
,( , , , ) / ( , , ) /
( , , , ) /
H C H C L HG H C L CG
L H C L LE
G G G H p p p Y z C p p p Y z= + = +
 
If gas is not available but electricity is, then energy demands are 
E E L p p p Y z= =
,0=W   .0=K  
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0
( , , , ) / ( , , , ) / ( , , , ) /H C L H C L HE H C LE E E E H p p p Y z C p p p
,0=W  .0=K  
CE H C L LE
G
Y z L p p p Y z
=
= + + = + +
If neither gas nor electricity is available, then energy demands are 
,0=G  ,0=E  
( , , , ) / ( , , , ) /H C H C L HW H C L CWW W W H p p p Y z C p p p Y z= + = +  
 .( , , , ) /H C L LKK L p p p Y z=
Expan
they are available. Expanding the fuel set to include LPG, four typical 
regimes can be defined depending on the availability of lectricity, and LPG 
assuming that either wood or dung are always available as a backup energy source for 
heating or cooking, and that kerosene is always available to purchase for lighting. Other 
combinations are also possible, but they are rarely  practice.  
Assuming that cross-sectional variation in fuel availability is indicative of 
variatio
egime 3a, and 11 percent of the time in regim
e but electricity is not, 
approximately 2 percent of the time. Thus, I have chosen to ignore this minor regime 
with a good gas supply but a poor electricity supply in the model. 
ding the model to more fuel choices 
For purposes of empirical application, this model is expanded to consider additional fuel 
choices where 
 natural gas, e
 observed in
n across time, calculations reveal that 49 percent of the time households in the 
2003 HES sample are in regime 1, 21 percent of the time they are in regime 2, 12 percent 
of the time in r e 3b.37 They are in the 
additional regime of fuel availability, when gas supply is availabl
                                                 
37 In order to make this calculation, I assumed that electricity supply with an average of more than 10 hours 
per day is sufficiently reliable to use electricity for heating and cooking; if it is less reliable, then electricity 
supply was assumed not to be available for heating and cooking use for the purposes of calculating these 
figures. 
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Therefore we limit the number of choice sets to four regimes. Each household can 
face up to four regimes depending on local circumstances. Some households live in areas 
onditions are largely 
determ  we assume that households do not switch between having access 
to LPG and not having it over time. To the extent that this switching occurs, consumption 
of fuel wood and LPG was aggregated into a single category of transitional (LPG) and 
s converted into oil equivalents of energy consumption for 
estimation purposes. Other factors that influence fuel choice, such as the preferences for a 
clean or convenient fuel, are ignored for the moment.   
The energy service production functions, direct and indirect utility functions, and 
income evaluated at the optimum in each availability regime are provided in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1 Fuel availability regimes and household service production functions. 
where LPG is supplied, while others do not. Because these c
ined by locality,









Maximized utility function 
and energy service 
expenditures 
Indirect utility function  
 
1 G, E, LPG, H = h(z G) 
L = l(zLEE) 
U(H,C,L,X) =  
Y = PG (GH+GC) + PE EL+X0




C = c(zCGG) U (zHGGH, zCGGC, zLEEL,X0) 
 
H C L
V(PG/zHG, PG/zCG, PE/zLE,,Y) 
2 E, LPG, K, 
W 
H = h(zHEE) 
C = c(zCEE) 
L =  l(zLEE) 
U(H,C,L,X0) =  
U (zHEEH, zCEEC, zLEEL,X0) 
Y = PE (EH+EC+EL) +X0
 
) 
V(pH,pC,pL,Y) =  






B), K, W 
H = h(zHWW) 
C = c(z B) 
L =l(z
CB HW H CB C LK L 0 PW HW B CB K LK ) 
LKK) 
U(H,C,L,X0) =  
U (z W , z B , z K ,X ) 
Y = PW WH + PB BC+PKKL+X0
 
V(pH,pC,pL,Y) =  




W, K H = h(zHWW) 
C = c(zCWW) 
U(H,C,L,X) =  
U (z
L = l(zLKK) Y = PW (WH + WC)+ PKKL+X0
) 
 
HWWH, zCWWC, zLKKL,X0) 
 
V(pH,pC,pL,Y) =  
V(PW/zHW, PW/zHW, PK/zLK, Y
 
 
                                                 
38 A similar approach is used in practice in project and policy evaluation, when for simplicity households 
are assumed indifferent among effective units of energy from different substitute fuels. For example, this 
approach is used in the World Bank publication that provides guidance on cost benefit analysis of 
electrification projects (Energy Sector Management Assistance Program, 2002). 
 95
Interte




results in consu on sm r exam holds are saving money for 
retirement (Blundell et. al. 1994). 
Certain features o ble e intratemporal budget 
allo ion pr e. real  wh
high cost energy regimes falls, and the margin  utility of income rises. Optimal 
co p  in
indirect utility on, I c  as an instantaneous rate of income n 
time, which remains con the en the monthly model 
presents an aggregation over the monthly time period in a manner that would be 
ith typical modeling where the time period of observation is sufficiently short 
mporal weighting of energy availability regimes 
The model as outlined thus far generates a switching regression framework as regimes of 
fuel availability are changed. In practice, however, the regimes change frequently and 
thus within the monthly time periods of observation. Because switching among the 
various availability regimes cannot be anticipated and occurs randomly within the time 
periods of observation, the problem must be modeled as an aggregation over sub-time 
periods within various regimes. Thus, the intratemporal budget allocation process 
requires discussion. The vast majority of household consumption models assumes 
constant conditions within the time period of observatio
re on intertemporal budget allocation considers how households allocate income 
among observed time periods. A principal implication of this literature is that household
allocate expenditures over time to keep the marginal utility of wealth con
mpti oothing, fo ple, when house
f this pro m are also present in th
cat oblem her O mver ti e,  income d ri g e iodsu n p r en ho eh l s a e n us o d r  i
al
nsumption thus falls. In order to sim lify the derivation of the tratemporal expected 
functi  treat in ome  at each point i




to have constant conditions within each time period. I assume that expectations of gas 
ing and lighting services is a weighted average of the 
service
and electricity reliability are constant so changes in expectations do not affect behavior. 
 Making these two assumptions, it is possible to specify an aggregate expected 
indirect utility function over a monthly period of observation as a weighted average of the 
indirect utility functions over shorter time periods in each regime. The weights are the 
shares of time that households are in each energy availability regime over the course of a 
month. Thus, the term “expected” as used in this chapter describes expected or average 
conditions over a one-month period considering the average share of time spent in each 
energy availability regime. It does not suggest any risk aversion response on the part of 
the household has been incorporated into the model. Thus, with the time shares of each 
regime merely serve as the weights in computing the average. Making these assumptions, 
fuel use over the course of a month can be modeled in terms of fuel availability as 
follows. Assuming that only one fuel is used at a time for producing each household 
good, the amount of heating, cook
s obtained from the different inputs: 
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )( ),
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )( ),
( ) ( )( ) (1 )( ),
H HG H HE H HW
C CG C CE C CW
E H G z E z W z
E C G z E z W z
E L E z K zL LE L LK
θ φ θ φ
θ φ θ φ
θ φ θ φ
= + + − −
= + + − −
= + + − −
 
where θ denotes the share of time a household is in Regime 1, φ  is the share of time in 
Regime 2, and (1 – θ –φ ) is the share of time in Regime 3a or 3b, depending on location. 
The frequency and duration of gas and electricity service interruptions vary over time. 
Thus, θ and φ  vary over time and households. Survey data provides information on the 
average number of the daily hours of supply for each energy source in the previous 
month, which are used as data for θ and  .φ  
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The instantaneous input fuel demands in this approach are implicitly assumed to 
be independent of the weights θ, φ , and )1( φθ −−  in the short-run. In addition, the 
decision problem is assumed to be the same in each monthly time period aside from 
factors that can be controlled in estimation (such as fuel prices, outages, household 
characteristics, weather, etc.). In other words, instantaneous fuel use at time t2 is 
independent of fuel availability and choice at time t1 and of the expected instantaneous 
availability and choice in time t3. If there is a dependence on other periods, then the 
aggregate fuel demands need to be modeled as a dynamic problem. These assumptions 
seem plausible over relatively short periods of time where appliances are fixed. 
Thus, the expected utility function over the course of a month takes the following 
form (for households in areas where LPG is not available) where expectations are over 
fuel availability regimes: 
( ) , , , , , , (1 ) , , , .G G W WE E E E K
HG CG LE HE CE LE HW CW LK
P P P PP P P P P
z z z z z z z z z
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
Implementation with an explicit indirect u




A flexible functional form can be used to model the indirect utility function of household 
energy services because the energy services can be regarded as essential. However, every 
household energy service can be produced from a variety of fuels, so each individual fuel 
can be appropriately modeled as a non-essential good. Flexible functional forms have 
been used in numerous applications in the last three decades because more flexible 
er ture, these models are used to test theoretical 
functional forms are tractable compared to earlier primal demand systems. The most 
well-known flexible functional forms for demand systems are the translog proposed by 
Christensen et. al. (1975) and the almost ideal demands system (AIDS) proposed by 




o test the 
restrict
lobally in the unit interval.  Modifications have been proposed 
to increase the flexibility of the AIDS model. Examples are the dynamic specification of 
the model (described in Edgerton et. al. 1996), the quadratic generalization of Engel 
odified almost ideal 
ons derived from consumer demand theory and provide estimated price and 
income elasticities (Pollak and Wale  1992, S an and Clements 1995, Edgerton et. 
al. 1996).  
In Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980, p. 312) words, the AIDS model has several 
advantages over alternative functional forms: it “gives an arbitrary first-order 
approximation to any demand system; it satisfies the axioms of choice exactly; it 
aggregates perfectly over consumers without invoking parallel linear Engel curves; it has 
a functional form which is consistent with known household-budget data; it is simple to 
estimate, largely avoiding the need for nonlinear estimation; and it can be used t
ions of homogeneity and symmetry through linear restrictions on fixed 
parameters.” The remaining limitation of the AIDS model is that individual budget shares 
are not guaranteed to lie g
curves in the quadratic AIDS model (Banks et. al. 1997), and the m
demand system (MAIDS), which guarantees budget shares in the unit interval (Cooper 
and McLaren 1988; Agrawal and Powell 1992). 
Similarly, Jorgenson, Lau and Stoker (1982) strongly argue in favor of the 
translog over the AIDS model on the basis of the translog model’s flexibility. Although 
this issue has generated considerable debate in the literature, Lewbel (1989) demonstrates 
that both models are not only very similar in terms of the theoretical restrictions they 
impose on consumer behavior, but also in terms of estimation results. Thus, Lewbel 
(1989) proposed a general model that nests both the AIDS and translog forms and 
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estimated it using consumer expenditure surveys produced by the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. He shows that estimation of the generalized form and estimation of the AIDS 
and translog models separately produce very similar parameter and price elasticity 
estimates and both models are about equal in terms of the explanatory power. Thus, in his 
own words, “the controversy over the relative merits of the AIDS and translog systems 
appears to be unnecessary, since both yield very similar elasticity estimates” (Lewbel 
1989).  
Both the AIDS model and the translog functional forms belong to the so-called 
price-independent generalized logarithmic (PIGLOG) class of preferences proposed by 
Muellbauer (1976). The key feature of the AIDS model is linearity of budget shares with 
respect to the logarithm of total expenditures. The budget shares are specified as  
{ }( , ) log log / ,i i ij j iw P Y p Y Pα β ϑ= + +∑  
i
0 k k kj k j
k j k
and where , ,
j
where w  = denotes the budget share of fuel i, and P is a price index defined by 
P p p pα α β= + +∑ ∑∑  log log 1/ 2 log log ,
α β  and ϑ are estimated parameters satisfying 




=∑ .,,, LCHji =    























,jiij ββ =   and .1=∑ kα  
k
Data constraints present problems for application of either of these approaches. 
As discussed in chapter 3, total expenditures had to be imputed for two-thirds of the 
sample for this study. However, using an imputed total expenditures variable on the right 
hand side of the budget share equations is likely to generate biased parameter estimates. 
While an instrumental variables approach could be used, all of the variables on which 
instruments could be based are already in the regressions. Alternatively, I have chosen to 
use a homothetic specification. The homothetic translog model is the simplest 
specification in the translog family and is also the special case of the AIDS model 
implied by homotheticity. By assuming that 0,ϑ =  the AIDS model reduces to the 
homothetic translog. As argued in chapter 4, household income (total expenditures) has 
little correlation with budget shares. Hence, the assumption underlying the homothetic 
pear very 
restrictive in the case of Azerbaijan.  
The homothetic translog indirect utility function is given by 
jV p Y Y p p pα β= − −∑ ∑∑  
where 
translog model that total income does not affect expenditure shares does not ap
( , ) log log 1/ 2 log log ,i i ij i
i i j
jiij ββ =   ji,∀ ,     ,   and  0ij
j
β =∑   i∀ 1,i
i
α =∑   .,,, LCHji =  
By Roy’s identity in the budget share form, the budget share for fuel i that would 
apply if fuel i where the preferred fuel and were available throughout the observed time 
period would be given by the following expression: 
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( ) /V α βlog log
( ) / log
i





= − = +




i denotes the budget share of fuel i. Applying this to the expected indirect utility, 
E(V), above using the homothetic translog indirect utility function form obtains the 
following expression for the expected budget shares: 
j j j





p , and 
3j
p  denote the prices of heating, cooking and lighting fuels in each 
of the three regimes.  
Substituting the prices that correspond to each of the regimes obtains the 
following expression for the expected indirect ut nction: 
(
1 2
( log ) ( log ) (1 )( log )i i ij j i ij j i ij j
){ ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}
2( ) log log / log / log / 0.5 log /
0.5 log / 0.5 log / 0.5 log / log /
             log log /
H G HG C G CG L E LE HH G HG
CC G CG LL E LE HC G HG G CG
HL G HG E LE CL G CG E LE
E V Y P z P z P z P z
P z P z P z P z
Y P
θ α α α β
β β β
φ α
= − − − −
− − −




log / log / 0.5 log /
0.5 log / 0.5CC E CE







0.5 log / log / 0.5 log / log /
H E
P z P z P z P zβ β− −
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )}
( ){ ( )
2log / 0.5 log / log /
/ (1 )
log log / log / log
HE C E CE E E LE HH E HE
LL E LE HC E HE E CE
E LE
HW W HW CW W CW LK K
P z P z P z
P z






− − − ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}
2
2 2
/ 0.5 log /
0.5 log / 0.5 log / 5 log / log /
0.5 log / log / 0.5 log / log / ,
LK HH W HW
CC W CW LL K LK HC W HW W CW
HL W HW K LK CL W CW K LK
z P z
P z P z P z P z







where the α’s β’s are unknown coefficients, and the z’s are the known energy 
conversion coefficients.  
Rewriting the model in terms of price indexes obtains a relatively simple model 
for estimation purposes,  





* * * **
** ** ** **
( ) log log log l **g 0.5 log 0.5 log
             0.5 log 0.5 log 0.5 log 0.5 log ,
H H C C L L HH HH CC CC
LL LL HC HC HL HL CL CL
E V Y p p p p p
p p p p
α α α β β
β β β β
= − − − − −
− − − −
 
o
where the pi*’s are price indexes defined by 
( ) ( ) ( )*log log / log / (1 ) log / ,i G iG E iE W iWp P z P z P zθ φ θ φ= + + − −  , , ,i H C L=  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
**log log / log / log / logp P z P z P z Pθ θ= + / log / log /
(1 ) log / log / ,
ij G iG G jG E iE E jE E iE E jE
W iW W jW
z P z P z







except that G and W are replaced by E and K, respectively, in the case where i = L and/or 
j = L.  
The application of Roy’s identity in the budget share form thus results in the 
following set of conditions:   
, , ,i j H C L=  
( ){ ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )}
( ) ( ) ({ }
{
( ) / log log / log / 0.5
log / log / 0.5 log / 0.5 log / ,
= ( ) / log log / log / log /
       log /
G G H C HH G HG CC G CG HC
G HG G CG HL E LE CL E LE
E E LE EE E LE HL G HG CL G
HE CE LE HH E H
w E V P P z P z
P z P z P z P z
w E V P P z P z P z
P z
θ α α β β β
β β
θ α β β β
φ α α α β
= −∂ ∂ = + + + +
+ + +
− ∂ ∂ = + + +
+ + + + ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (( )
( ) ( )( )}
log / log /
0.5 log / 0.5 log / 0.5 log / log /
0.5 log / log / ,
E CC E CE LL E LE
HC E HE HC E CE HL E HE E LE
CL E CE E LE
P z P z
P z P z P z P z









( ){ ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )}
( ) / log (1 ) log / log /
0.5 log / log / 0.5 log /
0.5 log / ,
W W H C HH W HW CC W
HC W HW W CW HL E LE
CL E LE
w E V P P z P z
P z P z P z
P z
θ φ α α β β
β β
β




( ) ( ){( ) / log (1 ) log / 0.5 log /K K L LL K LK HL W HWw E V P P z P zθ φ α β β= −∂ ∂ = − − + +  
( )}0.5 log / .CL W CWP zβ+  
 
Since 1log/)( =∂∂ YVE  in each of the regimes, the above four equations provide the 
expected budget share expressions for different fuel types. 
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Fuel prices are transformed by the data on network energy supply hours, denoted 
by θ  and φ , which vary over households in the survey sample. Therefore, the lack of 
n estimation problem. Price variability is 
introduced alternatively by the changing regimes of availability, w ich thus permits 
estimation of the demand for household services, and which can then be translated into 
market demands under various price and availability scenarios using the observed 
household technology parameters. 
 
e, βHH and βCC are always multiplied by the same terms so that only their sum, βHH 
+ βCC, 
sed for heating, cooking and lighting, which is possible 
because the 2003 HES data contain information on usage hours of different electric 
appliances in the present and in the reform scenario. Disaggregated demand equations 
can be obtained by taking the derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to 
electricity prices related to specific uses, as if those prices were different. The resulting 
budget shares of electricity are: 
electricity price variation does not pose a
h
These equations suggest some possible identification problems for estimation. For
exampl
is identified. This problem can be resolved by disaggregating electricity demand 
into demand for electricity u
( ) ( ){( ) / log log / 0.5 log /HE HE H HH E HE HCw E V P P z P zθ α β β= −∂ ∂ = + +  
( )
E CE
}0.5 log / ,HL E LEP zβ+
( ) ( ){( ) / log log / 0.5 log /CE CE C CC E CE HC E CEw E V P P z P zθ α β β= −∂ ∂ = + +  
( )}0.5 log / ,CL E LEP zβ+
( ) ( ){( ) / log log / 0.5 log /LE LE L LL E LE HL G HGE V P P z P zθ α β β= −∂ ∂ = + +   w
( )} ( ){ ( ) log / 0.5 log /CG L LL E LE HL E HEz P z P zφ α β β+ + +  0.5 log /CL GPβ+
( )}0.5 log / ,CL E CE
 
P zβ+  
where denotes the market price of electricity used for heating, cooking and lighting, 




 of the intermittent supply model 
The mo
imes induces variability in the prices of home energy 
services that permits identification of preference parameters. This perm
second-order flexible functional form to be used to generate demands for essential 
household energy services while reflecting non-essentiality of specific fuels. In order to 
enable this structure, households are assumed to minimize the cost of producing 
household energy services with a rigid structure of fixed-proportions household 
roduction technology without specific preferences for fuel type. This generates a clear 
 is a theoretically valid means of facilitating estimation of demand by fuel type 
and are used theoretically to derive specifications of estimated equations even though the 
observed prices for electricity are always the same for all uses. Identification is made 
possible because the effective price of home energy services differs by use when due to 
switching among fuel availability regimes. In the remainder of this dissertation, however, 
I do not differentiate between electricity prices for different end-uses of electricity. 
Conclusion about the advantages
deling approach proposed in this chapter takes into account the specific nature of 
energy supply and demand conditions in Azerbaijan. By explicitly modeling household 
energy demand in different fuel availability regimes, this model circumvents the heavy 
data requirements of the discrete choice approach as well as other shortcomings of other 
models reviewed in chapter 5. The model developed in this chapter aggregates demand 
for fuels over time to correspond with observed time periods in revealed preference data, 
enabling estimation of parameters of interest for policy analysis notwithstanding the 
missing gas consumption data and a lack of variability in electricity prices. Rather, the 
variation in fuel availability reg
its a standard 
p
hierarchy of fuel choice based on relative fuel prices and fuel availability in each regime. 
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The approach proposed in this chapter does not model the choice of appliances, and so it 
should be interpreted as a model of short-run behavior. However, as evident from 
chapters 2 and 4, ownership of household appliances does not appear to be an important 
factor affecting fuel switching in Azerbaijan compared to the importance of fuel 
availability and prices.  
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7 Results of Model Estimation for Azerbaijan 
This chapter presents estimates of the model developed in chapter 6 using the survey data 
and stated preference data of the surveys discussed in chapter 3. Specifically, the model 
was estimated using the actual consumption data and prices for gas, wood/LPG and 
kerosene budget share equations and contingent behavioral data for the heating, cooking 
and lighting share equations for electricity.39 Thus, electricity price varies only in the 
three electricity budget share equations and not in the gas, wood/LPG and kerosene 
equations. Use of stated preference data was regarded as essential for identifying 
electricity demand because the policy scenarios of interest are far outside of observed 
prices in the revealed preference data.  
The estimated model 
In this chapter I modify the notation of the previous chapter and denote the share of time 
in Regimes 1, 2 and 3 by R1, R2 and R3, respectively, instead of the earlier notation to 
emphasize the fact that these shares of time are variables rather than parameters. In the 
contingent behavior scenario, the share of time households are in Regime 3, when neither 
network gas nor electricity is available, is zero. Thus, the share of time in Regime 1 is 
obtained as 1 – R2 and the shares of time in Regimes 1 and 2 sum to one.  
                                                
 
for Azerbaijan. The model is estimated by combining both the revealed preference data 
 
39 An ideal approach would have been to construct a panel data set with observations on actual and 
hypothetical behavior for each household. Estimation of a system of fuel demands would have been 
facilitated by having both types of data for each demand equation. Unfortunately, the data on hypothetical 
consumption of any fuels other than electricity are very poor in the 2003 HES and could not be used in 
estimation. Hence, I have used stated preference data (with electricity price variation) for electricity and 
revealed preference data for other budget shares of other fuels. As shown in chapter 8, I compare the 
distribution of electricity consumption predicted by the model with actual electricity consumption data to 
verify validity of the model’s predictions.  
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 Additionally, the parameters of the indirect utility function were, in effect, made a 
function of household demographic variables. Thus, for example, a term such as 1 1Rγ  
was replaced by 1 1 1 1R HRγ ω+  where ω  represents a parameter vector and H represents a 1
vector of household demographic variables. 
The resulting empirical model after this transformation consists of the following 
six budget shares: 
1 1 1 1 1 ,Gn n n Gnw c R HRγ ω ε= + + +        (1) 
2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 2log log ,HEn n n En n n En HEnw c R R P HR HR Pγ γ ω ω ε= + + + + +   (2) 
3 4 2 5 2 2 2 3 2log log ,CEn n n En n n En CEnw c R R P HR HR Pγ γ ω ω ε= + + + + +   (3) 
( ) ( )
( )(3 2 4
log log 1
log logn En En
w c R R P P R HR
HR P H P
γ γ γ β ω
ω ω
⎡ ⎤= + + + + − + +⎣ ⎦
⎡+ ⎣ )
4 6 7 2 8 2 2 2 2
21 ,




5 9 3 10 3 5 3 6 3log log ,Wn n n Wn n n Wn Wnw c R R P HR HR Pγ γ ω ω= + + + + + ε   (5) 
n Wn Kn
w c R R P R P HR HR P6 11 3 3 12 3 5 3 7 3
log ,
Kn n LL n Kn n Wn n n Kn
HR P6 3
log log logγ β γ ω ω= + + + + + +
ω ε+
 (6) 
where w denotes the budget share of each fuel by household n = 1,…,N; G, E, W, and K 
denote network gas, electricity, wood/LPG and kerosene, respectively; R1 and R2 are the 
data on the share of time spent in each electricity regime, based on the average village 
hours of gas and electricity supply, ε denotes the error term in each budget share 
equation, and parameters to be estimated are denoted by c, γ, β, and ω, and the  γ’s 
consist of the following combination of the model’s structural parameters:  
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Cross-equation restrictions were imposed in this system, so that 
same parameters appear in different equations, they are restricted to be equal. The 
estimated equations are shown in the Appendix to chapter 7 with the estimated γ’s 
expressed in terms of the structural parameters.  
Ideally, the system of budget share equations should be estimated separately, once 
of these two models could be tested and, if not rejected, the data could be combined into 
an estimated system in which each household contributes two observations to the overall 
likelihood function. Thus, present and reform scenario consum
prices would be included for all fuels. However, the data on reform scenario consumption 
of traditional fuels is missing for most households in the 2003 HES. Available data 
permit estimation of  actual and reform scenario consumption levels only for the 
electricity budget shares. Only actual consumption shares are available for traditional 
( ) ( )
7
log 0.5 log / 0.5 log / ,
0.5
LL LE HL G HG CL G CG
HL




( )log 0.5 log logcw HC HW CWz z zβ− +
whenever the 
using the actual data and once using the contingent behavior data. Then the equivalence 
ption at the corresponding 
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fuels and network gas. Due to the specific conditions of metering and rationing in 
Azerbaijan, this comparison based on electricity shares alone was not feasible. Outages 
occur outside Baku and Sumgayit, which are the only areas with metered electricity 
supply and fairly strong payment enforcement. Thus, in these areas where household 
electricity consumption is responsive to prices few substitute fuels are used. Conversely, 
in the areas with frequent supply interruptions supply is not metered. Therefore, current 
electricity consumption levels could not be used in model estimation. Instead, I use 
electricity consumption in the reform scenario and consumption of other fuels in the 
current case scenario. 
In Azerbaijan, payment arrears and non-payment of electricity bills is wide-
spread. The average payment ratio of monthly electricity bills by households is only 56 
percent, when it is calculated at the village/town level and slightly lower when calculated 
at the individual level according to the 2003 HES data. Further, there is significant 
heterogeneity of payment enforcement by location. In order to account for the effect of 
heterogeneity in the enforcement of payment discipline, electricity prices were multiplied 
by the average village/town payment ratio of the electricity bill, and prices were 
transformed in this way both on the left-hand and the right-hand sides.  Since the 
payment ratios are not at the individual but rather at the settlement level, they are not 
endogenous variables. 
The dependent variables are budget shares, which I calculated as expenditures on 
each type of energy divided by total expenditures. As discussed in chapter 3, total 
40
                                                 
40 Another form of the budget share equations without transforming the left-hand and right-hand side by the 
payment ratio variable was tested and rejected on the basis of the likelihood ratio test at a one-percent 
significance level (the log likelihood in that model was 27,791 compared to the log likelihood of 29,388 in 
the chosen model).  
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expenditures were not available in the 2003 HES and were imputed for three-quarters  of 
the sample using information on the other one-quarter of the 2003 HES sample 
households included in both the 2002 HBS and 2003 HES. Results reported in this 
chapter thus use imputed total expenditures for households for whom actual expenditures 
were not available, and actual expenditures otherwise. Using imputed total expenditures 
for the entire sample may have some advantages as using the imputed measure purges 
possible joint endogeneity between total expenditures and energy expenditures. To 
investigate this possibility, I have re-estimated the model using imputed total 
expenditures for the entire sample and did not find any substantive differences between 
the two
ethod enabled imposition of cross-equation restrictions on the 
vector 
 sets of results (as reported subsequently in this chapter).  
Results of estimation 
Assuming that the vector of error terms has a zero mean and that the error terms are 
identically and independently distributed, this demand system can be regarded as a 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) problem. All independent variables in SUR 
systems must be exogenous and the equations in such a system must be linked only by 
their disturbances (Greene 2000: 615). These conditions are assumed to be satisfied. 
Specifically, the model is estimated using the direct maximum likelihood method by 
simply inserting the special form of the variance-covariance matrix in the log-likelihood 
function. Using this m
of structural parameters including the α’s and β’s.  
 The log likelihood for the nth observation is  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }11ln ln 2 ln ,2n n nL p y x y xπ β −′′ ′= − + Σ + − Σ −  n nβ
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where Σ  is the determinant of the error covariance matrix, p is the number of equations, 
y is a vector of budget shares (dependent variables of the demand system), x is a vector of 
independent variables, and β  is a vector of parameters to be estimated (Gould et.al. 
2003). Each of these parameters is a linear combination of the structural parameters, 
which were estimated directly using the method of direct maximum likelihood imposing 
cross-equation constraints. The estimation was implemented in STATA. The code used 
for the model’s estimation is reported in the Appendix of this chapter. 
The results of model estimation are reported in Table 7.1 (Model A). The model’s 
parameters are highly statistically significant, due to the relatively small number of 
parameters that require estimation after imposing the specific household technology 
ices made possible by representing prices for 
terms) terms) and region 
  Coeff. z  Coeff. Z Coeff. z 
form, and to the rather wide variation in pr
household services given variability in energy availability.  
Table 7.1 Maximum likelihood estimation results. 
 
 Model A 
(without IMR 
 Model B 
(with IMR 
 Model C 
(with IMR terms 
dummies) 
  
Hα   0.038** 4.2  0.040** 4.5  0.040** 4.4 
C
  α  -0.036** -3.6  -0.035** -3.5 -0.034** -3.4 
Lα   -0.006 -1.0  -0.008 -1.4  -0.005 -0.9 
HHβ   -0.022* -2.1  -0.020 -1.9  -0.022* -2.1 
CC
  β  -0.004 -0.4  -0.008 -0.8 -0.005 -0.6 
LLβ   -0.004** -6.7  -0.004** -7.1  -0.004** -6.9 
HCβ   0.029** 6.5  0.031** 6.9  0.030** 6.8 
 -0.007 -0.4  0.000 0.0  -0.005 -0.3 CLβ  
HLβ   0.010 0.5  0.004 0.2  0.008 0.4 
 c1
constant term in eq. 




constant term in eq. 
(2) 0.005* 2.2  0.005* 2.2 
 
0.009** 3.7 
 c3  
constant term in eq. 




 c4  
constant term in eq. 




constant term in eq.  
constant term in eq.  
(5) 0.017** 7.5  0.017** 7.5 0.020** 8.8 
 c6  (6) 0.007** 5.3  0.007** 5.4 0.011** 7.2 
1ω   
2
household size*R1 -0.000 -0.1  -0.000 -0.1 -0.000 -0.2 
ω  household size *R2 -0.012** -5.4  -0.012** -5.3  -0.012** -5.4 
3ω  
household size 





*R1* log EiP  -0.000** -3.0  -0.000** -3.0 
 
-0.000** -3.0 
5ω  household size *R3 0.001 0.8  0.001 0.8 0.001 0.7  
household size  
6ω  *R3 -0.000 -0.7  -0.000 -0.6 -0.000 -0.6 * log WiP  
7ω  
household size 
*R3* log KiP  -0.000 -1.0  -0.000 -1.1 -0.000 -1.3 
 s  
 
 s1 house*R1 0.007** 4.0  0.007** 4.0  0.006** 3.2 
2 house *R2 0.017 1.5  0.016 1.4 0.012 1.0 
 s3 house *R2* log EiP  -0.003* -2.0  -0.003 -1.9  -0.003 -1.5 
 s4 house *R1* log EiP  -0.000 -0.7  -0.000 -0.6  -0.000 -1.0 
 s  
 s
5 house *R3 0.009 1.9  0.009* 2.0 0.008 1.8 
 4.3  0.003** 4.4 
 s house *R3*
6 house *R3* log WiP  0.003** 4.4  0.003**
log KiP  7 -0.002** -4.4  -0.002** -4.3  -0.002** -4.3 




etered*R2 -0.025* -2  028* -2 023 -
* log EiP  0.003 1.9  0. 2 
 m3 metered*R1
004* 2.  0.003 1.9 
* log EiP  0.00 2.5  0.00 2.4  0.0 .2 
1 ldren*R2 0.007 0.8  0.007 0.8  0. .8 
2 hildren*R2*
1** 1* 01** 3
007 0 h chi
c h log EiP  -0.001 -  -  -  
 r1 rural*R2 
 r2 rural*R2
0.7  -0.001 0.7  -0.001 0.7
0.059** 3.6  0.061** 3.7  0.053** 3.2 
* log EiP  -0.010** 
 z1
IMR for 




 r1 Region 1 
 r2 Region 2 
 r3 Region 3 -
Log likelihood 
Observations 
-4.1  -0.010** -4.3  -0.009** -3.8 
  017** 7.3 
 
017** 7.4 
   0.012** 6.2 
 
0.011** 6.2 















29,318   29,356   
 
29,388  
1,797   1,797  1,797  
N : “House” i qual to 1 if a household resides in a house rather than an apartment, 
“ ren” is the ber of children in ld l” is va  equal ou s 
living in rural a  dummy variable equal to 1 if electricity consumption is metered, 
“IMR1” is the In e Mills Ratio term a n 2” e Inve Rati m 
i cooking e ted regional dummy variable is “region 4.” Significance at the 5% 
l  indicated *’ and significance  l  i c *’
ote
child
s a dummy variable e
 num a househo , “rura a dummy riable  to 1 for h sehold
reas, “metered” is a
vers in the heating equ tio (2), “IMR  is th rse Mills o ter
n the 
evel is
quation (3). The omit
 by ‘  at the 1% evel is ndi ated by ‘* . 
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In order to evaluate whether the estimates are economically meaningful, it is 
n ssary to f r or e la . Since the research focus of 
t issertation is on electricity  m ed to the elas y 
of d and for heating, cooking a
The sy  of get sh ati e im re ul s i ent e 
elas cities of ic ty  use f g k g t akin riv s 
of t  budget sho rlie  t s c , w re pec e pri f 
elec su owing sio
ece irst derive the exp essions f  pric  e sticities
his d reforms, ost attention will be devot ticit
em nd lighting with electricity. 
stem bud are equ ons st ated he  res t n differ pric
ti electr i  by or heatin , coo in  and ligh ing. T g the de ative
he  share equations, wn ea r in hi hapter ith s t to th ce o
tricity re lts in the foll  expres ns:  
2 2 2
3 3
log P (1 log− )
,nEHn n n E
En EH















EHnη  de wn ice ty e ric d ea ingnotes the o pr  elastici  of el ct ity use for h t , 
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where ELnη  denotes own price elasticity of electricity used for lighting. Although not 
shown in the above expressions, o er term ultiplied by the variable t 
contain an electricity price result in additional expressions that are equ  th t 
t  of the expressions a but ultiplie  dif rent bu ding 
th s that are m s tha
ivalent to e las
erm in each bove, m d by a fe t correspon
estimated parameter. 
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 The estimates of own price elasticities for heating, cooking and lighting with 
electricity were calculated using the coefficients from the estimated model as shown in 
Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 Estimated own electricity price elasticities of heating, cooking and lighting.  
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Heating   -0.27 0.14 -1.98 0.05 -0.53 0.00 
Cooking -0.75 0.13 -5.67 0.00 -1.01 -0.49 
Note: evaluated at the mean of the data for all households. 
Lighting and refrigeration -0.25 0.07 -3.54 0.00 -0.40 -0.11 
  
In general, estimates of the overall price elasticity of electricity demand reported 
in the literature range from -0.34 to -1.2, and they appear to be lower in Europe than in 
the U.S. (Reiss and White 2005, Freund and Wallich 1996, Dahl 1992). Although the 
 of residential 
electricity demand in some developing countries has been estimated at about -0.88 (Dahl, 
1992). In the countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, price elasticities 
Freund and 
Wallich (1996), the stock of appliances tends to be very inefficient in those countries 
compared to appliance stocks in the U.S. and Western Europe. It will take time to replace 
existing appliances with a more efficient appliance stock in Azerbaijan. Most households 
estimated in this dissertation for Azerbaijan are lower, averaging between -0.25 and -0.75 
depending on whether electricity is used for heating, cooking or lighting. 
All price elasticity estimates in Table 7.2 are statistically significant at 5 percent 
level. The 95 percent confidence intervals for price elasticities estimated here is a range 
from 0 to -1 even though the confidence intervals for specific uses are half that size. The 
ranges are reasonable for long-run price elasticities that have been reported in the 
evidence for developing countries is scarce, the long-run price elasticity
of electricity demand are likely to be lower because, as pointed out by 
use very inefficient electric appliances, so it is not surprising that price elasticities 
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literatu
in the long-run, thereby increasing the magnitude of the household response to 
a  in Norway, 
the difference in the elasticit  sma en tiv rce energy not 
a the sub on e and y isc y bet the 
short-run and long-run response (Halvorsen and Larsen 2001). As shown in chapter 4, at 
least one alternative source of energy (LPG, fuel wood or dung) is available in 
elasticities are likely to be smaller than long-run elasticities because the stock of 
appear very reasonable. 
Testing for sample selection bias and location-specific omitted variables bias 
bias because chosen budget shares are bounded from below by zero as in the classic Tobit 
wood for heating and cooking for several reasons. First, if the reliability of electricity is 
low opportunity cost of time or abundant availability of wood sources nearby. Third, 
there could be other r
is reliable such as switching costs, appliance unavailability, or personal preferences. 
re for the U.S., Europe, and developing countries. The distinction between long-
run and short-run price elasticities is important as households can adjust their stock of 
appliances 
 change in price. However, as revealed by estimation of electricity demand
ies is ll wh alterna e sou s of  are 
vailable, minimizing stituti ffect thereb the d repanc ween 
Azerbaijan even when the network energy sources are not available. Since short-run 
appliances is fixed in the short run, the estimates reported thus far in this dissertation 
The first set of results reported earlier in Table 7.2 could be prone to sample selection 
model. That is, when electricity is available, some households may still choose to use fuel 
sufficiently low, some households may choose fuel wood even when they could use 
electricity. Second, fuel wood collection costs are very low for some households with a 
easons behind the choice of fuel wood even when electricity supply 
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 Sample selection bias could arise in each individual regime of fuel availability. 
But the dependent variable in the model of this dissertation is a weighted average budget 
share rather than an instantaneous budget share relating to a single regime of fuel 
availability. Since the model is not a standard Tobit or other type of a discrete/continuous 
model, the sample selection problem in this model does not correspond directly to the 
sample selection bias problem in the literature. Therefore, the necessary correction for a 
particular regime would only apply to the time share associated with that regime.  
To test for the presence of this type of sample selection bias, I re-estimated the 
model correcting for sample selection bias only for the share of response associated with 
the corresponding regime. As shown in the literature, the problem of zero budget shares 
associated with selection bias can be corrected by using a two-step procedure first 
proposed by Heckman (1979). The first step in this procedure can be modeled as a 
probability of participating in a market: 
* ' ,nj nj njP b p υ= +  
where njp  is a vector of variables that affect the probability 
*P  of participation in a 
nj
nj
market for fuels j = 1,…, J; b is a vector of associated coefficients, υ  is a vector of error 
 n = N j terms for households 1,…, . The budget share of fuel is modeled as a continuous 
choice:  
* 'nj nj njw xγ ε= + , 
where xnj is a vector of variables that affect the level of consumption. The asterisk (“*”) 

















⎧⎪= ⎨  
) , 
where 
arket participation and included in the 
second step to estimate the demand system. Since I am including observations with 
positive and zero expenditures in the estimation of the continuous portion of the model in 
the second step, the Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated differently for the households with 
ds with positive expenditures the IMR should be computed as  
*w P w= . 
The first step in the estimation procedure obtains the probability of market participation 
nj nj nj
( ) (( )Pr 1 | , ,nj nj njP b p h b p= = Φ
Φ  denotes the standard normal cumulative density function. This probability is 
estimated in my model by using observations for all households that can choose between 
electricity and fuel wood and omitting observations for households that have such a poor 
electricity supply that they can never use their electric heating and cooking appliances 
because of frequent interruptions and low voltage. The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) can then 
be calculated using the estimated probability of m
positive and zero observations. It has been shown (Lazaridis 2004, Cheng and Capps 

























  ( )ϕ ⋅where denotes standard normal probability density function. 
Households with very poor electricity supply do not in reality face a choice 
e 






between using electricity and fuel wood. Thus, for households with less than the averag
du
with zero because these households are not likely candidates to switch to electricity. As a 
result, the IMR term is non-zero for 40 percent of the sample. After multiplying it by R2, 
it ranges between -1.4 and 0.8. Results of the probit models that separately predict the 
probability of using electricity for cooking and heating are reported in Table 7.3.  
In order to test whether sample selection bias could be affecting the earlier results, 
the model is re-estimated including the computed IMR for households with zero and 
positive expenditures on electricity used for heating and cooking. In the model estimated 
in the first part of Table 7.1 (Model A), sample selection bias could arise in regime 2 
when electricity is available. Therefore, the computed IMR term is multiplied by the 
share of time in regime 2 and entered additively. The selection bias correction term, equal 
to IMR*R2, was added to the cooking and heating electricity budget share equations as an 
additional covariate.  
 119






Household size -0.052 0.029 
 (1.84) (1.03) 
ing a 0 
 (2.06) -0.35 
Dumm
 
Dummy =1 if rural -0.938** -0.246 
Share of time in regime 2 0.962 2.205** 
Share of time in regime 3 -0.145 -1.206** 
 
Dumm
 (3.53) (2.19) 
Total liv rea (sq. m) 0.003* 
y =1 if live in a house -0.458** -0.51** 
(2.84) (2.89) 
Share of children (<10 yrs old) -0.08 -0.317 
 (0.32) (1.25) 
Price of electricity (Manat/oe) 0 0 
 (0.63) (1.47) 
 (4.92) -1.34 
 (1.92) (4.13) 
 (0.34) (2.92) 
Total monthly expenditures 0 0* 
 (0.72) (2.41) 
Dummy =1 if use gas for heating -0.721 -0.198 
(1.82) (0.47) 
y =1 if metered 0.284* 0.518** 
 (2.11) (3.72) 
Average village pay ratio -1.146** -0.712* 
Regional dummy variables (Zone 4 omitted):   
 (2.88) (4.30) 
 (2.10) -1.43 
Zone 3 -1.249** -1.553** 
 (4.54) (5.78) 
Constant 1.31 0.023 
 (1.9) (0.03) 
Observations 1,274 1,274 
Pseudo R-squared 
Note: The absolute values
Zone 1 -0.805** -1.206** 
Zone 2 -0.588* -0.393 
19.5 21.3  
 of t statistics are given in parentheses. Significance at the 5% level is 
indicated by ‘*’ and significance at the 1% level is indicated by ‘**’. 
 
The presence of sample selection bias due to these factors is not likely in any of 
the budget share equations because, as revealed by the discussion and evidence presented 
in chap r 4, the hierarchy of fuel choices is clearly dictated by fuel availability, which is 
controlled for in this model. In addition, when either gas supply or electricity supply is 
te
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r rce of heating, although 
some still use it as a back-up source when sup  perfectly re  they may 
use it as a secondary source.  
e 7.4, the vast majo e households ever have a 
reliable supply of gas (i.e., they are never in Reg ) use wood as t ary heating 
source. In fact, only one household with a reliable gas supply, with gas over 41 percent of 
t  wood as a primary heating source. The situation is similar with 
electricity, where 234 out of 377 households that never have reliable electricity (or gas) 
supply use wood as a primary heating source. Only 20 households out of a total of 274 
who are in the electricity regime more than 91 p of the time still choose to rely on 
fuel wood for heating. Hence, it is very unusual for people to choose wood as their 
primary heating source when they have a suffic reliable gas or icity supply. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the Inverse Mills Ratio correction te rlier in this 
chapter did not have an appreciable effect on the model’s coefficients and price 
e ies. 
Table 7.4  Use of fuel wood as primary sourc g (number of s). 
Do not use wo Use wo
eliable, households do not choose fuel wood as a primary sou
ply is not liable and
As shown in Tabl rity of th  that n
ime 1 he prim





e inof heat ho lduseho
  od od 
Share of time in regime 1   
0 856 756 
.01 to 0.4 0 2 
 
re of time in regime 2   
0 377 234 
0.81 to 0.9 84 45 
0.99 to 1 141 0 
0
0.41 to 1 385 1 
  
Sha
0.01 to 0.8 506 460 
0.91 to 0.98 133 20 
Source: 2003 Household Energy Survey 
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The estimated model does not account for differences in average winter 
temperatures and other climatic conditions by location, because weather-related data at 
the level of the sampling unit were not available. The omission of weather patterns and 
other l
ication as a basis for policy simulations in the following chapter. 
F t to the 
definitio res variable which, as described in chapter 3, was imputed 
for three-quarte sample. While M el C used actual total expenditures for the 
households for which this variable was available and imputed total expenditures 
otherwise, Model D uses imputed total expenditures for all households. The results of 
Model D are n cal to Model C with differences in the coefficients only in the 
                                                
ocation-specific variables that affect energy demand could result in omitted 
variables bias. In an attempt to control for this bias caused by location-specific omitted 
variables, I used a fixed-effects specification and included regional dummy variables in 
all six estimated equations.41  
Estimation results that include the IMR term are reported in the central two 
columns of Table 7.1 (Model B). While the IMR term is positive and significant, it is 
small in magnitude. The results of Model C which includes the regional dummy variables 
in addition to the IMR terms are reported in the last two columns of Table 7.1. The 
inclusion of regional dummy variables does not significantly affect the magnitude of 
other parameters and they are only slightly different from the estimates in Models A and 
B. Since two of the three regional dummy variables are statistically significant, I use this 
model specif
inally, I have investigated the robustness of Model C with respec
n of the total expenditu
rs of the od
early identi
 
41 In ord  control for possible clustering, I have also attempted to use the robust maximum likelihood 
estimation procedure of the variance-covariance matrix, but maximum likelihood estimation of Models A 





son for failure of this assumption is the adverse health 
effects 
 decimal point and with little difference in significance levels (see Appendix Table 
7.1). 
Testing plausibility of the assumption of perfect substitutability of fuels 
As discussed in chapter 5, in conclusion to the discussion of the direct demand estimation 
method, the assumption of perfect substitutability of energy from different sources in the 
production of household energy services may not necessarily be satisfied in practice. In 
particular, the most likely rea
of kerosene or wood fuels, which are well recognized in some other countries. For 
this reason, I conduct a statistical test about whether an additional multiplicative discount 
factor should be attached to kerosene or fuel wood (and LPG) to represent their inferior 
quality compared to energy from network sources. Thus, energy conversion coefficients 
of kerosene into lighting and fuel wood (and LPG) into cooking and heating were divided 
by a discount factorϖ , as shown in the Appendix to chapter 7. The resulting system to be 
estimated is unchanged except for the fuel wood/LPG and kerosene budget share 
equations, which include additional additive terms containing the discount factor. Every 
term that includes ϖ  is a constant aside from variation in the energy regime, e.g., the 
term 0.5log ( )HL CLϖ β β+  is a constant in the kerosene budget share equation multiplied 
by the share of time kerosene is in the chosen fuel mix. If those constants are zero, which 
corresponds to 1ϖ = , then there is no discounting associated with non-network energy 
sources. While adding these terms to the estimated budget shares caused convergence 
problems indicative of identification issues, no improvement in the log likelihood could 
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be achieved.42 Thus, I conclude that households are primarily interested in the cost of 
household services rather than any health side effects, which provides some evidence to 
validate the estimates in Table 7.1.  
Testing equality of parameters of indirect utility function by regime 
Finally, I have considered a test to see if the parameters of the estimated indirect utility 
function are the same across availability regimes. This test investigates whether the 
model adequately captures the role of preferences in fuel choice, or whether households 
have non-financial preferences over heating fuel choice. For this purpose, the expected 
indirect utility function from chapter 6 can be rewritten as 
1 2 3( ) , , , , , , (1 ) , , , .G G W WE E E E K
HG CG LE HE CE LE HW CW LK
P P P PP P P P P
z z z z z z z z z
θ φ θ φ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
= + + − −
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
where the indirect utility functions, V , V , and V  have different parameters in each 
availability regime. Associated demands were derived from each equation by Roy’s 
functional form of the resulting budget share equations is the same as previously, but 
instead of a total of 9 structural parameters the model has 27 structural parameters. In 
other l parameters in the first regime are not assumed to be equal to 
the corresponding parameters in the second and third regimes etc. Unfortunately, 
convergence could not be achieved in this model when coefficients were allowed to be 
different in each individual regime. Although the data are not sufficient to fully 
implement this general test that allows parameters to differ in each individual energy 
E V V Y V Y V Y⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
 
1 2 3
identity to obtain the system of observable demand equations for estimation. The 
words, the structura
availability regime, results could be achieved when allowing the indirect utility 
                                                 
42 Admittedly, however, this is not a powerful test, because the difference in discount factors ϖ  could 
partly reflect a difference in appliance efficiency across households. 
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parameters of one regime to differ from the others. In these cases, the hypothesis of 
identical coefficients could not be rejected.  Thus, the results provide some confirmation 
of, and no evidence against, the structural assumption whereby a common indirect utility 
ity regimes, and 
 The comparison of estimated 
elasticities with the earlier results indicates that the inclusion of the IMR term and the 
regional dummy variables does not appreciably affect the results. The new price elasticity 
s of the estim
Table 7.5 Estimated own price elasticities of heating, cooking and lighting (with correction of 
  Coefficient Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
function applies for household energy services across energy availabil
where differences among regimes are fully represented by the assumed Leontief 
household production technology and its implications for cost minimization. 
Estimated price elasticities and conclusions about their plausibility 
Price elasticities calculated on the basis of estimates from Model C are shown in Table 
7.5 (for Model D they are shown in Appendix Table 7.2.)
estimates fall within the confidence interval ates obtained in Table 7.2. 
sample selection bias). 
All households       
Heating   -0.30 0.14 -2.22 0.03 -0.56 -0.03 
Lighting  -0.30 0.07 -4.15 0 -0.44 -0.16 
Cooking -0.97 0.11 -8.77 0 -1.19 -0.75 
Poor       
Cooking -0.50 0.12 -4.12 0 -0.74 -0.26 
Nonpoor       
Lighting  -0.30 0.09 -3.53 0 -0.47 -0.13 
Note: evaluated at the mean of the data and at the mean of each category. 
Cooking -0.83 0.13 -6.22 0 -1.09 -0.57 
Rural       
Heating   -0.31 0.19 -1.63 0.10 -0.67 0.06 
Cooking -0.36 0.32 -1.12 0.26 -0.99 0.27 
Lighting  -0.41 0.11 -3.59 0 -0.64 -0.19 
Urban       
Heating   -0.28 0.12 -2.39 0.02 -0.51 -0.05 
Lighting  -0.24 0.07 -3.3 0 -0.38 -0.10 
Heating   -0.27 0.11 -2.55 0.01 -0.48 -0.06 
Lighting  -0.31 0.06 -5.15 0 -0.44 -0.20 
Heating   -0.31 0.15 -2.07 0.04 -0.62 -0.01 
Cooking -0.98 0.15 -6.58 0 -1.27 -0.69 
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Price elasticities of electricity demand vary by the type of appliances, household 
location, and demographic characteristics, as recognized by the early literature that 
conditioned electricity demand on the stock of household appliances (e.g., Dubin and 
McFadden 1984, Chern et. al. 1983, Parti and Parti 1980). In a recent study of California 
households, Reiss and White (2005) once again point out significant heterogeneity in 
household elasticities of demand for electricity and emphasize the importance of taking it 
 alternative tariff 
 For 
h ound 
e sticities to be very c ro. ingly ouseho oul o 
types: those who use electricity for space hea r air ditio and ice 
sensitive, and those who do not and who are price insensitive (Reiss and White 2005). 
Thus, for households with electric space hea the a e p elastic as 
e d at -1.02, and only t -0.20 fo households without it. For households without 
e pace heating and nditio the p asticit as e ed at y -
0.08. Clearly, welfare consequences of tariff reform policies are very different for these 
household categories.  
 Azerbaijan sup onstrai lay an important role in determining how 
sensitive households will be to an electricity p ncreas Furth e, on uld 
into account in an evaluation of the social impact of energy policies and
designs. The model of residential electricity demand, developed in their study, is an 
attempt to allow price and income elasticities to vary with consumption level and 
appliance holdings and estimate price elasticities disaggregated by the type of end-use.  
Estimation results reveal much higher elasticities for households with electric 
space heating or air conditioning than for households without such equipment.
ouseholds that do not use electricity for either of these two purposes, the study f
la lose to ze  Accord , h lds c d be divided in tw
ting o  con ning are pr
ting, verag rice ity w
stimate  a r 
lectric s air co ning, rice el y w stimat  merel
In ply c nts p





l possible explanations for this surprising result. Price elasticities 
tend to
much lower elasticities when electricity prices are very low as they are in 
Azerbaijan. Overall, the estimated price elasticities of heating and lighting are very low at 
around -0.30, and higher for cooking at around -0.83 (Table 7.5). Electricity demand is 
more elastic for urban than rural households. This is not surprising, given that the supply 
quality is higher and demand rather than supply constraints are a more important factor 
that influences the level of electricity consumption in urban areas. In rural areas, 
estimated price elasticities for heating and cooking are statistically insignificant, probably 
for the same reason. 
Two findings are somewhat puzzling. First, price elasticities are lower for the 
poor than for the nonpoor. Second, the price elasticity of heating tends to be lower tha
king. Low elasticity estimates may point to a higher welfare impact of a change in 
the price of electricity on households that use it for the base load (lighting and cooking), 
and a lower impact on households who use it for heating.  
The finding that the elasticity of heating is as low as lighting, while the elasticity 
of cooking is more than three times as high as the heating elasticity for urban households 
is striking. Space heaters have high wattage and are typically operated for more hours 
every day than ovens and stoves. So one would expect that the immediate response to a 
price increase would be to reduce electricity consumption for heating more than for 
cooking. This response would be consistent with what Reiss and White (2005) have 
found in California.  
There are severa
 be higher when households are able to reduce their electricity consumption fairly 
easily, for example, by improving efficiency of current appliances, reducing the heated 
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area, or switching to substitute sources of energy. Notwithstanding the low cost of 
homemade electric appliances that are commonly available, fewer households own 
electric space heaters than electric ovens or stoves in Azerbaijan. Traditional homemade 
ovens are simply tin boxes with a spiral, which are traditionally used for baking bread 
and other purposes. Compared to homemade space heaters, ovens are safer in operation. 
The difference in the relative appliance costs and their safety could explain the 
discrepancy in the estimated price elasticities of electricity used for heating and cooking. 
Conclusions 
To con
specific fuels is lacking. The 
model 
ates should be interpreted as short-run elasticities.  
clude, the model estimated in this chapter produces reasonable results for a 
problem of intermittent supply and thus intermittent data availability. The elasticity 
estimates, made possible by introducing variability in the imputed prices of essential 
household energy services through switching energy availability regimes, are consistent 
with the literature, even though variability in prices of 
incorporates the key economic variables that affect energy demand and results in 
highly significant coefficient estimates. As expected, there is a significant difference in 
the estimated elasticities depending on whether electricity is used for heating, cooking, or 
lighting. Although why the estimated elasticity of cooking is substantially higher than 
heating is not entirely clear, some possible explanations related to the stock of appliances 
and the ease of fuel substitution. Since the appliance purchase decision is not included in 
the model, the elasticity estim
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Appendix to chapter 7: 
Budget share equations with the model’s structural parameters 
 
Network gas: 
( ){1 log / log / 0.5 log / log /Gi H C HH G HG CC G CG HC G HG G CGw c P z P z P z P zα α β β β= + + + + + +
 
}0.5 log / 0.5 log / 1 ,HL E LE CL E LE i GiP z P z Rβ β ε+ + ∗ +  
 
Electricity for heating: 
{ }2 log 0.5 log 0.5 log 2HEi H HH HE HC CE HL LE iw c z z z Rα β β β= + − − − ∗  
{ }0.5 0.5 2log ,HH
 
HC HL Ei HEiR Pβ β β ε+ + + ∗ +  
Electricity for cooking: 
{ }3 log 0.5 log 0.5 log 2w c z z z Rα β β β= + − − − ∗  
{
CEi C CC CE HC CE CL LE i
}0.5 0.5 2log ,CC HC CL Ei CEiR Pβ β β ε+ + + ∗ +  
 
Electricity for lighting: 
{ }4 log 0.5 log / 0.5 log / 1LEi L LL LE HL G HG CL G CGw c z P z P zα β β β= + − + + ∗  
{ }0.5 log 0.5 log 0.5 log / 0.5 log / 2HL LE CL LE HL G HG CL G HG i
{
z z P z P z Rβ β β β− + + + ∗  
} ( )0.5 0.5 2log log 2log ,R P P R PLL HL CL Ei LL E E LEiβ β β β ε+ + + ∗ + − +  
 
Fuel wood and LPG: 
( )(5 log log 0.5 log log 0.5 log /Wi H C HH HW CC CW HC HW CW HL Ew c z z z z P zα α β β β β= + + − − − + + LE
} { }0.5 log / 3 3log ,CL E LE i HH CC HC Wi WiP z R R Pβ β β β ε+ ∗ + + + ∗ +  
 
Kerosene: 
{ }6 log 0.5 log 0.5 log 3Ki L LL LK HL HW CL CW iw c z z z Rα β β β= + − − − ∗  







Modification of the fuel wood/LPG and kerosene budget shares to test whether 
households are indif s of energy services 
 
uel wood
ferent between the source
F /LPG: 
(5Wi Hw c α= + ( )log log 0.5 log log 0.5 log /C HH HW CC CW HC HW CW HL E LEz z z z P zα β β β β+ − − − + +
} { }0.5 log / log ( ) 3 3log ,CL E LE HH CC HC i HH CC HC Wi WiP z R R Pβ ϖ β β β β β β ε+ − + − ∗ + + + ∗ +
Kerosene: 
 
{ }6 log 0.5 log 0.5 log 0.5log ( ) 3Ki L LL LK HL HW CL CW HL CL iw c z z z Rα β β β ϖ β β= + − − − − + ∗




ϖ  is the discount factor associated with the use of traditional (fuel wood and 











the whole sample) 
 Coeff. z  Coeff. z 
pendix Table 7.1 Estimation results using predicted and actual versus all predicted budget share
  Model C 




   
Hα    0.040** 4.4  0.041** 4.9 
Cα    -0.034** -3.4  -0.036** -3.9 
Lα    -0.005 -0.9  -0.004 -0.7 
HH
  -0.022* -2.1  -0.025** -2.5 β  
CCβ    -0.005 -0.6  -0.002 -0.3 
LLβ    -0.004** -6.9  -0.004** -7.1 
  
HCβ   0.030** 6.8 0.031** 7.2 
CLβ    -0.005 -0.3  -0.011 -0.6 
  
HLβ   0.008 0.4 0.015 0.8 
1
constant term in eq. 




constant term in eq. 
(2)  0.009** 3.7 
 
0.008** 3.8 
 c3  
constant term in eq. 
(3)  0.022** 11.8 
 
0.022** 12.3 
 c4  
constant term in eq. 




constant term in eq. 
(5)  0.020** 8.8 
 
0.019** 8.6 
 c6  
constant term in eq. 





1ω  household size*R1  0.000 0.2  0.000 0.2 
2ω  household size *R2  -0.012** -5.4  -0.012** -5.7 
3ω  
household size 





*R1* log EiP   -0.000** -3.0 
 
-0.000** -3.0 
5ω  household size *R3  0.001 0.7  0.001 0.7 
6ω  
household size 
*R3  -0.000 -0.6 
 
-0.000 -0.5 * log WiP  
7ω  
household size 
*R3* log KiP   -0.000 -1.3 
 
-0.000 -1.3 
 s1 house*R1  0.006** 3.2  0.005** 3.0 
 s2 house *R2  0.012 1.0  0.010 0.9 
 s3 house *R2* log EiP   -0.003 -1.5  -0.002 -1.5 
 s4 house *R1* log EiP   -0.000 -1.0  -0.000 -0.9 
 s5 house *R3  0.008 1.8  0.008 1.9 
 s6 house *R3*  0.003** 4.4  0.003** 4.3 
 s7 house *R3*
log WiP  
log KiP   -0.002** -4.3  -0.002** -4.2 
 m1 metered*R2  -0.023* -2.0  -0.022* -2.0 
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 m2 metered*R2* log EiP   0.003 1.9  0.003 1.9 
 m3 etered*R1m * log EiP   0.001** 3.2  0.001** 3.6 
.017* 2.1 h1 children*R2  0.007 0.8  0  
2 hildren*R2* h c log EiP   -0.001 -  -  
 r1 rural*R2 
 r2 rural*R2
0.7  -0.003* 2.1
 0.053** 3.2  0.047** 3.1 







 r1 Region 1 -  -  
 r2 Region 2 
 r3 Region 3 
Log likelihood 
Observations 






 0.005** -6.1  0.004** -5.3 
 -0.000 -0.4  0.001 0.7 
 -0.004** -5.4  -0.004** -5.2 
 29,388   29,938  
 1,797   1,797  
Note: “House” i q  to 1 ehold r s in a house han an ap ent, 
“ dren” is the n a hou ” is my variable r ho ds 
living in rural a  d mm  equal t f elec city on is ed, 
“IMR1” is the In  the n (2), “IMR2  is th Mills R erm 
i king e ted reg my variable is “region 4 cance a  5% 
l  indicated  th  is indic y ‘**
s a dummy variable e
 number of children i





 equal to 1 fo
 consumpti
usehol
meterreas, “metered” is a
verse Mills Ratio term
u tri





t then the coo quation (3). The omit
 by ‘*’ and significance atevel is e 1% level ated b ’. 
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A dix Table  own el tricity price elasticiti  heating, coo d lightin
Model D 
ppen  7.2 Estimated ec es of king an g. 
  C Model 
  Coefficient Z Coefficient Z 
All households      
He
Coo
ating   -0.30 -2.22 -0.27 -2.2
king -0.83 .22 .80 -6.3
ting  .30 .15 .31 -4.5
ral     
ting   -0.31 .63 -0.44 -4.0
oking -0.36 .12 .26 -2.3
ting  -0.41 .59 .93 -8.8
an     
ting   -0.28 -2.39 -0.26 -2.3
king -0.97 .77 .93 -8.8
-0.24 .30 .24 -3.5
    
6 -6.77 
Lighting  -0.30 -3.53 -0.31 -3.85 
 4 
-6 -0 0 
Ligh -0 -4 -0 3 
Ru













2 Lighting  -0
Poor 
Heating   -0.27 -2.55 -0.26 -2.70 
Cooking -0.50 -4.12 -0.45 -3.88 
Lighting  -0.31 -5.15 -0.33 -5.68 
Nonpoor     
Heating   -0.31 -2.07 -0.29 -2.05 
Cooking -0.98 -6.58 -0.9





STATA code used to implement direct maximum likelihood estimation of the model. 
 
# delim ; 
 
*capture program drop testdemog_regions_d0; 
program define testdemog_regions_d0; 
 version 8.2; 
 gs todo b lnf; 
 pname ah ac al bhh ll bhc bcl 
gma66 
 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 h1 h4 h5 h6 h7  s3 s4 s5 s 1 n2 n3 ch1 pl1 
2 m1 m2 rg1 rg2 rg
 
 tempvar ll; 
 tempname isi; 
 quietly {; 
 
 al p = 6; 
 
 scalar `ah'   = `b'[1,1]; 
 alar `ac'   = `b'[1,2]; 
 alar `al'   = `b'[1,3]; 
 alar `bhh'   = `b'[1,4]; 
 lar `bcc'   = `b'[1,5]; 
 lar `bll'   = `b'[1,6]; 
 lar `bhc'   = `b'[1,7]; 
 alar `bcl'   = `b'[1,8]; 
 alar `bhl'   = `b'[1,9]; 
 lar `sigma11' = `b ]; 
scalar `sigma13' = `b'[1,13]; 
scalar `sigma23' = `b'[1,14]; 
scalar `sigma33' = `b'[1,15]; 
scalar `sigma14' = `b'[1,16]; 
 scalar `sigma24' = `b'[1,17]; 
 scalar `sigma34' = `b'[1,18]; 
 scalar `sigma44' = `b'[1,19]; 
 scalar `sigma15' = `b'[1,20]; 
 scalar `sigma25' = `b'[1,21]; 
 scalar `sigma35' = `b'[1,22]; 
 scalar `sigma45' = `b'[1,23]; 
 scalar `sigma55' = `b'[1,24]; 
 scalar `sigma16' = `b'[1,25]; 
 scalar `sigma26' = `b'[1,26]; 
 scalar `sigma36' = `b'[1,27]; 
 scalar `sigma46' = `b'[1,28]; 
 scalar `sigma56' = `b'[1,29]; 
 scalar `sigma66' = `b'[1,30]; 
 scalar `c1'      = `b'[1,31]; 
 scalar `c2'      = `b'[1,32]; 
 scalar `c3'      = `b'[1,33]; 
 scalar `c4'      = `b'[1,34]; 
 scalar `c5'      = `b'[1,35]; 
 scalar `c6'      = `b'[1,36]; 
 
 scalar `h1'   = `b'[1,37]; 
 scalar `h2'   = `b'[1,38]; 
 scalar `h3'   = `b'[1,39]; 
 scalar `h4'   = `b'[1,40]; 
 scalar `h5'   = `b'[1,41]; 
 scalar `h6'   = `b'[1,42]; 
 scalar `h7'   = `b'[1,43]; 
 
 scalar `s1'   = `b'[1,44]; 
 scalar `s2'   = `b'[1,45]; 
 scalar `s3'   = `b'[1,46]; 
 scalar `s4'   = `b'[1,47]; 
ar
tem
sigma11 sigma12 sigma22 sigma13 sigma23 sigma33 sigma14 sigma24 sigma34 sigma44 
 bcc b bhl 
sigma15 sigma25 sigma35 sigma45 sigma55 sigma16 sigma26 sigma36 sigma46 sigma56 
si














'[1,11 lar `sigma12' = `b ]; 






 scalar `s5'   = `b'[1,48]; 
scalar `s6'   = `b'[1,49];  









a12',`sigma22',     0,       0,         0,       0) \ 
a13',`sigma23',`sigma33',    0,         0,       0) \ 
a14',`sigma24',`sigma34',`sigma44',     0,       0) \ 
a15',`sigma25',`sigma35',`sigma45',  `sigma55',  0) \ 
a16',`sigma26',`sigma36',`sigma46',  `sigma56', `sigma66'); 
(S); 
 is not positive semidefinite"; 
  
hg)+`bcc'*ln(pg/zcg)+0.5*`bhc'*(ln(pg/zhg)+ ln(pg/zcg))-
e *ln(pe/zle))*r1 -`c1' -`h1'*h_r1 - `s1'*s_r1 - `rg1'*region1 - 
-  
' 0.5*`bhc'*ln(zce)-0.5*`bhl'*ln(zle))*r2 -
c p_ele-`c2' - `h2'*h_r2 -  `h3'*h_r2p_ele  
 -`n1'*n_r2 - `n2'*n_r2p_ele - `m1'*mills_heat 
1 2 - `rg3'*region3; 
' 0.5*`bhc'*ln(zce)- 
 
 scalar `n1'  = `b'[1,51]; 
 scalar `n2'  = `b'[1,52]; 
 scalar `n3'  = `b'[1,53]; 
 
 scalar `ch1'  = `b'[1,54]; 
 scalar `ch2'  = `b'[1,55]; 
scalar `apl1'  = `b'[1,56]; 
scalar `apl2'  = `b'[1,57]; 
scalar `m1'  = `b'[1,58]; 
scalar `m2'  = `b'[1,5 
 
 scalar `rg1'  = `b'
`b' scalar `rg2'  = 
scalar `rg3'  =  
 
 
 matrix CHOL =  (`sigma11',        0,     0,       0,         0,       0) \ 
    (`sigm
    (`sigm
    (`sigm
    (`sigm
    (`sigm
 matrix S =CHOL*CHOL'; 
 
 *noi matrix list CHOL; 
 
 /* 
 capture matrix CHECK = cholesky
 if (_rc != 0) {; 
   display in red "Matrix




 matrix iS= syminv(S); 
 
  // get residuals; 
 
 scalar pg = 42.68907563; 
 scalar pe = 1129.412; 
 scalar zhg = 0.85;   
 scalar zcg = 0.60; 
 scalar zhe = 0.89; 
 scalar zce = 0.75; 
 scalar zle = 0.90; 
 scalar zhw = 0.40; 
 scalar zcw = 0.25; 
 scalar zlk = 0.60; 
 
 tempname r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6; 
 





 generate double `r2'= 
ish_ELEh- (`ah -`bhh'*ln(zhe)-
(`bhh'+0.5*`bh '+0.5*`bhl')*r2
 - `s2'*s_r2 - `s3'*s_r2p_ele 
- `rg1'*region  - `rg2'*region 
 
 generate double `r3'= 
 ish_ELEc- (`ac -`bcc'*ln(zce)-
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0.5*`bcl'*ln(z e))*r2 -(`bcc'+l 0.5*`bhc'+0.5*`bcl')*r2p_ele -`c3' -`h2'*h_r2-`h3'*h_r2p_ele  -
2 ch1'*c_r2 - `ch2'*c_r2p_ele- `apl1'*apl_r2 - `apl2'*apl_r2p_ele 
o n1 - `rg2'*region2 - `rg3'*region3; 
'- .5*`bhl'*ln(pg/zhg)+0.5*`bcl'*ln(pg/zcg)+`c4')- 
ln zle)-`bcl'*ln(zle))-(`al'-
l p_ele - `bll'*(p_ele_p_ele)-`h4'*h_p_ele_p_ele - `h3'*h_r2p_ele 
4  - `s3'*s_r2p_ele -`s2'*s_r2-`n1'*n_r2 - `n2'*n_r2p_ele - 
on1 - `rg2'*region2 - `rg3'*region3; 
hh *ln(zcw)-0.5*`bhc'*(zhw+zcw)+ 
pe *ln(pe/zle))*r3-(`bhh'+`bcc'+`bhc')*r3p_wood -`c5' - 
 
e (`al'-`bll'*ln(zlk)-0.5*`bhl'*ln(zhw)-0.5*`bcl'*ln(zcw))*r3+ 






`n1'*n_r2 - `n '*n_r2p_ele - `
-`m2'*mills_co k - `rg1'*regio
 








 generate double `r5'=ish_WOD-  
 (`ac'+`ah'-`b '*ln(zhw)-`bcc'
 0.5*`bhl'*ln( /zle)+0.5*`bcl'
`h5'*h_r3 - `h6'*h_r3p_wod - `s5'*s_r3 - `s6'*s_r3p_wod - `rg1'*region1 - `rg2'*region2 - 
`rg3'*region3;
 
 generate doubl  `r6'=ish_KER- 





 local resids "`r1' `r2' `r3' `r4' `r5' `r6'"; 
 tempvar g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 ip; 
 generate double `ip' = 
 forval i = 1/`p' {; 
  matrix isi = iS[
  matrix colnames isi = `resids'; 
  matrix score double `g`i'' = 
  replace `ip' = `ip' + `r`i''*
  }; // end forval 
 scalar det = det(S); 
n(2*c(pi))+ln(det)+ `ip');   mlsum `lnf' =  -0.5*(3*l
quietly  }; // end 










Motivation for reforms is mostly fiscal, but the efficiency and distributional 
ations in the design of reform programs. A planned 
creas in ele e subsidy and raise revenues, freeing up 
sourc  for tor as well as social spending on 
ucati ary financing. An increase of 
icity prices will also result in a better resource allocation facilitated by appropriate 
price signals, thus encouraging more efficient consumption of electricity. Although such 
reforms can generate substantial efficiency and welfare gains for all sectors, they can also 
reduce the real income of households, especially the poor. 
Residential electricity prices in Azerbaijan are far below the cost-recovery level, 
and the Government has committed to eliminate all financial support for the provision of 
electricity and other utility services by 2010. The reform option that appears most 
plausible envisages a 50 percent increase in wholesale electricity tariffs (from 71 
AZM/kWh to 106.5 AZM/kWh) effective in 2006, with equal annual percentage 
increases thereafter in order to reach full cost recovery, estimated at 174 AZM/kWh, by 
elfare analysis and discussion of policy implications 
 
In the past, countries with former centrally planned economies pursued a social pricing 
for electricity. Making electricity services universally accessible and affordable 
w  important part of a governm
ac ble to all. In the last decade, most countries with former central planning have 
re ed their energy sectors in pursuit of three types of objectives: fiscal, efficiency, 
tributional.  
objectives are also important consider
in e ctricity tariffs will eliminate th
re es reinvestment in the electricity sec
e on, health and othd er areas in dire need of budget
electr
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the end of 2010 (World Bank 2005).43 In spite of the apparently poor reliability of 
lectricity supply in many parts of the country, the government has not set clear targets 
for reliability improvement.  
the magnitude of the welfare impact of the likely price increase scenario, potential 
use the model estimated in the previous chapter to predict the level of electricity 
consum
reliability changes. The assumptions about price increases and supply reliability levels 
price and the current reliability level. Scenario 3 assumes a reliability improvement with 
reliability improvement from the current level to uninterrupted 24-hour-per-day supply. 
ario 
assume
  Table 8.1 Scenario descriptions. 
e
The main purpose of this chapter, and ultimately of this dissertation, is to explore 
reliability improvements, and potential combined price increase and reliability 
improvement scenarios on Azeri households. The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I 
ption in each policy scenario and to investigate household response to price and 
are summarized in Table 8.1 for five scenarios. Scenario 1 is a baseline scenario with 
current price and reliability levels. Scenario 2 considers a 50 percent higher electricity 
no price change. And Scenario 4 involves a combined 50 percent price increase and 
Scenario 5 is a 100 percent price increase and a 50 percent improvement in reliability. If 
current electricity supply exceeds an average of 12 hours a day, then this scen




Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5    
Electricity price Current 50% increase Current 50% increase 100% increase 
Supply reliability Current Current 24 hr supply 24 hr supply 50% improvement  
 
                                                 
43 Residential prices are expected to increase in similar proportion to wholesale electricity prices and reach 
the full cost recovery level of about 4.5-5.5 US cents/kWh by 2010. 
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Second, I calculate the welfare gains and losses for each policy scenario 
compared to the baseline and explore how the direction and magnitude of the welfare 
impact of reforms varies with household location, access to substitutes, and demographic 
characteristics. Third, I identify the most vulnerable households and propose strategies to 
mitigate the adverse welfare impact of reforms on these groups. 
An approach for economic welfare analysis of policy reform 
Electricity consumption levels in alternative reform scenarios can be predicted using the 
three estimated budget shares for electricity reported in chapter 7: 
2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 2log log ,HEn n En n En HEnw c R R P HR HR Pγ γ ω ω ε= + + + + +    (2) 
3 4 2 5 2 2 2 3 2log log ,CEn n En n En CEnw c R R P HR HR Pγ γ ω ω ε= + + + + +    (3) 
( ) ( )
( )( )log log 1 ,HR P H P Rω ω ε⎡ ⎤
4 6 7 2 8 2 2 2 2
3 2 4 2
log log 1LEn n En LL En n n
En En n LEnn
w c R R P P R HRγ γ γ β ω⎡ ⎤= + + + + − + +⎣ ⎦
+ −⎣ ⎦
The level of electricity consumption for heating, cooking, and lighting in kWh per 
month is calculated as the product of the corresponding budget share and total income 
divided by electricity price. Consumption quantities are calculated for each household 
taking into account each household’s demographic characteristics. The resulting 
predicted consumption levels are reported in Table 8.2.  
As predicted by the model, current electricity consumption during the winter is an 
average of 308 kWh h, a d  4 r month if electricity 
were supplied at the current price without interruptions. The predicted 
consum tion in the reform scenario that combines a 50% price increase and a reliability 
improvement is about 323 kWh per month, which is slightly above the current 
consumption level predicted by the model. As indicated in Table 8.2, predicted electricity 
+
 (4) 
 per mont nd it woul increase to 82 kWh pe






ption for the nonpoor is substantially higher than for poor households in all 
scenarios. Similarly, it is higher for unmetered than for metered households. The change 
in electricity consumption predicted by the model implies an average overall arc price 
elasticity of -0.69. 
Table 8.2 Predicted winter electricity consumption by scenario (kWh/mon





price and 50% 
Current price and 
current reliability 
50% higher price 
and current 




reliability supply supply higher reliability
Urban 260 168 424 283 151 
Rural 374 246 564 379 251 
Nonpoor 332 216 516 346 204 
Poor 217 142 355 239 149 
Unmetered 317 207 498 335 207 
Metered 294 191 459 
Total 308 201 482 323 193 
307 171 
 
Distribution of electricity consumption predicted by the model for all households, 
assumi
parable to revealed preference 
data. 
ng all households are metered, is similar to the distribution of actual electricity 
consumption from Barmek company records for metered households in Baku as well as 
imputed electricity consumption based on reported hourly usage of electricity (Figure 
8.1). Thus, although actual electricity consumption data were not included in model 












Figure 8.1 Comparison of model’s predictions with actual electricity consumption. 
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Note: The first histogram describes the distribution of actual electricity consumption from Barmek utility 
company records for metered households in Baku (calc lated as the monthly utility company’s bill divided by 
electricity price). The second histogram describes the istribution of imputed electricity consumption using 
information on reported hourly usage of electric applian s in the current price and reliability scenario. The third 
histogram describes the distribution of predicted electric y consumption in current price and reliability scenario. 
Predictions are based on Model C estimated in chapter . Source: 2003 Household Energy Survey and Barmek 










The key policy issue in the process of designing the reform strategy is to identify 
households that would gain and lose from the reforms. In general, households are 
unequivocally worse-off from a price increase, and they are universally better-off with an 
improvement in the supply quality. But overall, some categories of households may 
experience welfare gains while others experience losses from a reform that combines a 
price increase with a reliability improvement. Since political concerns for the poor are an 
important factor in implementing reforms, it is important for the government to 
understand the distribution of gains and losses in order to design an effective mitigation 
strategy.  
The welfare effect of a change in electricity price and reliability levels can be 
measured by compensating variation (CV). It is implicitly defined in terms of the indirect 
utility function as 
, 
where p is electricity price and r is reliability of electricity supply. The left-hand side of 
this expression is expected indirect utility after the reform after extracting the CV, and the 
right-hand side is expected indirect utility before the reform.  
Following Just et. al. (2004), the analytical expression for CV can be derived by 
solving the equation that implicitly defines CV in terms of the indirect utility function. 
The level of expected indirect utility before the price and quality change is defined by the 
( , , ) ( , , )V p r Y CV V p r Y′′ ′′ ′ ′− =
expression for the homothetic translog indirect utility function derived in chapter 6, with 
electricity price and shares of time in each regime evaluated at their pre- and post-reform 
levels using parameter estimates reported in chapter 7. This derivation, as detailed in the 
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Appendix to this chapter, results in the following definition of CV as a percent of total 
consumption expenditures:44
1 2/ 1 ,Z ZCV Y e −= −  
where 
( ){ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
2
1 log / log / log / 0.5 log / 0.5 log /
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mic welfare implications of reform 
As shown in Figures 8.2-8.5, welfare effects are heterogeneous. It appears that higher 
income households stand to have the highest losses from a price increase that is 
unaccompanied by a quality improvement. At a first glance, gains from an improvement 
in reliability seem to be slightly higher for the poor households. In every instance the 
gains and losses are widely dispersed even for households at the same income level. The 
 
44 A more detailed derivation of this result is shown the Appendix. 
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gains from the restoration of perfect supply by far outweigh the losses from a 50 percent 
price increase (Figure 8.4), although there are some losers in the scenario of a higher 
price increase and lower reliability improvement (Figure 8.5).  
In every reform scenario, the welfare level of some households is not affected by 
the electricity price change and reliability improvement. It is likely that these households 
have a reliable gas supply and for this and other reasons their electricity consumption was 
very low and would continue to remain low in the reform scenario. The simulated 
positive or negative welfare impact on the remaining households is not very large. The 
losses never exceed 1 percent of total expenditures. The gains have a greater range of 
e households gain almost as much as 3 percent of total expenditures 
(Figure 8.4), even though the scenario of perfect supply reliability and no price increase 
is not realistic. The relatively low magnitude of the gains and losses is plausible, because, 
as shown in chapter 4, electricity expenditures also constitute a small share of total 
expenditures. However, the findings with respect to the losses and gains of the poor 
versus non-poor should be interpreted with some caution, keeping in mind that the 
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Source: calculated from 2003 Household Energy Survey. 
As shown in Table 8.3, in Scenario 2 of a 50 percent electricity price increase all 
households experience welfare losses. The absolute value of the losses is below one 
percent of total household income. The losses are somewhat higher for rural households 
compared to urban households and there are strong regional differences. The differences 
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by income level, for example, across incom ery small. The most distinct 
differen .45 As 
expected, households in category 3, which never receive network gas and receive very 
little electricity, are unaffected by the price change of electricity. Conversely, households 
in category 1 (with a reliable gas supply), and in category 2 (without a reliable supply of 
gas but a reliable supply of electricity) experience losses form a price increase, and there 
are mitigated by the quality improvement in Scenario 4 but not in Scenario 5. 
Table  8.3 Compensating variation of three reform scenarios (% of household budget) 
  Scenario 2
e quintiles, are v










Scenario 4:  





100% price increase 
and 50 percent 
quality 
improvement 
Urban -0.08 1.89 1.62 -0.03 
Rural -0.33 1.64 0.9 -0.05 
Nonpoor -0.2 1.74 1.34 -0.06 
Poor -0.24 1.94 1.24 0.03 
Unmetered -0.26 1.82 1.19 -0.04 
Metered -0.11 1.74 1.51 -0.05 
Zone 1 (Absheron Peninsula) -0.06 1.7 1.59 -0.05 
Zone 2 (North) -0.3 1.77 1.01 -0.03 
Zone 3 (South) -0.28 1.79 1.09 -0.05 
Zone 4 (Mingechevir and Ganja) -0.09 2.05 1.66 0.01 
Poorest 20% -0.24 1.94 1.24 0.03 
Quintile 2 -0.21 1.75 1.31 -0.01 
Quintile 3 -0.19 1.62 1.34 -0.02 
Quintile 4 -0.16 1.9 1.44 -0.08 
Richest 20% -0.23 1.7 1.26 -0.12 
Category 1 -0.75 0.39 1.1 -0.07 
Category 2 -0.35 1.61 0.83 -0.05 
Category 3 0 2.86 2.08 0 
Total -0.04 -0.21 1.79 1.32 
 
                                                 
gas supply at least some of the time or they had electricity supply more than 90 percent of the time before 
percent of the time. Households in category 3 never have gas supply and have electricity supply less than 
20 percent of the time. 
45 Three categories were defined to reflect the reliability of network energy. Households in category 1 have 
the reform. Households in category 2 never have gas supply, and have electricity supply between 20 and 90 
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On average, all households experience welfare gains of about 1.79 percent of total 
income as supply interruptions are eliminated (Scenario 3). A combined price increase 
and reliability improvement in Scenario 4 results in a welfare gains for all household 
categories, although they are clearly lower in magnitude than the gains from a supply 
improvement in the absence of a price increase. Households in category 3, who presently 
have a very poor supply of electricity, experience the highest welfare gains from a 
reliability improvement, and therefore also the highest gains from the combined price and 
A particularly important question co
alternative reform scenarios is identifica ou ill ly 
d by the reforms (Table 8
 8.4 Number of households ain and l m the reform, by district. 
 rio 4 rio 5 
 Gain (or no ) 1/ L Gain (o fect)  1/ 
reliability change. 
in the urse of a welfa
seholds who w
re evaluation of 
be adversetion of h
affecte .4).  
Table  that g ose fro
Scena Scena
 effect ose r no ef Lose 







 90 9 
Baku 361 24 
Sumgayit 5 1 145 1 




 Sabirabad and Imishly
1 0 201 0 
Ismailly 1 1 118 74 
Goycay 5 23 116 82 
Zone 3:
Imishly 15 15 
d 18
ingechevir and Ganja C
5 155 15 
Sabiraba 5 0 166 19 
Zone 4: M ity
Mingechevir 73 0 
nj ity 14
     
Total 1,733 64 1,573 224 
0 73 
Ga a C 8 0 148 0 
      Note: The category of “gainers” in this table also includes households with zero CV. 
 
As shown in Table 8.4, only 63 households experience welfare losses in Scenario 
4 of a combined price and reliability change, but the number of losers triples in Scenario 
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5 of a 
n Azerbaijan. Therefore, I proceed with detailing a profile of the 
vulnera
able. As shown in Table 8.5, vulnerable households 
are  located in fuel 
wood scarce reas in per of all the losers living in this part of the 
cou
Tab n values for househ ho gain and e from the refo cenario 5). 1/ 




higher price increase and a lower reliability improvement. Although according to 
the model nearly all households would experience welfare gains in the reform scenario, 
small changes in the assumptions about the magnitude of the price increase, supply 
reliability and payment enforcement can result in welfare losses for the vulnerable group, 
as indicated by Scenario 5.  
In both scenarios the adversely affected households tend to be located in a few 
areas: Goycay, Ismailly and Baku. However, the 2003 HES does not include households 
from all districts i
ble households according to their demographic characteristics and energy supply 
conditions. For the purposes of this analysis, households that experience losses in 
Scenario 5 are defined here as vulner
 equally likely to be located in rural and urban areas, but they tend to be
 a the South, with 70 cent 
ntry.  
le 8.5 Mea olds w  los rm (S




Dem  characteristics and inographic come structure:    
Hou 4.4 4.8 sehold size** 3.8 
Num 0.65 72 ber of children in a family* 0. 0.39 
Chi  10 as a share of hou ze 0.13 13 ldren under sehold si 0. 0.08 
Em d size 0.07 05 ployed persons as a share of househol 0. 0.20 
Hou 0.90 0.98 se (dummy)** 0.32 
Livi m2)** 68 75 ng area (total 53 
Sha  from salaries** 0.18 10 re of income 0. 0.41 
Sha come from pensions 0.26 27 re of in 0. 0.22 
Sha come from remittances  transfers)** 0.05 13 re of in (private  0. 0.11 
807,735 Total monthly consumption expenditures** 1,089,644 717,745 
    
Energy use and appliance ownership:    
Electric stove (dummy)* 0.10 0.05 0.11 
Electric oven (dummy) 0.35 0.38 0.20 
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Electric space heater (dummy) 0.25 0.29 0.33 
Wood stove (dummy)* 0.75 0.88 0.12 
Heat with electricity (dummy) 0.26 0.31 0.36 
Cook with electricity (dummy) 0.32 0.34 0.22 
Heat with gas (dummy)* 0.02 0.00 0.97 
Heat with wood (dummy)** 0.75 0.88 0.12 
Use dummy variables:    
    LPG 0.50 0.54 0.13 
    Kerosene** 0.87 0.98 0.51 
    Dung** 0.10 0.25 0.00 
    Network gas - - 1.00 
    Electricity 0.99 0.99 1.00 
    Wood** 0.76 0.89 0.13 
    
Location (dummy variables):    
Rural  0.83 0.85 0.05 
Region 1 (Absheron Peninsula: includes main cities)** 0.15 - 0.61 
Region 2 (Northern areas: rich in forest cover)** 0.15 0.50 0.02 
Region 3 (South: fuel wood scarce areas)** 0.70 0.43 0.18 
Region 4 (West: Ganja and Mingechev cities)** - 0.07 0.18 
    
Quality of energy supply and other indicators:    
Payment ratio (previous month's payment/bill) 0.49 0.55 0.51 
Average village/town payment ratio 0.59 0.60 0.54 
Metered (dummy)** 0.22 0.12 0.63 
Average hours of gas supply (winter) - - 20 
Average hours of electricity supply (winter)** 16 9 19 
Electricity price (Manat per oil equivalent) 953 1,033 1,051 
0.31 Pre-reform share of time in regime 1 (gas regime) - - 
Pre-reform share of time in regime 2 (electricity 
regime)** 0.68 0.37 - 
Share of time in regime 2 in Scenario 5** 1.00 0.74 - 
    
Other:    
Imputed** 0.82 0.70 0.73 
Compensating variation as percent of total 
expenditures** -0.46 0.05 - 
Total energy expenditures (Manat/month)** 5  6  0,147 1,485 2  4,946
Energy as a share of total expenditures* 0.05 0.10 0.04 
Poor (dummy)** 0.08 0.43 0.10 
Note: 1/ The results are for a total of 1,797 households for wh odel was estimated. Com ing 
ining 203 households with mi a. Signi difference b n 
s indi  “**” if d nt at one pe evel, 
ficant findings is that the average income level in the 
,089,644 Manat per month) is tantially er than th  the 
om the m pensat
variation is missing for the rema ssing dat ficant etwee
summary statistics for the losers and gainers categories i cated by iffere rcent l
and by “*” if different at five percent level. 
 
One of the most signi  
vulnerable group (1  subs high at of
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non-vulnerable group (717,745 Manat per mon and this ome difference is 
e finding that the share of the poor am the losers is low is 
uch lower poverty rate amo e losers rcent) tha ong 
ent). 
 distinguishing characteristics of the adversely affected group of households 
r incidence of fuel wood and dung. There is a higher share of
s in the group of vulnerable households, and all of th e in the icity 
a 50 percent reliability improvement in Scenario 5 in contrast to 
the lo group also ad a highe rage 
ctricity supply (16 versus 9 hours on a typical 
e (hypothetical) electricity price is lower for the 
es do not appear to be related to the magnitude of 
 On average, the losers have a lower share of energy in 
re are very few differences in the income ture 
 are the lower share of remittances (private 
ld members) and a slightly higher share of income 
s a slightly lower share of households living 
 area than in the gainer category.  
losers from the reforms tend to be households who 
households that incur welfare losses from the reforms are not located solely in Baku 
(Table 
th),  inc
statistically significant. Th ong 
also confirmed by a m ng th (8 pe n am
the gainers (43 perc
Other
include lowe  metered 
household em ar electr
regime (Regime 2) after 
the group of the gainers. Prior to the reform, sers’  h r ave
reliability level and daily hours of ele
winter day). Interestingly, the averag
losers than for the gainers, so their loss
the stated price increase alone.
total expenditures than the gainers. The  struc
of the two groups. The only exceptions
transfers from friends and househo
from salaries. Last, the loser category include
in houses and slightly smaller living
To sum up these findings, the 
have relatively poor access to substitutes (gas, wood and dung) and/or households who 
had relatively reliable electricity supply before the reforms. Contrary to expectations, 
8.4). Only 15 percent of all the losers are located on the Absheron Peninsula 
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(including Baku), while another 15 percent are in the forest-rich areas in the North and 70 
percent in forest-poor areas in the South.  
Overall, this comparison of the losers and gains from the reform with the most 
extreme price increase scenario indicates that there is a strong locational determinant in 
the dire
 are more likely to 
be non
ction and magnitude of the welfare impact, but losers will not be confined to one 
geographic area, even though losses appear to be borne mainly by the relatively richer 
households.  
An earlier ex-ante evaluation of the same reforms by the World Bank (2005), that 
did not attempt to quantify welfare gains from a reliability improvement in Azerbaijan, 
concluded that poor households would be particularly vulnerable to the adverse impact of 
pricing reforms. One of the policy recommendations was for the Government of 
Azerbaijan to design a well-targeted social assistance scheme to mitigate the adverse 
effects of the price increase. Welfare gains from improvements in supply reliability were 
deemed to be important for Azeri households but they were not quantified because of a 
lack of clarity about the appropriate methodology. Inclusion of the positive welfare 
impact of these gains using the intermittent supply model reveals that the poor are more 
likely to be the gainers even if a moderate price increase accompanies service quality 
improvements. Furthermore, households that will be adversely affected
-poor. Thus, in this particular situation, a strong policy emphasis and targeted 
investments in improving service reliability can be more effective at protecting 
vulnerable households than income transfers through a social protection scheme.  
The results of these policy simulations demonstrate the need to account for the 
welfare impact of improvements in service quality in the course of cost-benefit analysis 
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of infrastructure reforms in situations where reforms are expected to result in both a price 
increase and a reliability improvement.  
The actual welfare impact may diverge from the simulations presented here to 
some extent. With uninterrupted supply some of these households, especially those who 
are in the vulnerable category, may adjust to the price change by purchasing more 
efficient appliances. Higher average income in the loser group suggests that this is a 




old category. Investigating this possibility calls for further analysis but it requires 
further data on appliance costs and purchase decisions, which were not available in the 
surveys used in this dissertation. 
Payment enforcement  
No scenario of stricter payment enforcement is included in this chapter because raising 
payment enforcement by a certain percentage of the historical enforcement rate is 
equivalent to raising price by the same percentage in this model. For example, improving 
payment enforcement by 50 percent is equivalent to raising the nominal price by 50 
percent, which is a policy outcome that is modeled in Scenario 2. In practice, the decision 
to accumulate payment arrears is endogeneous. Thorough analysis of this issue would 
require detailed information on payment rates with sufficient variability for a 
representative sample of metered households in each geographic zone. These data were 
not available, as metering for electricity has been introduced mainly in the Barmek 
service area on the Absheron Peninsula. Household behavior with respect to bill p
mportant issue of policy concern that could be revisited after detailed data on 
electricity consumption for metered households become available. 
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Conclusions 
Policy simulations in this chapter clearly show that gains from an improvement in the 
reliabil
sers tend to be the nonpoor, who can be broadly divided 
first category consists of households residing in areas with good 
substitute sources of 
ity of electricity supply outweigh the losses in a range of possible policy scenarios. 
Combining pricing reforms with an improvement in service quality is a very effective 
way of mitigating the losses that would result from implementing pricing reforms without 
a concurrent quality improvement.  
Even in an extreme case of a partial improvement in reliability and doubling of 
electricity prices, there are few losers. Contrary to expectations, only a small share of 
them are located in Baku and other large cities. The main finding of the policy 
simulations is that the reform’s lo
into two categories. The 
supply of gas and relatively good electricity supply prior to the reforms. The second 
category includes the majority of the losers, and consists of households who have poor 
access to substitutes, such as in the forest-poor areas in the South of Azerbaijan. Since the 
group of adversely affected households includes very few poor households, targeted 
social protection measures may not need to accompany the reforms. However, it is 
crucial that the supply quality improve substantially in order to ensure that there are few 
losers.  
The provision of network gas will be an effective mitigation strategy. As seen in 
this analysis, the loser category does not include any households with reliable gas supply. 
To the extent that the residential gas prices will also rise in the course of the reforms, the 
simulations in this chapter present a partial view of the reform’s welfare impact. Policy 
makers will need to evaluate the availability of electricity and 
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energy as well as their cost relative to household income in order to select areas for 
targeted investments to improve the quality of energy services. A strong location-specific 
determinant that underlies the observed energy consumption patterns of Azeri households 





Appendix to chapter 8:  
using the indirect utility function 
CV can be implicitly defined in terms of the expected indirect utility function before and 
after the change in price and reliability as follows: 
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Using the definition of CV in terms of the indirect utility function results in the following 
expression:  
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By definition, CV is negative for a welfare loss and positive for a welfare gain.  
This expression is used in chapter 8 to calculate compensating variation of a price and/or 
reliability change. 
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This dissertation has developed a new approach to enable policy-makers to analyze 
welfare gains from improvements in the quality of public water and energy supply in 
developing countries. With the tight budgetary constraints that usually exist, it is 
important to be able to prioritize public sector investments on the basis of expected 
fits. However, policy analysts are rarely able to measure the benefits of improving 
the quality of infrastructure services, even though they are a large component of the 
overall welfare impact. The most frequently cited reason for failures to carry out such 
welfare analysis is the scarcity of data on service quality.  
Major contributions 
The main contribution of this dissertation is a new model of welfare evaluation of 
changes in the quality of infrastructure services for the case of limited data availability. 
The model can be estimated using existing data from household energy surveys or data 
from the energy sections of multi-purpose household surveys. It uses a structural 
approach that fits the common case of intermittent supply in developing countries and 
accommodates missing data that is commonly generated by intermittent supply. It permits 
the use of common second-order flexible forms for estimating the demand for the 
essential household services of utilities. But it also permits the sensible modeling of weak 
complementarity for specific market goods used to produce household services by 
explicitly modeling the household technology. This approach makes possible the use of 
engineering data on household energy conversion coefficients, which enable more precise 
estimation of the key economic parameters that reflect tastes (note the superior 
significance of estimated coefficients).  
bene
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Potential applications of this model range from ex-ante reform evaluation to ex-
post monitoring of policy outcomes. Broad applicability and modest data requirements 
make this approach a useful contribution to policy analysis and to the literature on 
welfare evaluation of quality changes in infrastructure. 
An application of the proposed model in the former Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan 
demonstrates how this approach can be used in welfare assessment of energy sector 
reforms. Another novelty of the approach used in this dissertation is the combined use of 
revealed and stated preference data in order to examine the welfare implications of price 
and reliability changes that differ drastically from observed historical data. The reforms 
that have recently been initiated will have far-reaching poverty and distributional 
consequences for the country because they result in both an improvement in supply 
reliability and an increase in energy prices. Similar reforms in Armenia and Georgia, the 
other two countries in the Caucasus region, have largely failed and resulted in social 
unrest when electricity prices hikes were not matched by an improvement in the quality 
of electricity supply. This underscores the importance of including welfare evaluation of 
quality changes in the overall assessment of reforms before their implementation. 
Estimation results in this dissertation strongly indicate that households in the 
areas with poor supply quality have a high willingness to pay for reliability 
improvements. However, low income households with little access to substitute energy 
sources stand to incur substantial welfare losses from an electricity price increase, and 
poverty in the country may rise. A reform scenario with a modest 50 percent price 
increase would result in average welfare losses of less than one percent of total household 
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expenditures. However, they would be higher for further price increases as shown by the 
scenario of a partial reliability improvement and the doubling of electricity prices.  
In reality the reforms are likely to result in a substantially higher price increase 
over time to reach the cost recovery level, so that the estimate of the losses in this thesis 
is a conservative estimate. The best way to mitigate the adverse effect of the price 
increase will be to improve reliability. Although this is an obvious fact, policy makers 
have not set clear reform targets for improving service quality. For political reasons, the 
political establishment is still hesitant to admit to what extent supply interruptions are a 
problem in many parts of Azerbaijan and to set quality targets. As shown in this 
dissertation, the welfare gains to households from a reliability improvement would be in 
the range of 1.5 to 2 percent of total household expenditures.  
Qualifications and further research 
The estimated welfare effects in this dissertation are likely conservative estimates of the 
gains for many reasons. The estimates exclude the secondary benefits that households 
would experience from a more favorable business environment, improved reliability of 
water supply where pumped irrigation is used, better health services, education and the 
positive environmental externalities. To some extent the losses will be mitigated by 
income growth in the economy if the quality of electricity supply improves and the gains 
are higher than estimated in this dissertation. Such gains may result from the general 
equilibrium effects that were not included in the overall welfare measure in this approach. 
For example, a series of recent case studies reveal that the gains from improving supply 
reliability for energy services are likely to significantly outweigh the losses from a price 
increase in the agricultural sector in Azerbaijan (World Bank 2004). In addition, 
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households will experience gains from improvements in the quality of health services and 
education. Gains of this type were shown to be very high for electrification projects in 
other parts of the world (World Bank 2002). 
Further, environmental benefits will result from a decreasing pressure on forest 
resources and an improvement in indoor and outdoor air pollution in the areas that 
heavily rely on fuel wood and kerosene. As discussed in chapter 4, households in 
Azerbaijan do not appear to be aware of the extent to which fuel wood consumption 
increases the risk of respiratory illness in children. Thus, improved health outcomes 
would be an additional positive externality of a more reliable electricity or gas supply. 
Since all of these components were omitted in the calculation of the welfare gains from a 
reliability improvement, the estimate of the welfare gains should be interpreted as a 
conservative estimate of the overall gains of a reform program that would result from 
establishing a reliable electricity supply. 
Survey evidence also shows that, although households may incur sizable welfare 
losses from indoor air pollution when they rely on traditional fuels, they do not recognize 
indoor air pollution as a strong factor contributing to the high incidence of respiratory 
illness among fuel wood users. Therefore, policy interventions that improve the reliability 
of modern energy sources should be combined with an information campaign about the 
health effects of fuel wood use if they are to result in significant benefits in this country.  
 Two further aspects of the modeling approach in this dissertation should be 
pointed out in conclusion. First, the appliance base was assumed to be fixed, so the 
analysis is short-run analysis. Any scenario that substantially increases the electricity 
price is likely to induce a change in appliances over time. In turn, that could lead to 
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increased use of more efficient appliances that will reduce the welfare effects of the 
higher prices. Furthermore, increasing reliability of electricity is also likely to induce 
switching to more efficient appliances and eliminate the need to have backup appliances. 
Any complete, longer-run analysis of reforms must consider these factors, but such 
analysis will require further surveys designed to generate data on appliance purchases. 
Second, there is a tradeoff between flexibility versus specificity in modeling the 
household technology and the ability to identify the economic behavioral parameters. The 
modeling approach adopted in this dissertation imposes a very specific structure on the 
household technology. The rigid modeling structure allows proceeding with model 
estimation even in the presence of missing data on prices and consumption levels of some 
fuels. While this approach enables identification of the parameters that are important for 
policy analysis, it limits the applicability of the model to situations where the model’s 
assumptions are inappropriate. For example, this model could not be used if there were 
no clear hierarchy of fuel choice dictated by fuel prices and availability as in Azerbaijan, 
or in a situation where appliances are expensive and the need to purchase new appliances 
represents a significant burden to fuel switching. Future modeling efforts of the 
intermittent supply problem would need to take into account household adjustment of the 
stock of appliances and collect comprehensive data to permit welfare evaluation in these 
situations. 
Finally, the policy conclusions based on the empirical findings in this dissertation 
need to be interpreted with some caution as the reliability of the poverty measure have 
been limited by data availability. The information on total household expenditures, which 
has been used in the model estimation and to define the poor and nonpoor households 
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whenever the 2003 HES data were used, were not available in the survey and had to be 
imputed. Thus, for one-quarter of the sample, information on total expenditures was 
available from an earlier 2002 HBS survey, and for three-quarters of the households no 
information was available. The imputation procedure required to predict this variable for 
households with missing information necessarily makes the prediction less accurate for 
the poor than for all other welfare categories. Although we observe very significant 
differences in total expenditures of the reform’s losers and winners, the conclusions could 
be either less or more definitive if some of the households classified as non-poor were 
actually poor. The fact that overall there are very few losers from a reform that ensures a 
reliability improvement reinforces the key conclusion of the policy analysis in this 
dissertation: there is a high willingness to pay for quality improvements in Azerbaijan, 
and as long as the reforms result in a substantial reliability improvement even combined 
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